special issue
U.S. - U.S.S.R.

THE PROGRESSIVE

50 CENTS MARCH 1958

the RUSSIANS and OURSELVES

CHESTER BOWLES
CYRUS S. EATON
HOWARD FAST
LOUIS FISCHER
JOHN GATES
ELEANOR S. LOWMAN
HENRY S. REUSS
DANIEL SCHORR

50th YEAR OF PUBLICATION

Office memo

THE FIRST six weeks of our 50th year of publication brought a sorely needed spurt in contributions to *The Progressive's* Membership Fund. The result is that we are happily able to announce we have now reached our goal of $28,000, thus assuring uninterrupted publication through the year that will complete a full half century of publishing *The Progressive*.

We are busily at work on plans to reduce expenditures wherever possible and to increase revenues, but it's a rough road ahead with costs continuing to rise and a substantial increase in postal rates—one that could hit us severely—in the offing.

•

After many hours of poring over the ledgers, we have come to the conclusion that our one great hope to avoid increasing the Membership goal later this year is to increase our subscription rates. We reached this decision with the greatest reluctance because we know many of our subscribers are pretty hard-pressed themselves.

But we see no alternative. It is eight long years—years in which the cost of everything else has shot sky-high—since *The Progressive* established its present rates. Most other magazines, and all in our field, yielded long ago, and some have raised rates more than once since our last rate increase in 1950.

Effective April 15, the one-year rate will rise from $4 to $5; the two-year price of $7 will become $9; and the three-year rate will change from $10 to $12. The cost of single copies will go up from 35 cents to 50 cents.

We have set April 15 as the effective date for the increase to give subscribers six weeks grace in which to extend their subscription at the old rates. This holds true regardless of when the subscription expires.

•

The April issue, now in preparation, will include articles and reviews by Justice William O. Douglas, Harrison Salisbury, analyst of Soviet affairs for the New York *Times;* Chester Bowles, Professor Fred Rodell of the Yale Law School (on Justice Black's 20 years on the Supreme Court bench), Leonard Kenworthy (a first hand-report, "Exploring the New Africa"), Dr. Max Seham (a survey of the inadequacy of voluntary health insurance), and Kermit Eby (a stern study of labor's need for reform).

•

Twice in recent weeks articles in *The Progressive* were subjects of debate and discussion in Great Britain. Representative Henry S. Reuss' article, "The Hope of Europe," in our April 1957 issue was the topic of debate in the House of Lords, introduced by Lord St. Oswald of Yorkshire. And in Manchester, Norman Amundson used *The Progressive's* special issue on the Middle East (November) "to great advantage" in moderating a symposium on "Power Politics in the Middle East" for Arab and Jewish students in England.

VOLUME 22 NUMBER 3

The P

FOUNDED IN 1909 BY ROBERT M. LaFOLLETTE, Sr.

MARCH, 1958

EDITOR MORRIS H. RUBIN
ASSOCIATE EDITOR MARY SHERIDAN
BUSINESS MANAGER GORDON SINYKIN
ADVERTISING MANAGER JOHN McGRATH
OFFICE STAFF ROSE L. REDISKE, HELEN KLEPPE, DOROTHY BEYLER, BETTY HAMRE, ELEANOR WIND

3 **THE RUSSIANS AND OURSELVES**
CASUALTIES OF THE MISSILE AGE
Editorials
5 **NOTES IN THE NEWS**
6 **THE POWER OF COOPERATION**
Edward P. Morgan
8 **MORE THAN A RACE TO THE MOON**
Chester Bowles
11 **MEETING THE SOVIETS HALFWAY**
Cyrus Eaton
14 **DO WE KNOW WHAT WE ARE AFRAID OF?**
Owen Stratton & Claire Zimmerman
16 **LIFE FOR THE AVERAGE RUSSIAN**
Daniel Schorr
19 **RUSSIA REVISITED**
Louis Fischer
21 **SOVIET AND AMERICAN EDUCATION**
George Fischer
24 **THE CASE OF THE DOCTORED REPORT**
Eleanor S. Lowman
28 **SOVIET CONTRADICTIONS**
George Gibian
32 **SCIENTISTS UNDER FIRE**
Edward U. Condon
34 **TWO WHO TURNED**
John Gates and Howard Fast
41 **FOOTSTEPS TO DEMOCRACY**
Henry Reuss
44 **SOCIALIZED MEDICINE IN THE U.S.S.R.**
Mark G. Field
47 **CHANGING SOVIET TACTICS IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS**
Michel Gordey
50 **WHAT SOVIET CHILDREN ARE TAUGHT ABOUT AMERICA**
Ruth Widmayer
53 **THE PEOPLE'S FORUM**
57 **BOOKS**

THE PROGRESSIVE is published monthly. Copyright 1958 by The Progressive, Inc., 408 West Gorham Street, Madison 3, Wisconsin. Entered as second class matter at the post office, Madison, Wisconsin, under the act of March 3, 1879.

SUBSCRIPTION PRICES: U. S. and foreign—One year $4; Two years $7; Three years $10. Trial subscription (for new subscribers only)—Nine months $2.45. Printed in U.S.A.

50th YEAR OF PUBLICATION

PROGRESSIVE

"YE SHALL KNOW THE TRUTH
AND THE TRUTH SHALL MAKE YOU FREE"

The Russians and Ourselves

THIS SPECIAL issue of *The Progressive*, presented as part of the observance of our Fiftieth Year of publication, is almost wholly devoted to "The Russians and Ourselves." The fifteen articles, written by experts in their fields, tell a sobering story of two giants standing astride our world —and reaching into outer space—and pose a challenge that will be resolved by nothing less than co-existence or co-extinction.

The dominant conclusion that emerges from a reading of recent history, as it unfolds in this issue, is the fact that the Soviets have shattered the Western—largely American—monopoly of power and are moving everywhere with confidence and competence to hammer home their own claims to leadership and equality.

In fields we once thought ourselves supreme—education, science, technology—we now find ourselves crowded into a corner by the giant strides of a nation that a decade ago lay devastated by the Nazi war machine. In areas we once thought ourselves paramount—the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and even Latin America—we find ourselves pressed by a nation which hardly had a friend anywhere ten years ago.

Sputniks I and II merely dramatized, and made credible to an American public long deluded by wishful-thinking press and politicians, the fact that, for all its built-in contradictions, the Soviet system is capable of prodigious feats of invention and production. Our own 30-pound Explorer is whirling away in outer space, but so is Sputnik II—half-a-ton heavier—and it is the latter that underscores the salient fact that the Soviets are moving ahead *at a faster rate* than we are. In fact, Wernher von Braun, technical director of the Army's Ballistic Missile Agency, estimates that only by increasing our rate of progress by 20 per cent for each of the next five years, can we hope to catch up with the Russians by 1963.

But far more important, in our judgment, is the rate of progress the Soviets have achieved in the political and economic phases of the struggle between them and us. No one who reads the reports in this issue of *The Progressive* by Chester Bowles, Michel Gordey, and Representative Henry Reuss, all of whom have recently toured the areas of which they write, can escape the conclusion that the Kremlin has broken our monopoly of power and influence in most of the strategic areas of the world, and is moving ahead, spectacularly, to strengthen its new claim to a role in leadership in a world so long dominated by the West.

Within the Soviet Union, life for the average peasant and worker is hard, often cruelly so, but as Daniel Schorr, CBS correspondent in Moscow, emphasizes in his on-the-spot report in this issue, conditions are measurably better than they were and getting better all the time. No diplomat or correspondent stationed in the Soviet Union that we know about believes for a moment that the Communist system will collapse soon, or that the majority of Russians would like to see the regime overthrown. And yet much of American foreign policy, as preached and practiced by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, is based on the perilous delusion that, given time, the Soviet system will collapse from within.

Herblock in The Washington Post

"Never Laid a Glove on Me. By the Way, Where Am I?"

Dulles, and President Eisenhower who follows his lead, find it comforting to pretend that the Communists are not the government of China, that Russia is not becoming an increasingly significant power in the Middle East, and that the Soviets must yield to our terms for the unification of Germany. But the signs, however much we detest them, multiply almost daily that we no longer exercise paramount power, that we share that power with a potent Communist coalition that refuses to be treated as anything less than an equal. To behave in world affairs as though nothing has happened in the past decade to alter the world power structure is to build American foreign policy on dangerous and self-defeating fantasies. To go on insisting that peace can be achieved only by forcing Soviet acceptance of our package is one of the basic fallacies of American foreign policy, for it ignores altogether the realities of the current, and perhaps long-lasting, stalemate in strength. To refuse to negotiate because we may one day "catch up" with the Russians in ultimate weapons is to doom us and the whole world to an endless arms race which in the end would corrupt and corrode everything we thought we wanted to make secure.

The hard truths that emerge from the articles in this issue—and from all the other realistic reporting on

contemporary world affairs—make it more urgent than ever that we subject our foreign policy to that "agonizing reappraisal" to which Mr. Dulles referred in an altogether different connection. To end the cold war and seek creative solutions to the problems of peace, we must, in the words of Walter Millis, writing recently in the New York *Times* Magazine, "recognize that co-existence means the continued existence of *both* of the two great systems of social and political organization."

It is this recognition, in part, that leads one of America's foremost capitalist-industrialists, Cyrus S. Eaton, to argue so firmly in this issue "The Case for Meeting the Soviets Halfway." When our government embraces that sound counsel, we shall have taken a great stride forward toward developing not panacea pipe-dream answers but tolerable relations with the nation with which we must live together or die together.

Casualties of the Missiles Race

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S budget message and related pronouncements from the White House make it painfully clear that the nation faces a period of retrenchment and retreat in the critical field of social welfare. It is a missile-minded program the President has advanced—and one whose burden will fall most heavily on those least able to bear it.

Mr. Eisenhower spoke earnestly of national sacrifice, but an examination of his fiscal policies underscores the melancholy facts that—

One—The wealthiest in the land will pay no more—for there is no provision whatever for plugging any of the tax loopholes through which great wealth escapes its fair share of taxation.

Two—Home and farm owners will be required to make additional sacrifices—for the President proposes saddling the states and municipalities with obligations currently carried by the national government.

Three—Subsidies to business interests will remain undisturbed.

Four—Grants for assistance to the needy will be sharply reduced.

Perhaps the most alarming development in the Administration's fiscal program is to be found in the field of school construction where we urgently need to wipe out the current deficit of 300,000 classrooms and build the additional 265,000 classrooms that will be needed by 1960. Last year, in his message requesting a $1,300,000,000 school construction program, the President said: "Of all the problems in education, one is *most critical* . . . the critical shortage of classrooms . . ." This year the President dropped proposed federal aid to classroom construction altogether, tossing the burden over to home-owners on the local and state levels.

There are other and equally serious casualties in the President's new budget. The public housing program is slashed; funds for the assistance of the needy, the aged, the blind, the mentally retarded, the severely crippled, and dependent children are reduced; payments to farmers are cut; funds for hospital construction are tapered off; public works will be abandoned despite the disturbing rise in unemployment; land reclamation, power, and flood control projects are to be drastically decreased with no new starts on any project; and vocational education and urban waste-removal programs are to be dumped on the state and local governments.

These assistance programs bear the entire brunt of the economy drive dictated by the demand for more money for missiles. None of the subsidies going to business interests is disturbed—those that go to the ship builders and ship owners, the big silver interests, the wool growers and the beet sugar growers, the bankers, and the oil interests. In a period of deepening recession only the needy are singled out for sacrifice in the $600,000,000 economy wave.

Herblock in The Washington Post

"It's Just That We Can't Afford the Money"

One might have expected a spontaneous howl from the Democrats when this program that is not modern, but medieval, Republicanism was presented. Except for a few distinguished exceptions, however, Democrats had little or nothing to say.

Outside of Congress the Democrats, through their Advisory Council, an arm of the Democratic National Committee, viewed the Eisenhower program with concern, but only in the most cautious terms. When the Advisory Council closed its post-budget message deliberations, there were platitudes aplenty, but no militant call to action in specific areas. Typical of the great straddle which accommodates Democrats of clashing viewpoints was the Council's timorous call for "renewed consideration" by Congress of civil rights legislation.

This meant one thing to some Democrats, quite another to others—precisely the end desired. New York's Governor Harriman, for example, thought the statement meant a call to Congress to act in the present session on civil rights legislation. But Paul M. Butler, chairman of the Democratic National Committee, was more of the opinion that what the statement meant was that "whenever Congress in its ordinary procedures can take it up" would be soon enough.

In Congress, a few eloquent Democratic voices were raised against specific areas of retrenchment in the budget, but there was no organized expression of revolt or anything to indicate that the party in control of Congress—the party of the New Deal and the Fair Deal—would do serious battle against the President's plan to extract a few more missiles out of the hides of the needy, the aged, the homeless, and the hungry.

In the peaceful struggle of competitive co-existence with the Soviet Union, part of our task is to aid the underprivileged peoples of the world to harness their resources for better living standards that would enable them to resist the Soviet Union's programs of economic penetration and political subversion. But another and equally important requirement is that

we raise living standards here at home so that we can demonstrate to the uncommitted millions of humanity the superiority of our free way of life.

We are backing away from our greatest source of strength in the struggle of competitive co-existence when we embark on the to-hell-with-the-general-welfare program presented by President Eisenhower. For if there is anything that is dramatic, inspiring, and hopeful that we have to offer the great mass of humanity still shopping around for a way of life, it is the concept that free men working under a free government and a free economy can provide a fuller measure of social justice, economic security, and human dignity than can the regimented society of Soviet Russia.



The Arrogant Mr. Acheson

We have always been of two minds about Dean Acheson, who was Secretary of State under President Truman. He has seemed to us a man of cool competence and strong conviction, who speaks with great clarity and writes like an angel. But along with these admirable qualities we have always been bothered by, quite apart from our frequent disagreement with his views, streaks of petulance and arrogance which have made him a lesser man than he might have been.

Acheson recently took it upon himself to set the world straight about George F. Kennan's qualifications to speak for the Democratic Party. Kennan, former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union and chief of the State Department's Planning and Policy Division under Acheson, had delivered a series of six lectures over the BBC which greatly fired the imagination of the people of Europe.

Among other things, Kennan proposed the neutralization of a unified Germany and the withdrawal of American and Soviet troops from continental Europe as a start on the road toward breaking the East-West deadlock. Acheson sneeringly dismissed some of Kennan's affirmative policies as "utter rubbish" and hastened to assure "bemused Europeans" that Kennan wasn't speaking for the Democratic Party.

Kennan, of course, hadn't pretended to speak for anyone but himself. He was laying down no American policy; he was seeking to let some fresh air into a room gone stale and musty with the negative concepts of Dulles-Acheson rigidity. Curiously enough, when Acheson spoke he had no authority to speak for the Democratic Party, although his words gave the impression that his was a quasi-official if not wholly official disclaimer by the Party. In fact, few Americans realized that Acheson's statement was sponsored by the American Council on Germany, Inc., a private organization dominated by officials of the Chase Manhattan Bank who are hardly interested in a unified Germany that would almost certainly be a Social Democratic Germany.

Hopeful Leadership

Acheson's outburst at Kennan symbolized, in a way, the dreary approach of the Democratic Party to matters of foreign policy. For the most part Democrats in and out of Congress cheerfully snipe away at Secretary of State Dulles, but few if any in positions of power have cared to cross swords with him by proposing basic alternatives to the inflexible dogmas embraced by Dulles. Few Democrats in Congress cared to speak up to make it clear that Acheson's sarcastic negativism did not represent their views.

In neither his statement nor his new book, *Power and Diplomacy*, does Acheson have anything to offer by way of foreign policy except arms and more arms and still more arms. He is critical of Dulles. Thus: "On one thing only I feel a measure of assurance—on the rightness of contempt for sanctimonious self-righteousness, which, joined with sly worldliness, beclouds the dangers and opportunities of our time with an unctuous film." But this is purely personal; nowhere is there a head-on collision with Dulles' position, and indeed there can't be, for Acheson doesn't greatly disagree with the Dulles policies.

This holds true for most Democrats in Congress too. Happily not all, however. A band of Young Turks in the House, under the leadership of Wisconsin's Representative Henry S. Reuss, has been pleading for affirmative alternatives to the sterile course currently being pursued. And Minnesota's Hubert Humphrey, who has worked long and tirelessly on the Disarmament Subcommittee, is asserting hopeful leadership in the Senate. Recently he had the good sense to speak out against our pious insistence on a package deal for peace, arguing in a notable speech in the Senate that we might try to show our good faith by negotiating one proposal at a time.

Then & Now

We can remember, when we were young, how the ideological ancestors of right-wing publications like *U.S. News & World Report* would carry the most doleful warnings that New Deal and Fair Deal legislation would destroy our free enterprise system. The other day *U.S. News & World Report* reassured the free enterprise system that its present recession could not snowball into a depression. The reason? Those very New Deal and Fair Deal measures that were once thought to doom American business.

"Don't worry about another depression like that of the 1930's," *U.S. News* etc. sang out cheerfully. "Safeguards are built in this time." Bank failures? Poosh! There's the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (once regarded as one step removed from communism). Stock-market crash? Not a chance. There are many government regulations (once denounced as foreign importations designed to strangle the investment business). Mass layoffs? Perhaps, but there is that cozy cushion of unemployment compensation (once thought to be Red Russia's secret weapon against American capitalism). Farm collapse? Not this time; prices may be below their peak but they are now protected directly by government subsidies (once, and still widely, regarded

The Power of Cooperation

by EDWARD P. MORGAN

This article is adapted from one of Mr. Morgan's nightly commentaries on the news sponsored by the AFL-CIO—in our judgment one of the most distinguished programs of news analysis on any network.—THE EDITORS.

By now almost everybody must have heard or read about what happened to tow-headed, six-year-old David Fleming, Jr., of Queens Village, New York. He died, but he didn't.

David had a defect in his aorta. At a point where this big vessel descends through the chest to carry the heart's blood to the lower body, the aorta was puckered to a narrow channel. This caused a dangerous swelling, as if from a crimp in a thin garden hose. The problem: to replace the diseased section with a piece of healthy tissue from the aorta of a dead man—an extremely delicate and risky operation even if everything went perfectly.

Things did not go perfectly. Surgeons at St. Francis Hospital in Roslyn, Long Island, found the aorta had already sprung a leak and the blood had clotted outside it. After David had been on the operating table two hours the leak burst. The boy began bleeding to death; his heart stopped. Instantly, the chief resident surgeon took the heart in his two hands and began massaging it in an effort to keep the blood flowing to David's upper body, especially the brain. For nearly three hours doctors took turns at this tense, tender exercise while the operating team worked with desperate efficiency on the broken aorta. The six-pint supply of David's type O Rh-negative blood was used up in transfusions. An urgent call had been broadcast for more. It arrived just in time. Fourteen pints were needed in all.

Finally, the last stitch was made. The resident surgeon, Dr. Raj Mahajan, stared at the still heart pressed between his hands. "One moment," he recalls now, "it was a flabby, dead organ. Suddenly it swelled alive—strong, firm and pumping steadily." Today David Fleming is alive and convalescing, thanks not just to rare good fortune and brilliant surgery but to an unmeasurable kind of power of cooperation that can, when mobilized, cut through human obstacles to demonstrate that man is still a more marvelous mechanism than any machine or missile he has yet invented.

Dr. Mahajan is a 30-year-old Hindu from India who came here in 1951 on a Fulbright fellowship. The surgical director of St. Francis, Dr. Edgar P. Mannis, who was in charge of the operation, and Dr. Edward Braunstein, the chief cardiac surgeon, are Catholics. The assistant cardiologist, Dr. Dorothy Finken, is Jewish. The rest of the medical staff—there were 15 persons directly involved in the operation—included Dr. Rocco Andriello, lately of Italy, Dr. Oliver French, lately of England, and Dr. Thomas Economopoulos, recently of Greece.

St. Francis Hospital, which specializes in cardiac services, has itself an interesting history. Its land was donated by a Quaker, the hospital was planned by a Jew, the present medical director is a Protestant, and the head of surgery a Catholic.

But the deeply wonderful fact about this story, it seems to me, is that underneath their many skins, men are capable of pooling their efforts in vast achievement. And if they can revive a heartbeat, what is there, really, that they cannot do, if they are moved to?

in some quarters, as a sinister conspiracy to penalize the consumer and enrich the farmer).

These are some of the reasons, we are told, why "1958 will not be another 1929." And they laughed at Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman when they said they wanted to do nothing more radical than to save American free enterprise from destroying itself!

International Spitballs

American foreign policy—inspired by the "wisest and most dedicated man" President Eisenhower said he knows—seems to have a built-in gift for making us look silly. Mr. Dulles' passion for keeping the Communists in their place gets us into "queer and unbelievable" positions at times, according to Dr. Warren Weaver, vice president of the Rockefeller Foundation, board member of the government's National Science Foundation, and past president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

Dr. Weaver was complaining about the State Department's weird rules restricting visits of Communist scientists on diplomatic and security grounds. It seems that a Russian scientist, if he can crash our pearly gates at all, may visit the Massachusetts Institute of Technology with its vast store of important scientific activities, but he may not go to the Harvard Medical School "because that is across the line in Boston and Boston has been ruled out of bounds."

"This sort of petty retaliation raises questions concerning our standards of national dignity," Dr. Weaver said. "Is it necessary for us to throw silly little international spitballs because someone else does?"

Sillier Still

If you soon begin to get the impression that Moscow has become the scientific capital of the world, you can also thank Mr. Dulles. Two of the most important of the many international scientific meetings that will be held in Moscow in 1958 are those of the International Astronomical Union and the special committee for the International Geophysical Year. American scientists dearly wanted both these prizes for the United

States, but Mr. Dulles has a rule that made this impossible.

Lloyd B. Berkner, member of the President's Scientific Advisory Committee, president of the International Council of Scientific Unions, and a member of the executive committee of the American Committee for the International Geophysical Year, tells why in the current *Foreign Affairs:*

"It has always been the rule of international, non-governmental organizations that any bona fide scientific group from any country would be recognized. This tradition has been accepted by American scientists because it keeps politics out of science.

"The People's Republic of China is represented by its Academy of Science. Since no truly international organization can accept an invitation to meet in any country that excludes some of its members, our ban on the entry of Communist scientists into the United States prevents any meetings of such organizations from being held in this country."

The result, said Berkner of the rule laid down by the "wisest man" the President knows, "is to increase the importance of Moscow as a scientific capital and on occasion to isolate American scientists unless they will travel to Moscow. This type of dictation by the Department of State serves neither the purpose of American foreign policy nor American science."

Competition

The foregoing may sound like pretty silly stuff, but it would be a grave mistake to assume that the State Department has an *absolute* monopoly on this sort of thing. Two leading scientists, for example, testified the other day that seven different government agencies translated the same non-secret Russian report—and then proceeded to stamp it "Secret."

The scientists' testimony didn't surprise many Americans who have long felt that our government does a better job of keeping things secret from its own people than from the Russians.

That Man Again

We don't enjoy, believe us, jabbing away at Mr. Dulles all the time, especially since it's become so popular.



The Milwaukee Journal

"Ladies and Gentlemen, Held Over by Insistent Popular Demand"

But the man is a positive genius at putting one foot in his mouth while he scampers up the runway of a plane on his other.

Just before dashing off to Turkey recently, the Secretary of State dropped around to tell a House Appropriation Subcommittee about our worsening relations with Canada.

For some time the Canadians have been disturbed by our dumping of farm produce, our restrictive import policies, and our trade and tariff program. In his testimony before the Congressmen Mr. Dulles allowed as how "relations with our good neighbor on the North are not what they should be."

"Why is this, and who is at fault?" Mr. Dulles was asked.

"I should say," said the Secretary of State, "that most of the difficulty is due to the inexperience of the present Canadian government in handling diplomatic relations."

We have heard a diplomat characterized as an honest man sent abroad to lie for his country, but we have never known one before who went out of his way to slander the nearest and dearest friend of the government he serves.

Southern Justice

Usually a heading of this kind might mean more bad news, but that's not the case here. In fact, this is the kind of Southern justice we dream about. Claude Cruell is colored. He owns 100 acres near Greenville, S.C., and has a penniless tenant, Sherwood Turner—a white man. Turner had to go to the hospital to be with his sick wife, but there was no one to take care of the children. Cruell and his wife offered to baby-sit and their offer was accepted.

For this simple act of kindness the Ku Klux Klan decided to teach Cruell a lesson. He had ranged beyond his station by aspiring to associate with and act like white folks. The Kluxers beat Cruell to a pulp.

But this time the cowardly hoodlums were arrested and tried. An all-white jury in the Deep South found two of them guilty of conspiracy and assault and battery and two others with conspiracy. A Southern judge gave the leader six years at hard labor, his chief aide three years, and the others a year.

Northern Justice

For all its moralizing, the North's skirts are far from tidy on the subject of race relations, as *The Progressive* has often emphasized. That's why we hail two modest but perhaps precedent-setting developments in recent weeks:

- Mohawk Airlines, bless 'em, announced the appointment of the nation's first Negro stewardess, Ruth Carol Taylor.

- The American Nursing Association reported considerable progress toward racial integration in the nursing profession during the past year. Examples: one state nursing association secured "no discrimination" clauses in 12 hospital contracts; three state associations reported that requests for photographs of applicants had been eliminated from professional application forms; another state group was able to persuade an employer to remove the qualification "white" from its advertisement.

- And then, still on the hopeful side, there is a survey in Madison, Wis., that disclosed what happened in one case to property values when a Negro moved into an all-white community: *nothing*. After a stormy debate three years ago, the cooperative suburb of Crestwood opened its gates to a Negro family. Despite dire predictions of collapse in values, a survey by the Governor's Commission on Human Rights three years afterward shows the property values in Crestwood are the same as the general price trends in the area.

More Than a Race to the Moon

by Chester Bowles

This article is adapted from Mr. Bowles' absorbing new book, Ideas, People and Peace, *to be published soon by Harpers. Formerly our ambassador to India, where he served with great distinction, Mr. Bowles recently completed another journey through Southeast Asia, the Soviet Union, and Europe. His forthcoming book is based in part on those travels. His other books include* Tomorrow without Fear, Ambassador's Report, The New Dimensions of Peace, Africa's Challenge to America, *and* American Politics in a Revolutionary World.—THE EDITORS

OCTOBER 5, 1957, will be remembered in history. On that day the Soviet Union, a nation which most Westerners had dismissed as industrially and scientifically backward, shot an earth satellite the weight of a good-sized man into outer space.

Instead of being an occasion for rejoicing at a brilliant scientific success, it was an occasion for fear. Armed with nuclear warhead, the rocket which launched Sputnik could destroy New York or Chicago 18 minutes after the button was pushed in Moscow. The military and scientific advantage which we had taken for granted had slipped away and a sense of uncertainty spread across America.

Across the seas the effect of this dazzling Soviet achievement was even more profound. Before October 5 almost no one had questioned America's industrial, military, and scientific superiority. Then suddenly there was Sputnik, ringing the earth, and millions began to ask whether Communism was not the winning side after all.

Sputnik's impact on much of the world was magnified because it followed closely on the heels of the Little Rock conflict. In newsreels and photographs the colored two-thirds of the world who live in Asia and Africa had seen nine dignified young Negro Americans walking toward a public school through lines of jeering whites whose faces were distorted with racial hate.

Were they watching the passing of the land of Jefferson and Lincoln from the position of power and respect which it had held for so long? Were they witnessing at last the Decline of the West? Millions so wondered, some of them bitter and exulting, but many more with a sense of hurt and tragedy.

Those who best understand America, however, saw the dramatic events in the autumn of 1957 not as an end but as a beginning. In Sputnik and Little Rock they saw the shock that was needed to awaken us from our dogmatic slumbers, to replace our complacency with a new sense of proportion, of humility, of determination to be up and doing again.

Knowing our capacity for creative action, they were confident that the result of this national awakening could be nothing but healthy.

America needs more than a sense of urgency, however; it needs a new vision. If we are to achieve this new vision the time has come to examine our relations with the world with blunt new honesty and perspective.

What are the full dimensions of the challenge? What precisely is required of us? Where have we fallen down?

In the last few years American foreign policy has failed, I believe on three counts:

1. It has failed to earn for us the respect and understanding of the people of the world.

2. It has failed to develop the impregnable military defense to which we have largely devoted our resources and our energies.

3. Consequently it has failed to further the prospects for a "just and lasting" peace.

When the war ended in 1945, America stood at the peak of her influence and power. Most of mankind looked to us for leadership, not simply in science and industry, but in their struggle for an increased measure of individual dignity and opportunity.

For several years, with the support of a bipartisan foreign policy coalition in Congress, with bipartisan administration in the executive branch, and with the bipartisan backing of a substantial majority of the American people, that leadership was forthcoming.

We broke with our tradition of isolationism to lay the basis for a full-blown military, political, and economic partnership with Western Europe. Our prodigious wartime efforts there were followed, not simply by defense measures against the possibility of a Soviet invasion, but by the Marshall Plan that laid the political and economic foundations for a new Europe, and by a NATO charter which looked beyond weap-

ons, air bases, and ground forces to the human factors that alone can create an Atlantic Community based on something more lasting than a common fear.

In Asia, Africa, and Latin America we gave freedom to the Philippines; supported the independence of India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, and Indonesia; upheld China's right to sit in the United Nations Security Council; reaffirmed the Good Neighbor Policy south of the Rio Grande; launched the Point Four economic development program; and invited thousands of young people from these awakening continents to come to America for study and training.

This many-sided response to a many-sided challenge provided a fresh and imaginative start toward a new American relationship with a new kind of world. It was geared to the economic, political, and ideological realities of this dynamic era. It was deeply rooted in the American tradition.

How is it, then, that we have allowed the prestige and influence which it gave us to be largely frittered away?

The reason, I believe, is clear: In situation after situation we sacrificed economics, politics, and ideas to military expediency. In our proper pursuit of military security we needlessly allowed ourselves to drift out of touch with the people whose convictions, fears, and hopes, for better or for worse, will shape tomorrow's world.

From its exciting promise of an Atlantic Community NATO has shrunk to become an uncertain military alliance based precariously on the prevailing interpretation of the present danger.

In Asia, Africa, and Latin America, where most of mankind lives and where the struggle between freedom and totalitarianism may ultimately be decided, our approach has been equally narrow.

When we looked to these underdeveloped continents at all it was primarily to seek military allies. We found several, to be sure, but many of the agreements that we made there have placed us in a position of uneasy partnership with the upholders of a doomed and hated status quo. Today we hold their loyalty not because they share with us a common purpose or even a common fear, but because they know that their own privileged positions can be maintained only through American subsidies.

Fitzpatrick in The St. Louis Post-Dispatch

Goal Beyond the Missile Race

In the meantime, the Communists have been busily at work in the villages, bazaars, and factories encouraging the discontent of the people against their right-wing governments, and associating us in the public mind with the money-lenders and absentee landowners who exploit them.

In many key underdeveloped nations the Soviet Union has borrowed the very techniques which we originated, adapted them to their purposes, supported them with budgets far more generous than ours, and turned them against us.

Today, they profess, however cynically, to champion anti-colonial revolutions, national independence, and even to offer such old-fashioned democratic promises as liberty, fraternity, and equality.

They have developed student exchanges to a point where thousands of Asians and Africans now study in Soviet universities. In July, 1957, they invited some one hundred thousand students from over eighty countries to the mammoth World Youth Festival in Moscow.

Borrowing further from our early initiative, the Communists have set up libraries in dozens of foreign cities and spent some twenty times as much as we to print millions of low-priced books in many languages.

Since 1953 the Soviet Union has even provided more capital than we have to assist the economic development of Asia and Africa, not including Soviet aid to China. Soviet loans on generous terms have been flowing into Afghanistan, India, Egypt, Syria, Burma, Indonesia, and elsewhere, and trade is being rapidly expanded with these and many other countries. The Soviet economic assistance program to Syria, negotiated in 1957, was larger than the current American aid program for the whole Middle East put together.

Yet many American policy makers assumed that the Soviet Union was under such a heavy drain from its military program and its aid to China that it had little to offer the struggling economies of non-Communist Asia, Africa, and Latin America beyond rosy promises and an occasional one-shot program for publicity purposes.

As late as April, 1955, my own report from India that the Soviet Union had offered to finance and build a large, modern steel mill there was ridiculed because such assistance was said to be "far beyond Russia's economic capicity."

If our focus on military defense had enabled us to build an impregnable military position, we could at

Herblock in The Washington Post

"How Did I Get into This Box?"

least be thankful for that. From a secure military base we could now confidently proceed to rebuild our political fences throughout the world.

The irony is that we have been unsuccessful on *both* counts.

Since the end of the Korean War Congress has appropriated the fabulous sum of $211 billion to create effective defense barriers against the expansive forces of world communism. Ninety-eight per cent of our entire national security budget has gone directly or indirectly into this effort to meet our military objectives. Yet in spite of our gigantic expenditure many observers were convinced that the balance of military power in the winter of 1958 was tilting toward Moscow.

Forty years ago Lenin realized that the world society which for centuries had centered in Europe was doomed and that the new world which would ultimately take its place would largely be shaped by movements which had been generated elsewhere. He saw that military and industrial power had their own strict limitations and that the decisive advantage would be held by those who understood the political, economic, and ideological forces which increasingly would shape the minds of men.

The ultimate victory of Communism, he believed, would come through a revolutionary alliance between the Soviet Union and the "exploited peoples of Asia and Africa."

Although his successor, Joseph Stalin, blundered in his efforts to carry out Lenin's ideas, the more flexible Kremlin leadership that succeeded Stalin is unlikely to repeat these mistakes. The Soviet program which has been taking shape in Asia, Africa, and Latin America not only recognizes the decisive importance of these continents in tomorrow's world; it also reflects a shrewd and tactful understanding of how to deal most effectively with them.

How can America and her Atlantic Community associates meet this broader challenge? How can we regain the initiative? Above all, how can we achieve the urgently needed balance between military security and positive political and economic action for peace?

As this is written our energies are largely focused on the scientific and military requirements. In the wake of the Sputniks and the frightening evidence of Soviet superiority in guided missiles, this in inevitable. If America becomes incapable of defending itself and those nations which associate themselves with her, we shall find ourselves living in a Soviet-dominated world sooner or later, and probably sooner.

But to assume that an adequate military defense is our *end* objective, is almost equally dangerous. The struggle between the forces of totalitarianism and those who support the dignity of man will not be determined by a rocket race to the moon.

Once we succeed in restoring the balance of military power, we will only be back where we were in 1956. We will only have restored the situation which Winston Churchill described as "peace by terror," a peace baldly based on the capacity of two nuclear giants, each to destroy the other, and on the hope that no reckless act in Moscow or Washington will inadvertently trigger a chain of events which could bring catastrophe to mankind.

It must be said that such a "peace," melancholy though we know it to be, is better than the specter of unilateral destruction or nuclear blackmail that faced us in the fall of 1957. But has civilization no greater destiny than to exist poised indefinitely on the brink of nuclear oblivion?

Must the two camps glare everlastingly at each other across uneasy boundaries, breathing hate and destruction, waiting for an opportune time to strike? Is there no way of breaking out from this nuclear straitjacket and striking out boldly along more creative and promising roads?

Our objective is a sound and lasting peace. One of several essential means to the securing of that end is an effective military balance. In view of the Soviet Union's scientific, industrial, and manpower capacity, America cannot possibly put herself in a position to demand diplomatic unconditional surrender at the negotiating table. A truly adequate defense program will deny any similar advantage to the Kremlin.

Someday, therefore, the two nuclear giants must come to accept each other's right to live and to let live. Someday they must find the way to bring fears and ambitions into balance.

Ultimately, this accommodation must include step by step disarmament, world atomic control, military disengagement in Europe and elsewhere, rapidly expanding world development, and, finally, the strengthening of the United Nations into an organ of peace stronger than any vetoing power.

In this broader perspective the challenge of the next decade takes shape. If life is to retain its meaning we must look far beyond the restoration of the military balance. Simultaneously with our urgent defense efforts we must seek to create a new atmosphere in which we can begin to make the first tentative moves toward peace.

In its present cocky post-Sputnik mood, it is wishful thinking to expect the Soviet Union to negotiate broad-scale, enforcible agreements on our many differences. As long as the Kremlin has reason to hope that the world will ultimately fall into its lap through European divisions, American mistakes, and its own alleged omnipotence, its leaders will be in no mood for the give and take on which a permanent peace must be based.

The long-term objective of American foreign policy is to remove the basis for this hope and to create the global conditions in which the essential accommodation may become possible.

In the meantime the door should never be slammed on any proposal that promises to ease present tensions, however slightly, or to provide agreement on whatever isolated or peripheral issues it may be in our common interest to settle.

the case for meeting the Soviets halfway

by CYRUS EATON

I AM dedicated to the proposition that the world's one real hope for honorable peace lies in actively striving for better understanding between nations of opposing philosophies. The idea seems simple and indisputable to me.

By contrast, the belief that international differences can be composed by the hurling of threats and invective strikes me as lacking in wisdom. When this theory forms the underlying basis of national policy, I confess I become alarmed. The elusive metaphysical doctrine of our State Department that baits Russia, for instance, and forbids our American journalists to visit and write from first-hand knowledge about China, is too subtle and esoteric for me to grasp.

Our Mr. Dulles sometimes talks just as the Kaiser did in 1914. And when one becomes swollen with pride, one becomes arrogant and truculent and someone will take up the challenge.

I am convinced that there will be no solution, no road to peace, as long as nobody will trust anyone else. Can any reasonable person deny the truth of this statement? It is not profound. It is only common sense. But the charges and countercharges continue. The armament race accelerates its pace to the perilous point where somebody on either side needs but to push a button, deliberately or accidentally, for full-scale war to break out.

I feel confident Russia is not now trying to sell the United States on Communism. She recognizes there is no possibility of imposing the Soviet political and economic system on this country. By the same token, we must recognize that we cannot recast Soviet Russia in our own mold.

"Time to Wage Peace?" asked the title of a recent article in the Manchester *Guardian* Weekly. The folly of the arsenal school of diplomacy draws this negative verdict from Britain's famed old internationally-minded journal:

"Certainly there is growing disillusionment with the theory that the greatest safety for the West lies in building up the greatest pile of nuclear weapons. No doubt the clear evidence we have recently had of the Soviet lead in missile research has been mainly responsible for helping the people to see clearly that neither side can ever win the race for effective nuclear supremacy. The pattern is clear. The development of some super-weapon by one side is soon matched by the other, which is already far advanced in the development of an effective counter-weapon. And so the hopeless race for supremacy goes on—absorbing an increasingly high percentage of the resources and skill of all concerned—although we already have a weapon so powerful as to make war unthinkable."

That final clause, "though we already have a weapon so powerful as to make war unthinkable", holds particular significance. War is unthinkable, yet we are obsessed by it. When the Soviets make a peaceful overture, we brush it aside immediately, before its proposals can be properly considered, and brand it propaganda. What right do we have to reject out of hand *any* overture that could conceivably serve as a first groping step toward rapprochement with the other military and economic colossus of our planet?

Last summer 22 of the world's leading nuclear experts gathered at my summer home in Pugwash, Nova Scotia. They came from Australia, Austria, Canada, China, France, Great Britain, Japan, Poland, the United States, and the Soviet Union. They represented the greatest scientific brains in the world today from countries of widely differing ideologies.

This remarkable community of scientific peers met with the common aim of discussing three main areas of crucial concern to the future of mankind: the hazards arising from the use of atomic energy in peace and war; problems of international control of nuclear weapons; and the social responsibility of scientists in the atomic age.

The original suggestion for this conference came from the late Albert Einstein and my good friend Bertrand Russell, distinguished British philosopher and Nobel prize winner. The Einstein-Russell spirit pervaded all the sessions. So did their often-expressed conviction that either war must be abolished or civilization will perish.

Doubt that the Russians would attend prevailed in many quarters before the meeting. When the Soviet scientists arrived, the same doubters predicted they would throw up roadblocks and use the occasion as a platform for propaganda. Nothing of the kind occurred. The Russians obviously approached the meeting with some caution. Certainly they had no hand in arranging it. After a day the tension eased with the realization that all concerned were conducting themselves in an open and above-board manner.

CYRUS S. EATON presides over a multi-million dollar empire of steel, coal, transportation, and other basic industries. Mr. Eaton is a philosopher and student as well and last summer opened his summer home in Pugwash, Nova Scotia, to the world's leading nuclear scientists for a full scale discussion of the problems of atomic energy in peace and war and the social responsibility of scientists in the atomic age.

After a week of deliberation, the Pugwash scientists issued a statement that nuclear war would be a "disaster of unprecedented magnitude." They did not believe that nuclear war, once begun, could be limited to any region. In event of an outbreak of general war, they warned, "the radiological hazards would be thousands of times greater than those resulting from fallout effects of test explosions. In combatant countries hundreds of millions of people would be killed outright by the blast of heat and by the ionizing radiation at the instant of explosion, whether 'clean' or 'dirty' bombs were used."

The scientists agreed that if "dirty" bombs were used in warfare, large areas would be made uninhabitable for extended periods of time, and additional hundreds of millions would die from the delayed effects of radiation from local fallout, some in the exposed generation and some in succeeding generations as a result of genetic effects.

They were competent, they stated, to speak with authority only on the scientific and technical implications of atomic energy. But they noted the need to take into account the "political problems which are the background to international negotiations." Scientists, they concluded, must now consider "the implications of their own work."

Professor Eugene Rabinowitch, research professor at the University of Illinois and editor of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* was one of the Americans at Pugwash. He subsequently wrote in the *Bulletin:* "The Pugwash conference was a great step forward . . . Other meetings of scientists interested in the impact of science on public affairs now seem likely . . ." Professor Rabinowitch recognizes that more international meetings on the Pugwash pattern are needed to influence the thinking of men and to give them the capacity to deal with the dangerous realities and exciting potentialities of the scientific age.

Shortly after the Russian delegation returned home, the Presidium of the Soviet Academy of Sciences ratified the findings of the Pugwash conference. The resolution emphasized the "responsibilities of scientists before society for the utilization of results of their scientific discoveries for constructive purposes only." A short time later, 195 of the U.S.S.R.'s leading scientists called in writing for an international conference. Their petition averred: "We Soviet scientists express our full readiness for common effort with scientists of any other country, to discuss any proposals directed towards the prevention of atomic war, the creation of secure peace, and tranquillity for all mankind."

I, for one, take this declaration with the utmost seriousness. I further think that anyone who shuns this approach betrays a sorry deficiency of wisdom and forfeits his claim to be called a true friend of the United States or the world.

Thoughtful people recognize, of course, that the rapid advance of scientific knowledge needs to be enlisted in the cause of peace, not war. Full utilization of science for constructive instead of destructive ends will remain an idle dream unless and until man himself undergoes a change of heart, and rejects the perilously stupid statesmanship that prides itself on seeing how close it can come to the brink of war. The day of "gentlemanly" combat is long past. Even the mass destruction of two world wars in this century pales by comparison with the horrifying prospect of human annihilation and genocide that would inevitably characterize another all-out war. Sooner or later we must achieve better understanding among nations or perish. Only by this understanding can we end distrust and abolish the dreadful specter of nuclear war that could exterminate the human family.

Woodrow Wilson took the United States into the First World War to make the world safe for democracy and to end all wars. After that war to make the world safe for democracy, we saw the rise of Mussolini, Hitler, and Stalin. After that war to end all wars, we had a Second World war to end Germany's military might. Now we are arming Germany again, at our own expense.

It is time for the world's leaders to show some common sense, to sit down and work out some compromises. There is no glory or reward in war. There is nothing in it for us from the standpoint of liberty or freedom. From the economic standpoint, it is terrifying. That is why men must sit down together and reconcile their differences. Comon sense, reason, persuasion, and patience are slow and unspectacular compared with war. But I don't think our statesmen have tried hard enough to use them.

This same sentiment is expressed by the Manchester *Guardian:* "Western Governments do not seem to be giving to their political thinking a fraction of the imagination and effort that they are putting into the strengthening of their defenses."

Lord Russell has lately addressed an "Open Letter to Eisenhower and Khrushchev" through the columns of the influential British weekly, *New Statesman.* He sagely observes:

"The supreme concern of men of all ways of thought at the present time must be to ensure the continued existence of the human race. This is already in jeopardy from the hostility between East and West and will, if many minor nations acquire nuclear weapons, be in very much greater jeopardy within a few years from the possibility of irresponsible action by thoughtless fanatics."

Never before, says this philosopher, has such a sense of futility blighted the visions of youth. Never before has there been reason to feel that the human race was traveling along a road ending only in a bottomless precipice. Individual death we must all face, he states, but collective death has never, hitherto, been a grim possibility. Who in his right mind can dispute this reasoning?

Lord Russell believes that if Eisenhower and Khrushchev were to meet in a frank discussion of the conditions of co-existence, and to seek agreements and adjustments that would diminish future strife, the world would acclaim their action. "The forces of sanity, released from their long bondage, would ensure for the years to come a life of vigor and achievement and joy surpassing anything known in even the happiest eras of the past."

The desperate hope of the ubiquitous little "man in the street" is reflected in a letter to a Canadian paper, the Vancouver *Sun;* it refers to an

article in which I urged talking over our differences with the Russians:

"Mr. Eaton says: 'This is a great time for people to speak up.' I am no politician, just one of the humble people, the ordinary men and women, who will be the victims if common sense does not prevail. But may I 'speak up' now, and implore the few men at the top who hold the future of the world in their hands to listen to the voice of reason and the voice of the people?

"Talk with the Russians!

"If you, through the medium of your paper, could organize a gigantic petition, and it could be copied in every city in the United States, asking just a plain answer from the man and woman in the street—Yes or No to the question 'Do you think we should talk with the Russians?'—I am sure the response would be an overwhelming 'Yes!' "

Scientific societies of Japan and Germany have met to endorse the recommendations of the Pugwash conference and urge early additional meetings of world thinkers. Thousands of letters, including many from Nobel Prize winners, have been pouring in from people in all walks of life in every part of the world, in support of my pleas for a new approach to world peace.

Here a few of the more significant excerpts from a single day's voluminous mail:

PROFESSOR MAX BORN, West German scientist and Nobel Prize Winner:

"The reaction of the American people to Sputnik, as reported in our newspapers, was rather a shock to me, and if it leads to an acceleration of the arms race, the prospects of the survival of the human race are slight. I am spending most of my time in trying to convince the German people that a settlement of political disputes by force is not possible any more, and would be suicidal. I cannot tell you how glad I am that you are trying to establish contact between all nations, in particular between the scientists."

DR. ALBERT SCHWEITZER, world-famed humanitarian and Nobel Prize Winner:

"I attach great importance to the fact that the proposal of the Soviet scientists goes back to your meeting of international scientists at Pugwash last summer."



The Christian Science Monitor

Better than Missile Rivalry

LORD ADRIAN, Master of Trinity College of Cambridge University, Nobel Prize Winner in Medicine, and the Recipient of the Royal Medal of the Royal Society:

"I have been greatly encouraged to learn how well the conclusions of your Pugwash Conference have been received by the press. I have read the account which appeared in *Nature* and I am sure that no responsible scientists in any country could disagree with the statement produced. You deserve the thanks of everyone for bringing about a meeting which came to such sensible and important conclusions on vital issues."

It would be difficult to find anyone in the world more dedicated to capitalism and democracy than I am. But I think the surest way to destroy both these institutions is for the United States to provoke war with the U.S.S.R. I think most of my fellow capitalists share my basic view. Big business men realize that another world war would wipe out everything they have striven to build up.

The longer we put off finding a common ground with Russia the harder it is going to be. Let's stop baiting Russia. Let her deal with her own economic theories and practices—time will have a great effect on them. Building a ring of bases around Russia from which we can launch bombers and missiles is foolish. It does nothing but give that nation a solidarity it would not have if it did not feel the Western World was plotting to destroy it.

I have long held that the more contact we have between the people of the two nations, the sooner we will realize that we are all human, with weaknesses and limitations, and that it is time we agreed not to annihilate each other. Either we will live together or we will perish together. I want to see constant exchanges between scientists, educators, artists, businessmen, farmers, *people* of the two countries.

I am firmly convinced that the Russians want peace. They are fully conscious of the deadly character of modern nuclear weapons. While they know they could inflict severe punishment on us, they also know they would pull themselves down with us into the bottomless abyss.

Our new $74,000,000,000 U.S. budget calls for expenditures of $47,100,000,000, or 64 per cent, for "protection" against the Russian challenge. The U.S.S.R. is doubtless also devoting two-thirds of her substance to "protection" against us. Neither nation can long sustain this crushing economic burden without courting impoverishment. The Russians have given obvious signs that they would like to turn aside from the armament race, in order to make more resources available to improve the lot of the common man.

In fact, Mr. Khrushchev put it to us with characteristic dramatic force last fall when he said: "We declare war on you in the peaceful field of trade . . . and . . . production. We are relentless in this. We will prove the superiority of our system."

This challenge is made to order for us. Why do we hold back? I am convinced we of America have the skills, the resources, the inventive genius, the resourcefulness, and the heritage of freedom to prevail in such a peaceful contest.

The time was never more propitious to start along the path to meet the Soviets halfway. The only promising, untried road to peace is negotiation of our differences. Let us speak up and insist that our statesmen make the appropriate overtures right now.

Do We Know What We Are Afraid Of?

by OWEN STRATTON & CLAIRE ZIMMERMAN

THE WORST danger in what the Sputniks have proved about the advanced state of Russian technology is that this proof has driven so many of us into a condition close to panic, in which we are not really sure what we are afraid of—a condition not greatly changed by our launching of a much smaller satellite.

Not knowing what we are afraid of, we have alternated between wild impulsiveness and frozen rigidity. We have talked excitedly about turning the American educational system upside down to produce more engineers and scientists and have committed the remarkable stupidity of the intensive propaganda build-up for the Vanguard missile failure. And in between frantic plunges, we have talked solemnly and rigidly about "security" and about winning or losing a nuclear war as though such a war could have any end but utter disaster.

This alternation between impulsiveness and neurotic attempts to use formulas that have already failed again and again is the classic symptom of acute anxiety, bordering on panic and stemming from causes that are not clear to its victims. When people do not understand why they are afraid, they tend to see their world as a threatening place, full of unspeakable dangers and almost insoluble problems. When they are not frozen by their fear, they spend their energy in frantic, unimaginative attacks on these "problems" which have been created, in large part, by their very fear.

It is only when people learn and accept the reason for their fear that they become less fearful and able to deal with the real problems that have been camouflaged by the imaginary ones. And only by understanding and thus reducing anxiety can people see clearly the opportunities that exist in situations previously believed hopeless.

The first step toward responding rationally and creatively to spectacular Soviet advances in science is to identify and understand the reason for our fear. Unfortunately, we have not yet done this but have, instead, rationalized by using three major explanations that are plausible but will not stand examination.

The first explanation for our fear that appears vaguely in editorials and official statements is that Soviet possession of missiles capable of launching satellites puts the United States in much greater physical danger than before. But for several years we have known that the Russians had atomic and hydrogen bombs and the bombers to deliver them. For some time we have known of the large Russian submarine fleet and of the probability that submarines armed with missiles like the Navy's Regulus could destroy at least our coastal cities. People in a position to know have assured us that there is no complete defense against a determined nuclear attack borne by aircraft and pre-Sputnik missiles. And others have said with almost equal authority that survivors of nuclear explosions in a future war stand a good chance of extermination by radioactive fallout.

The addition of intercontinental ballistic missiles to the Soviet arsenal no doubt puts us in somewhat greater danger than we were in before, but the difference between the two perils scarcely seems enough to account for our sudden near-panic. If a man is to be shot at, it does not seem sensible for him to get into a frenzy of anxiety over news that the shooting will be done with a .45 instead of a .44, as he had thought.

Perhaps because they sense this, some of those who are ringing the alarm bells add as a second reason for their fear that we have lost our deterrent power, since we are unable to retaliate with Intercontinental Ballistics Missiles should the Russians use them on us. Now it is clear, of course, that we do not yet have an ICBM, but that is far from saying that we are without deterrent power. We do have considerable numbers of jet bombers whose range General Le May demonstrated not long ago by flying one of them non-stop to Buenos Aires, and these bombers, with nuclear bombs, are stationed at bases within striking distance of the U.S.S.R. It is doubtful that the Russians could wipe out these bases with nuclear missiles before enough bombers could get in the air to do irreparable damage to Russia; and, in any case, to destroy the bases the Russians would, in the process, have to destroy much of the world it is said they want to rule. They would have to act far less rationally than they have been acting lately in order to disregard our present retaliatory power.

But—and this is the third reason the Paul Reveres offer for their anxiety—perhaps the Sputniks have damaged us disastrously in what is ponderously called the struggle for the minds of the uncommitted peoples.

No doubt our position in this theater of the cold war is somewhat worse now than it was before the Sputniks. Many foreigners, wearied by our boasts about the American standard of living and by our insistence upon their gratitude—as though they were indigent brothers-

OWEN STRATTON is chairman of the political science department at Wellesley College. CLAIRE ZIMMERMAN is assistant professor of psychology at Wellesley.

in-law—have certainly been pleased to see the Russians get the jump on us. But it is unrealistic to think that the Sputniks impressed these people exactly as they impressed us or that we can repair whatever damage our prestige has suffered by training more technicians to invent more efficient ways to kill people.

If the uncommitted peoples revered technological accomplishment as much as we do, they would have pledged allegiance to us long before the Sputniks. Clearly, they have not been much charmed by our past achievements in the science of destruction, even when these achievements seemed more advanced than the Russians'. If the neutrals did not embrace us then, it is unlikely that they will cleave to the Russians now simply because of the Sputniks. And it is also unlikely that they will join us in the future merely because we catch up with the Russians or outdo them in missile technology. It is a dead give-away of how power-oriented, how tinged with unconscious colonialism, our attitude is when we betray our belief that it is the prestige of weapons that wins the uncommitted peoples.

Although the ability of the Russians to attack us with ICBM's, our inability to retaliate in precise kind, and the erosion of our dignity abroad are matters of some consequence, the situation in none of these respects is so much worse now than it was before the Sputniks that it reasonably justifies our sudden state of near-panic. For an explanation of our fear we must look further.

Much of our fear is really a response to the psychological damage the Sputniks did to one of our most central beliefs—our belief in the necessary and eternal superiority of American technology. What has happened to us is similar to what happens to a man when he goes broke after spending a lifetime feeling superior to everybody else because he was the richest man in town.

We are the victims of excellent, although probably unintentional, propaganda in the form of two orbiting metal objects. The Sputniks had a meaning for many of us that was absent from all previous Russian propaganda, and, for the first time in 40 years, the Russians got inside our mental guard.

Since 1918 the Communists have been telling us, with almost no effect, that workers who think of themselves as members of the middle class are actually members of the proletariat, deceived by capitalist lies; that constitutional government is not a means of promoting the general welfare, but rather an engine of monopolistic oppression; that wage increases are not a division of the fruit of increased productivity, but bribes with which big business lulls the toilers.

Almost no one has taken this ideological propaganda seriously, partly because we have a strong practical bent hostile to any theory, but also because we have a set of deeply-felt beliefs that counteracted whatever the Communists said, insofar, indeed, as we listened at all. Most of us have "known" with the certainty that comes from never having been required to think much about it that all but a very few Americans are members of the middle class or soon will be; that our government of the people is run by the people for the people; and that our high standard of living is a necessary accompaniment of free American enterprise. These beliefs have been proof against theoretical propaganda.

In the same way, our faith in the superiority of American technology was proof against Russian propaganda of a less ideological kind. Although material accomplishment has always been tremendously important to us, and the Russians were aiming in the right direction when they talked of their rising steel production, their hydroelectric projects, and their advanced mining techniques, most of the time we simply did not believe them. And on the rare occasions when we did believe one claim or another, we neutralized it by reminding ourselves of all our deep-freezers and dishwashers. Whatever the Russians can do, we concluded, we can do better.

But the Sputniks were a different sort of propaganda. We could not ignore them or doubt them or neutralize them as we had neutralized Russian propaganda before. The Sputniks went right over New England and Iowa and California; and they were concrete, technical achievements, the type of achievement we have always admired most. Our faith in the supremacy of American technology has been badly shaken.



Fitzpatrick in The St. Louis Post-Dispatch

Any Space Left for Peace?

We are like an adolescent who sees for the first time that his parents are not the all-knowing and perfect people he believed them to be. To see this is painful and may lead to psychological crisis if he begins to think that all his beliefs are as unfounded as this one. On the other hand, if he can accept the necessity to abandon his unrealistic belief without losing his other, better-founded convictions, then he can cope successfully with the real problem of relating to his parents as people, not paragons, and he can use the real opportunities which this new relation offers him.

We must similarly adapt to our loss of belief in what we thought was an American birthright. Just as the healthy adolescent moves into adulthood by seeing that he could never learn to handle his problems for himself as long as he relied on what he thought was his parents' omniscience, so we must understand that our belief in American technological supremacy was a handicap rather than an advantage. It betrayed us into believing that we could contrive technical—mostly military—solutions to all the problems that beset us and kept us from attempting more promising non-technical solutions.

Abandoning a major article of

faith is an unsettling experience at best, and when we are not clear what has happened, the result is fear and panic. By the same token, the cure is insight into what has hapened, painful though the insight may be. Acceptance of what has happened will strip our eyes of the cataracts of fear, let us see our opportunities, and put us in a position to take advantage of them.

We shall be able to see, for instance, that we have an educational system that is not all bad, by any means, and is in some respects unequalled by anything else in the world. We shall also be able to see that reforms are needed, both in the quality and the quantity of our education, but that this does not mean we should convert our educational system into technical institutes or into something resembling Tom Brown's school days.

Recovery from the confusion of fear will also enable us to see that the area in which the Russians have reaped their greatest gain is not in technical achievement, but in offering the people of Asia and Africa economic and technical help designed to meet their needs and, ironically, in giving them the most fundamental of all capitalist forms of assistance—that of mutually beneficial trade. For us, the opportunities in this field are tremendous, but our addiction to tariffs, our agricultural surpluses, and our belief that nothing except war and charity is beneficial if it cannot be shown on the black side of a ledger demand real inventiveness on the part of Americans to overcome.

The world is—literally—full of opportunities for us, but in the end nothing will succeed unless we can restore the flow of inventiveness to public policy. There is no lack of inventiveness in this country, but it is choked by the fear that now limits our goals to a mere checking of Russian moves, fear that binds us to the old, sterile formulas, fear that stands in the way of accepting new ideas. Get rid of the fear, and we can start moving once more, not down the narrow and ignoble path of catching up with the Russians in weapons, but in a broad advance over the whole plain of achievement in genuine science, physical and social, in the arts, and in all the great range of human values and aspirations.

Life is hard but better for the average Russian

by DANIEL SCHORR

RUSSIANS tell this joke: One says to his friend, "Ivan Ivanovich, have you heard that the next five-year plan will make it possible for every Soviet citizen to own his own personal jet airplane?" The friend is amazed, but then reflects, "It's marvelous, but what do I need a jet plane for?" The instant reply is, "Ivan Ivanovich, don't be foolish! Now suppose you hear there are eggs available in Vladivostok . . ."

This joke originated well before the first Sputnik was launched, but could serve as a wry comment on the plight of the long-suffering consumer in the Sputnik age. The average Russian is impressed by his country's achievements in space, in science and technology. But he is painfully aware that the fruits of these achievements are slow to filter down to him in meaningful improvements in his living standards.

I was able to witness how institutionalized shortages are in the Soviet Union one night in Riga, Latvia, which had just been opened to Western visitors. On a street corner outside a furniture store, a crowd of some fifty persons gathered in animated conversation directed at a man in the center of the group who was making notes on paper. Public gatherings in the Soviet Union are rare enough so that my attention was attracted; as I came closer, I observed that the man with the pencil was writing down names on a list.

Someone in the crowd explained to me what was happening. It had been rumored that new beds would go on sale in the furniture store next morning. Since advance queues are officially forbidden, the would-be buyers were forming an unofficial queue on paper. Having inscribed themselves, they could go home and return next morning, an hour before opening time, when they could take their places in line for the scarce beds in accordance with their order on the list. Collective action would insure that the priority was observed.

Another Latvian told me that his heart's dearest desire was an automobile. He had put himself on the waiting list with the local automobile sales agency (a state outlet, of course!) for a Pobeda, the four-cylinder car which is the most popular in the Soviet Union. The waiting list, at this point, would bring him in line to buy a car in 12 years at the current rate of car sales. "And when I get it," he said, "I may not be able to afford it. So it will be a great temptation to sell it because I can get a price three times the 20,000 rubles I'll pay for it."

DANIEL SCHORR has been Moscow correspondent for the Columbia Broadcasting System for several years.

Since then, in an avowed effort to combat the black market, the government has raised the price of the Pobeda to 30,000 rubles—a 50 per cent increase. It is typical of the Soviet regime's approach to scarcity. Production of passenger cars is now at a rate of about 110,000 annually in a country of more than 200,000,000 people. In Detroit, a scarcity of this sort would be met by swift expansion of production. In Russia, it is met by raising prices. Russia's automotive capacity goes mainly into making trucks, all of which are owned by the state. The consumer can wait.

Actually, the Soviet regime is finding that there are limitations on how long it can make the consumer wait. In the post-Stalin era, an effort is being made to shift gradually from an economy of compulsion to an economy of incentive. Forced production has begun to show diminishing returns, and some measure of freedom is being introduced. Today, the Soviet worker is legally free to quit his job; the collective farmer is disinclined to produce unless he has something to buy with his money. Within the strict limits of absolute priority for heavy industry, an effort is being made to expand consumer goods production, which is already showing effect.

The man or woman one sees on the street in Moscow is considerably better (and more brightly) dressed than three years ago. The contrast was particularly evident last summer, during the World Youth Festival, when large supplies of clothing at relatively low prices were poured into the Moscow stores so that the capital would present a good appearance to the visitors from abroad. New shoes suddenly seemed to blossom everywhere; women displayed sheer blouses and flowered skirts. The desired effect on the foreign youth was obtained; the effect on the Muscovite himself was somewhat offset by his awareness of why the golden horn of plenty had suddenly opened.

But there has also been some real improvement—felt first in supply of food. Party Chief Nikita Khrushchev has proclaimed the aim of catching up with the United States in production of meat and dairy products, and has won his point over those (including the ousted Malenkov) who expressed fear that the price paid would be the slowing down of heavy industry development. Whether or not the propaganda goal will be achieved, it is evident that more food is available to the consumer today.

Based on official data, here is the 1956 consumption of food products in percentages of the 1940 consumption:

	Worker families	*Collective farm families*
Meat & animal fats	**188**	**163**
Fish & fish products	**169**	**244**
Milk & dairy products	**214**	**148**
Eggs	**176**	**210**
Sugar	**200**	**438**
Confectionery goods	**155**	**252**
Bread & bread products	**81**	**99.8**

The decline in bread sales was a natural consequence of the availability of more desirable foods.

Some absolute figures for food have been made available. Following are data on market supplies (not including food locally raised and locally consumed):

	1940	1955	1957 (est.)
Meat (thous. tons)	**655**	**1,765**	**2,210**
Dairy Products (thous. tons)	**4,893**	**11,700**	**17,954**
Vegetable oil (thous. tons)	**120**	**319**	**416**
Sugar (thous. tons)	**971**	**2,330**	**3,040**
Eggs (millions)	**1,428**	**2,226**	**3,200**

The comment is perhaps in order that after a tremendous expansion in production, market supplies of eggs last year averaged 16 per person for the 200,000,000 people of the Soviet Union—*or one and one-third eggs per month.*

The average Soviet worker, reports the Central Statistical Board, ate 88 per cent more meat and animal fats in 1956 than in 1940, 69 per cent more fish and fish products, 100 per cent more milk and milk products, 76 per cent more eggs, and 100 per cent more sugar. These figures reflect a great improvement; they also reflect the abysmal standards of 1940.

Manufactured goods, because they are not absolutely necessary to sustain life and because their output more immediately comes up against the barrier of heavy-industry priority, have lagged behind food production. But, from an almost unbelievably low base, there has been some improvement in recent years, visible both in statistical tables and on the street. This is the official picture:

	1940	1957 (est.)
Woolen fabrics (billion rubles)	**2.6**	**11.3**
Silk fabrics (billion rubles)	**2.0**	**19.5**
Garments (billion rubles)	**17.3**	**47.4**
Leather footwear (million pairs)	**163**	**310**
Cameras (thousand)	**355**	**1,214**
TV sets (thousand)	**....**	**753**
Clocks, watches (thousand)	**2,500**	**23,930**
Refrigerators (thousand)	**....**	**296**
Washing machines (thousand)	**....**	**434**
Vacuum cleaners (thousand)	**....**	**300**

The improvement is reflected in street impressions. Russia last year produced one-and-a-half pairs of shoes per inhabitant, and most persons one sees have adequate, if not stylish, shoes. Not only the foreign tourist, but the tourist from the provinces is seen carrying a camera. Television antennae have sprouted from Moscow rooftops.

But, in terms of price, the trickle of yearned-for consumer goods is still out of reach of the average consumer. A common sight in Moscow is a man standing in front of the GUM department store, staring at a suit of clothes (of mediocre quality) and then at the price tag—1600 rubles, perhaps almost two months of his pay. Refrigerators and washing machines are an even more remote dream for the majority. And it seems no coincidence that the scarcer an item, the higher the price. For price manipulation is part of the government's arsenal of weapons for trying to regulate supply and demand—or, rather, for trying to keep demand in line with supply. The Ministry of Trade admitted as much when it recently raised the prices of automobiles, motorcycles, and carpets, saying the purpose was to help fight

against profiteering in these commodities. With consumer goods, on the whole, too scarce for competition to play much of a role, prices are arbitrary, sometimes to a point where they evoke public indignation.

The Soviet press, acting as a safety valve, occasionally reflects the consumer's indignation. For example, the Communist youth organ, *Komsomolskaya Pravda,* recently wrote with heavy sarcasm about the prices of toys in Moscow's vaunted new children's department store, Children's World:

". . . Children's World has received toy autos manufactured at the Omsk machine-building factory. These cars did not have to travel to Moscow under their own power; they were simply taken out of boxes and put under glass. And now young auto fans stand around and try to guess what model car it is. Why does it have such a red-gray color and why doesn't it shine? . . . The parents turn their eyes to the price-tag—50 rubles [$5] . . . The wind-up car . . . does not wish to leave the store. Why is its 'traction' so poor? Because the weight of direct and indirect taxes does not let it move . . .

"To resolve our doubts, we went to the price department of the Ministry of Trade of the Russian Federation. We asked them to explain why a sometimes very unattractive toy costs almost three times as much as a clever toy. And here we discovered that there exists a perhaps unwritten but widely applied law. To encourage research by master toy makers, a commission often permits the setting of higher prices on an interesting new toy. At first, the manufacture of this toy requires greater overhead expenses than after it goes into mass production. But what happens afterward, when production is in full swing? The production cost drops. But does the retail price change? As a rule not, we were told by the Price Department.

"Several years ago, trying to make children's toys cheaper so that more persons could buy them, the government limited all toy-manufacturing establishments to a certain profit percentage. But the decision is not being complied with. Instead of the fixed five to six per cent, many establishments permit themselves a much larger profit . . ."

There has been similar criticism of clothing production—the most important consumer-goods industry. The clothing situation was judged so serious that an attack was launched in the columns of *Pravda,* the party organ and principal newspaper of the Soviet Union:

"The Soviet consumer presents justified claims to the clothing makers, especially with regard to selection, style, and finish of garments . . . It is no accident . . . that of hundreds of new styles, only a small part are used by factories, and the factory output frequently varies greatly from the samples adopted . . .

"The clothing industry still lacks rational methods for designing goods. The methods now used are, as a rule, based on 'normal' figures. In life, however, there is a great variety of sizes . . . Mass-produced clothes often do not conform to consumer demands . . . More attention should be paid to satisfying the demand for clothing of the various age groups . . .

"It is an intolerable fact that many factories for a long time have been using obsolete technology . . ."

Ironically, as consumer goods begin to trickle into the market place consumer dissatisfaction grows. The supply has reached the point where it is enough to tempt the consumer, but far from enough to satisfy him. It was bad enough when the shop windows were bare; now that things are on display, the worker wonders why the stock is exhausted before he gets to the counter, or why the price is out of reach for him.

The fact is that retail sales *have* expanded substantially. According to official statistics, sales of manufactured goods and food were 481.9 billion rubles in 1954, 501.9 in 1955, 547.2 in 1956, and 296 billion in the first half of 1957—16 per cent higher than in the same period of the previous year. But the base was so low, the supply is still so inadequate, the prices of many manufactured goods still so exorbitant, the distribution still spotty, the quality still uneven, that the consumer gripes even more.

Aware of this, the Party has announced improvements of consumer goods supply as one of "our urgent tasks." And the Ministry of Trade says, "Unflagging care should be taken of the customer, and his time should be valued. We must not tolerate the appearance of queues just because some official is inefficient." But this remains a promise for the future.

Housing is a subject in itself, officially acknowledged to be "one of the most acute problems." Here, too, while a building boom is in progress (huge apartment developments are rising in the outskirts of Moscow, and in Lvov, a former Polish city now in the Soviet Ukraine, the mayor told me that his city would be the first to overcome the housing shortage), a decent dwelling remains, for most Soviet citizens, still a vision for the future. The regime has been explaining that the housing shortage resulted from war devastation, the increase in population, and the need to build heavy industry first, admitting that "housing construction lagged behind the needs of the population" and that "until recently industrial construction proceeded at a higher rate than house-building."

In 1940, according to official figures, the average urban dweller had seven square meters of space (one meter equals 39.37 inches); in 1955, it was 7.4 square meters. In non-statistical terms, this means that millions of Soviet citizens live four and five to a room, with families sharing kitchens and bathrooms. A young Russian told me in frustration, "The greatest barrier to romance is that I can never find a room where I can be alone with a girl." And another said, "Half the friction among Russians would disappear if we didn't have to fight for the use of the kitchen and the bathroom."

The party chief, Nikita Khrushchev, has now promised that the housing shortage will be solved in the next 12 to 15 years. But, for the average Soviet citizen, even though aware that the tempo of building has been stepped up, this remains a distant dream.

All this tends to dampen the enthusiasm of the Soviet citizen about the spectacular scientific and industrial achievements of the Soviet regime.

Russia

REVISITED

by Louis Fischer

A RUSSIAN-SPEAKING American scientist, just back from his second visit to the Soviet Union in three months, quotes a Soviet colleague as saying, "If we can get along without Malenkov and Molotov, we could do without Khrushchev too." Another Muscovite expressed a similar view to the American visitor. In perhaps a far-fetched way, this represents a germ of democracy, for the expendability of dictators could further freedom from dictatorship.

Something is slowly brewing, slowly fermenting in the Soviet Union. I found, during my recent stay in Moscow, that a number of persons had either lost, or never achieved, the power of thought. But it would be a mistake to denigrate the Soviet political mind. Soviet society is no more thoughtless than classless. The highly-educated people as well as workers and peasants can and do assess the Soviet system in accordance with what it has given and cost them individually.

The Great Russians, about half the population of the Soviet Union, are probably Russian patriots and proud of the strength acquired by their country under Bolshevism. The national minorities, especially Georgians, Jews, and Ukrainians, and those ethnic groups in Asia which are being Russified may not be distinguished by their zeal for the Moscow leaders. But the Soviet citizen is astonishingly individualistic and his values are chiefly materialistic.

Decades of shortages, privations, sufferings, blood purges, political confusion arising out of drastic Kremlin zigzags, and the political impotence synonymous with totalitarianism have thrown the individual back upon himself and his family. Public life is a nuisance and horror—a thing to avoid. Existence centers on material goods, schooling, and careers for self and close relatives. The Muscovites whom I visited in their homes, most of them old, intimate friends who spoke frankly and freely, showed negligible interest in and not much acquaintance with the domestic or foreign politics of their government. They could not do much about them, so why bother? They did not want war; they want a second room in their apartment, a better dress, more vegetables, richer variety in food, less queuing.

The Soviet regime has been long on promises, short on delivery. The result is a mounting desire for improved living conditions. The Soviet citizens I saw in 1956 were better clothed and fed and, except for members of the upper class, more poorly housed than in 1938. Khrushchev's statements are ample proof that Russia has not yet solved the problem of food. He is striving mightily against the resistance of the peasantry who, we know from authenticated facts out of Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Poland, flee the collective farms at the first opportunity; the peasants do not like them and do not give them their full devotion or working energy. The emphasis on armaments and machine tools makes for consumer shortages and for inferior quality in wearing apparel, apartments, and other popular necessities.

All this is supremely political. The Soviet citizen has no vote (elections are always unanimous and hence unreal) and no freedom of expression. The Kremlin need not reckon with public opinion. Formally and officially there is none. But when everybody works for the state—and everybody does in the Soviet Union—the interests, moods, and sentiments of the people are a factor in production and administration. It is most difficult to run a country, even a dictatorship, when the nation is discontented. Russia has been a difficult country to run, and the relaxation of the Stalinist terror enhances the difficulty.

In 1956, my Moscow friends told me—and it was corroborated by many others—that for a year there had been no political arrests; that, moreover, millions were being released from the concentration camps. I met one friend who had recently returned from 18 years in Arctic exile at Vorkuta, and in Warsaw, in 1957, I spent ten hours, in four sessions, talking with a man who spent 22 continuous years in Soviet prisons and camps. During 1957, the Soviet police did make political arrests, but they were few and involved no highly-placed persons. Khrushchev has a much lighter touch than Stalin. The Kremlin, accordingly, must do more for the welfare of the population. For the recession of terror makes work discipline dependent on consumer goods available to the customer. In effect it exerts pressure on the butter-tomorrow regime to become a pay-as-you-go system. What Stalin did with NKVD revolvers and long-term promissory notes Khrushchev must accomplish by raising income and living standards plus a few short-term credits.

Here foreign policy interferes. The central political issue in the Soviet Union today is the high cost of for-

---

LOUIS FISCHER, one of the nation's best informed journalists on Soviet Russia, lived in the Soviet Union for more than a decade as an American correspondent. Mr. Fischer returned to Moscow for a month a year or so ago. He is the author of many books, including "The Soviets in World Affairs," "Machines and Men in Russia," "Soviet Journey," and "Why Recognize Russia?"

eign policy, which includes armaments and military and economic aid to China, the East European satellites, and the neutrals and uncommitted nations of Asia and other continents. Malenkov urged more emphasis on consumer commodities, and as prime minister between 1953 and 1955, he cut the military budget. He also paid less attention than Khrushchev to the aggrandizement of Soviet power abroad. Malenkov is now directing an electric-power station near the Chinese border, but the conflict between the needs of the individual and Soviet international aims remains.

Significantly, the Soviet press and radio ignored the Soviet delegate's offer, widely-publicized throughout the rest of the world, at the December Afro-Asian "Peoples Solidarity Conference" at Cairo, to grant unstinted economic and technical assistance "as brother helps brother" to underdeveloped countries. Short of capital herself, in fact forced by capital shortages to curtail the current five-year-plan, Russia can ill afford, and her citizens will hardly appreciate, the export of capital and materials in large quantities. The Kremlin may seek to keep these matters secret, but so many persons are involved that the aid operations must become widely known. If foreign aid is not too popular in the United States where it does not reduce the number of shoes, suits, homes, and cars available to the consumer, how much more so in Russia where it does?

Thus the urge to collect on state promissory notes accepted reluctantly by the populace these forty years has grown into a major factor in foreign as well as domestic politics.

Cultural life too is full of the potential of change. The Soviet literary thaw in 1955 and 1956 was followed by a 1957 freeze. In 1957, Khrushchev took the trouble to go to several writers' meetings and, in his usual bulldozer fashion, to attack Miss Aliger, a poet, and Vladimir Dudintsev, author of *Not By Bread Alone,* for, as he put it, not serving the purposes of the Communist party. Both have promised to do better next time.

Yet surcease from arbitrary arrests and from the numerous executions of authors, journalists, and editors of the Thirties has injected a little courage into the literary world. The editor of a Soviet literary monthly said to me in Moscow in 1956 that the built-in censor (in fact, a secret police official) has disappeared from magazine editorial offices. Now the editor is his own censor. In weighing the advisability of giving space to a politically non-conformist piece of writing, he might reason, "The censor would not have passed this; I could get a Party reprimand for using it, or I may be dismissed from my job, but I won't be arrested." This makes a lot of difference.

Boris Pasternak, whom I knew in Moscow in the Thirties, is Russia's greatest poet, but none of his verse has been published for more than two decades. He could not make his meter toe the Party line. Instead, he translated Shakespeare, Goethe, and the Caucasus poet Rustaveli. After Stalin's death he finished a novel. Unsure whether it would be published in the Soviet Union, he dared give it to an Italian Communist publisher who visited Moscow. The Italian Communist Party prohibited the publisher from printing the book, but the publisher quit the Party on account of Hungary and now Pasternak's novel has appeared in Italy where it is being acclaimed a masterpiece. Entitled *Dr. Zhivago,* and full of brave denunciations not only of Soviet practices but of the revolution and Marxism, it will soon be available to the English-reading public in Britain and the United States.

Herblock in The Washington Post

"Don't You Ever Have Anything Fresh?"

The dead hand that has rested and continues to rest on Soviet literature and art creates a cultural vacuum and boredom. In the midst of industrial bustle there is a vast intellectual emptiness, my Moscow friends told me. A number of them attended the concerts of the Boston Symphony which performed in Leningrad and Moscow when I was there. They were thrilled. "We have nothing to match this," a Soviet composer confessed to me. The Soviet theater, once the best in the world, is stagnant, the ballet's choreography is fifty years old, and writers still wear mental shackles. Youth turns to jazz, sex, American films, Western dances and dress; their seniors resort to drink, cards, and Russia's classic literature.

A Soviet youth newspaper which asked in a questionnaire who were the new generation's heroes got answers with names from the works of Lermontov, Pushkin, and the great Russian novelists of the Nineteenth Century, but none from the political or cultural worlds of the post-1917 era. Sputniks do not feed the soul. Their high cost also cuts food for the stomach. The steppes of Russia have sprouted factories and farms but intellectually the country is a desert. Yet the Soviet man's mind is athirst. Khrushchev is concentrating on the nation's food. How long can he withhold the quenching drink of freedom? He has taken a few steps backward from his February, 1956, Twentieth Party Congress secret speech condemning Stalin. The purges of Malenkov, Molotov, Shepilov, Kaganovich, and Zhukov are further retrogressive, disillusioning, confusing steps. The Soviet public obviously does not quite know which way Khrushchev is heading or how permanent is *his* tenure (though from the outside he looks secure, as Zhukov did until last October).

More than ever since 1917, the Soviet government depends on the good will and support of the people. But the population has no organization; the Party is the only political organization, and the essence of Khrushchev's internal strategy is to maintain the supremacy of the Party in economic matters as well as mil-

itary. The revolt of the Malenkov-managers represented, among other things, an attempt of the industrial leaders to win relief from Party interference and domination, to make the Soviet economy less a political economy in which material results would not always be sacrificed to Party and power ends.

The Khrushchev antagonism to Zhukov was based on Party hostility to even partially independent operations by another power group. Zhukov, having saved Khrushchev's political position in June, 1957, and helped decisively in ousting Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, and Shepilov, loomed too large, appeared too influential for Khrushchev's taste, and since they had been eliminated, Khrushchev no longer needed the Marshal. Behind this personal equation, however, is the struggle of the armed forces—loyal to state and Party and led almost entirely by Party men—to liberate itself from irksome political interference. The Party has won in all instances, yet it seems still to be on the defensive; especially since, for the population as a whole, it is synonymous with repression, compulsion, and world goals while the industrialists and the military are more closely identified with material and national interests.

The Soviet domestic situation appears extremely fluid, and crystal-ball predictions are, now as ever, dangerous. The Kremlin is seeking to win plaudits at home by victories abroad. (Khrushchev's near-fall in December, 1956, was largely the result of the loss of prestige he suffered from the Polish and Hungarian revolutions two months earlier.)

This consideration might justify a more flexible American foreign policy. One never knows what will emerge from secret, serious, patient, ambassadorial, then foreign-minister, then summit negotiations. Meanwhile, our government and institutions like universities, foundations, city governments, industrial companies, large farm cooperatives, research projects, and newspapers should undertake personnel exchanges with the Soviet Union (and Russia's satellites) in an attempt to achieve total civilian communication. Those who believe in democracy have nothing to fear from association with dictatorships.

Soviet and American Education

MISTAKEN ENVY

by GEORGE FISCHER

Few Americans are better qualified to compare Soviet and American education than Mr. Fischer. Son of long-time Moscow correspondent Louis Fischer and Markoosha Fischer, he spent a decade, 1929-1939, as a pupil in a Soviet public kindergarten, grade school, and high schools and another decade in the United States completing high school and obtaining a bachelor's degree at the University of Wisconsin and a doctorate at Harvard. For the past 10 years he has been an associate of Harvard's Russian Research Center and currently combines this assignment with a professorship of history at Brandeis University. He is the author of Soviet Opposition to Stalin, *and, just published,* Russian Liberalism, *to be reviewed next month by Justice William O. Douglas.*—THE EDITORS

IN THE brief half year since the first Sputnik, most Americans have swerved from disdain for Soviet education to almost defeatist frenzy. The many millions of words said and written on the subject failed to make clear how Soviet education really compares with American, or what the United States should do. But they did spread and deepen the country's concern.

Nor have the experts resolved this anxiety. Newspaper readers could detect repeated disagreements even among top American scientists, educators, and specialists on Soviet affairs. And statistics, that last refuge of modern polemics, failed to help. To cite a stark example, statistics tell us on the one hand that the U.S.S.R. has twice as many engineering students as the United States, but on the other statistics tell us that the total number of Soviet engineers remains smaller and that in total university enrollment the United States has a per capita lead of two and a half times.

Over the years, a few contrasts between Soviet and American education have stood out again and again in my mind:

- My Soviet schoolmates were much more studious and conscientious in school work than my American companions.
- Although having fun is in no way an American monopoly, the quantity and quality of American athletic, extra-curricular, and social activities would appall even the most sybaritic among Soviet students.
- A Soviet student's view of his own future is likely to be earnest and determined, an American's casual and not quite crystallized.
- In the realm of morals, Soviet students are either charmingly innocent and primly moral, or uninhibitedly coarse. Young Americans are relatively more sophisticated and outspoken, but also more uncertain about how to behave.
- There is an important contrast between the American's frequent and unself-conscious chatter about material goods and his liking of them, and the Soviet schoolboy's attitude—a priggish disdain about discussing such things but, in fact, much more avid preoccupation with them.
- Soviet students are likely to be proud of their country, including the achievements of the Soviet system, to

the point of thin-skinned sensitivity. Their American counterparts as often as not will manifest a quite similar chauvinism, but also emphasize doubts, dislikes, cynicism.

• I shall never forget how full of quick and independent opinions I thought my American schoolmates were when I first encountered them after a decade with Soviet pupils. Sweeping, pointed, sharply clashing judgments and attitudes seemed to pour out at a rate that was completely unknown to me in Russia.

Why do Soviet students appear to be so much more studious, earnest, determined, puritan than American students?

Because—

• Under the Soviet system Russia has focussed all its life on one objective: overcoming its position as a have-not, underdog, late comer. Just as naturally the United States, the most prosperous, productive, and powerful society of the Twentieth Century, has engendered a work atmosphere that is at once more chaotic, less single-minded, and leisurely.

• It is this, together with a dictatorial government whose central slogan is increasingly that of "overtaking America," that molds Soviet education. No wonder, then, that such a society could start with vast poverty and vast illiteracy and yet before long end up with a vast number of specialists. For these are all specialists in the country's number one item of business—industrialization and material progress. Success should not cause nearly so much awe and dismay when everything in a huge country with fabulous natural and human resources is geared to one such task.

• In concrete terms, the Soviet drive and political system are reflected in a wholly centralized and one-purpose type of education. All-important, too, is the absence of a free labor market and geographic mobility, as well as the often-mentioned encouragement and sometimes molly-coddling of scientists and engineers. When these special privileges for the educated elite are combined with the still strikingly low standard of living of others in Russia, it is no wonder at all that students there will be endlessly more conscientious and grimmer about their schoolwork than Americans.

• Since the U.S.S.R. today remains in large measure a late comer society in a great hurry, it has reduced to a minimum the activities—and people—occupied with affairs other than the bare essentials of technology, management, and the Soviet versions of Hollywood and Madison Avenue. While we often complain about the tastelessness of American mass culture, life here is not nearly so standardized or gray as in the single-purpose Soviet society.

• Yet the present population of the U.S.S.R., lacking the prosperity and old culture of the West or its own pre-Stalin Europeanized minority, does not find all this nearly so frustrating or repugnant as Westerners might. The Russians are deeply gratified by the material progress their country is making. Since most of them now come to education and the professions from distinctly lower-class backgrounds, the resulting rise of status and income justifies most if not all of the hardships imposed on them and on the rest of the country.

• Hence Russia, including its schoolboys, has only a minimum of

need, disposition, or people to engage in the kind of independent living, thinking, and politicking which are an American trademark. Here and there the Russians covet more freedom especially in professional and personal domains. But the Americans' luxurious trust in drawn-out public disagreements and little regulated human relations is something few Soviet citizens can ever accept or envy, not excluding the "restive" students and writers our press has been making so much of. It also explains why Soviet students are liable to be still more puritan, gauche, provincial, and chauvinistic than their American counterparts usually seem in the eyes of European critics.

• These traits appear to be counterbalanced by attractive traits in Soviet youth: determination and absolute certainty about their own future, a high degree of pure idealism, an uncomplicated faith in many of the old verities that Americans either scoff at or inwardly doubt. But these attractive features are based on a narrowness which Americans, fortunately, do not possess.

What conclusions can we then draw from these inferences about Soviet and American education?

Above all, that the basic difference is one between the countries as a whole, between over-all ways of life and stages of developments. These determine how students work, and what they want to be, more than any specific aspects of school itself. The Soviet Union is geared to telescoped modernization to the exclusion of all else; the United States wants to retain world leadership without sacrificing its free way of life. These are vastly different goals, and they cannot but be reflected in all aspects of life, including education. Until this is generally accepted in the United States, we are liable to overemphasize short-run education gadgeteering and court failure in our long-run objectives.

Thus the United States need not and cannot insist on a wholly centralized and uniform curriculum. Nor can we adopt the old Prussian emphasis on rote learning and rigid discipline which dominates Soviet schools today, or imitate their neglect of independent thinking and broader vistas. Above all, we cannot consider a program of the Soviet type that keeps other parts of the population much poorer and almost eliminates personal choices on careers. All these things we should not do, and the sooner we decide not to do them (or to envy a society that does), the better.

This does not mean, however, as too many Americans are proclaiming these days, that we are hopelessly

handicapped. If anything, the contrary is more true. The U.S.S.R.'s achievements are attained at so vast a cost and strain on individuals and all society that its present drive can persist only as long as these achievements appear greater than the hardships, and so long as hope exists of "overtaking America," the U.S.S.R.'s present drive is liable to persist. But so much of this in turn depends on the United States either standing still, or declining, that any effort on our part, even a partial one, will bear much more fruit than statistics or logic might indicate.

Specifically, the educational system of the United States, as well as its science and technology, today remain on a considerably higher level than those of the U.S.S.R. The Soviets are advancing more rapidly, and in certain carefully selected areas they have recently outdistanced us. Yet our continued over-all lead should remind us that the measures required are not nearly so extreme as pessimists and alarmists have been urging.

Therefore, I would suggest the following approach to the improvements generally desired in the country today:

• Pre-college instruction, in the sciences and elsewhere, is much worse today than it need be. With more money and a modicum of less indulgence (and blaming each other) by parents and teachers, a change for the better should not be at all impossible. We can do this without centralizing education, adopting Prussian methods, or sacrificing either non-scientific subjects or the student's individuality.

• The fact that scientists will feel less indispensable, and less universally respected, in a society that already has reached high prosperity and power than in one which is seeking these urgently, is hard to avoid or to alter. But the American public, the government, the press, and educational institutions can well start giving more approbation to scientists, scholars, and intellectuals than we have in the past. Nor need this be motivated and manifested by the narrowly utilitarian considerations prevalent in the U.S.S.R. On the other hand, it may well be that some of our scientists and "eggheads" in general—like so many other Americans —crave more outside love and approval than they need or can ever get, and that some experts' present criticisms might possibly be turned inward. In any event, again no Soviet-type procedure seems at all necessary.

• Much has been made of the financial considerations which keep gifted students out of science, scien-

tists out of the essential non-commercial, "pure" research, and intellectuals in general from doing long-range and high-quality work. This is unquestionably valid, and large new amounts of money must be made available for each of these purposes.

The current Administration proposal for federal aid to education consists of tiny grants to prospective students, and much too little money for advanced research. So endlessly wealthy and productive is this country that this, too, can be changed without any of the primitive and dictatorial practices on which Soviet advances have been based.

• "Crash program" has become a favorite term in current American discussions. In the realm of education, science, and research, such an approach would be little short of fatal. Perhaps we could risk it if we did not care about the people involved, used dictatorial methods, and would accept shoddy products as the Soviets often do. Barring this, there is no reason to embrace the desperate technique of "crash programs," all the more so because other methods of improvement have hardly been tried.

• The same is true of the teaching of science. After under-financing and neglecting our educational system, we now want to produce, almost exclusively, Albert Einsteins. This is not only impossible but unnecessary. Neither mass production of scientists nor a large number of science courses in any way ensures high quality. It remains to be seen whether such methods in the U.S.S.R. will produce a new post-1917 generation of outstanding scientists, of the relatively very few topnotch scientists and engineers that a great society requires. What we need, instead, is money and support for the gifted students and scientists that America possesses in quite ample numbers. On the crucial elementary and high school levels, this might well call for the establishment in all larger communities of special publicly supported schools for the scientifically gifted, as New York has done with the Bronx School of Science. In college, and particularly in graduate teaching, the key lies in a great deal more time and leeway for immersion in a complex specialty.

• This is true, likewise, of advanced research. What is required is not one grandiose scientific "West Point" of science but large—not ruinously large—amounts of additional funds to the dozen or more already existing research centers across the country that are outstanding and capable of much more research, and especially more daringly "pure" research.

• Perhaps most important, as long as we want the products of our schools to be not only good technicians but free men as well, we should never even consider stripping the curriculum of all but the bare utilitarian "essentials" as the Soviets have done. This is all the more true since a majority of our students will not be scientists anyway, and to impose a heavily scientific curriculum on them would be a waste of their time and their country's money.

In sum, my personal experience only confirms that we are mistakenly envying Soviet education for things wholly out of step with both our free society and our actual needs. American education indeed requires many improvements, to help make free citizens no less than more and better technicians. But these improvements depend on our own way of life and its continuing greatness, not on imitating or "overtaking" Soviet education.

EDUCATION IN THE U.S.S.R.

The Curious Case of

THE DOCTORED REPORT

by ELEANOR S. LOWMAN

DURING NOVEMBER, 1957, the U.S. Office of Education released a comprehensive report, *Education in the U.S.S.R.*, underscoring the size and intensity of the Soviet educational system. The book met with unusual interest, the entire first edition of 10,000 copies selling out in two days—unique in the history of U.S. Office of Education publications.

Highlights from the book were incorporated in speeches given by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, the commissioner of education, leading American educators, and scientists appearing before Congressional committees. Many newspapers and magazines devoted full page spreads and long articles to the material in the book.

A week later the nation's newspapers carried the story of charges of "suppression, inaccuracy, distortion, and delay of material of national import," charges made by the author of *Education in the U.S.S.R.*, in a letter to Secretary Folsom.

I was the author of that book. I made the charges. Why? What had happened?

It all began some eight years ago in Washington, D. C., with a stack of charts. These charts showed clearly the spectacular rate at which the Soviet Union was increasing its reservoir of scientists and engineers.

Although the number of college students in the United States was much larger than that of the U.S.S.R., only 20 per cent of American graduates were majoring in science; in the U.S.S.R. 50 per cent were science majors. The United States was training large numbers of engineers each year, but the Soviet Union was annually turning out twice as many. While there were many more people in the United States with a higher education and advanced training in science and engineering than there were in the U.S.S.R., when it came down to actually being employed in the economy, both countries had about the same number. This was the relative status of American and Soviet scientific and technical manpower. The trends were even more startling.

More students were majoring in astronomy at a single Soviet higher educational institution than in all American schools combined. Each year the flood of students wanting to study physics in Soviet universities was increasing. The picture for other important fields of science was the same.

The implication? Unless the United States undertook new measures to increase our own facilities for scientific education, to attract a greater number of able students into science studies, Soviet scientific and technological manpower in key areas would greatly outnumber ours in the next decade.

Numbers, though, are only half the story. What about quality? How good were these Soviet graduates? How were they being trained? These were a few of the questions raised by my colleagues in the government. My next assignment was to find the answers.

The source of my information? It came from everywhere. I reviewed every book in the Library of Congress bearing on the subject of Soviet education, I believe. I also surveyed the reference material at the Hoover Library at Stanford, the New York City Library, and the libraries at Harvard and Columbia Universitties. And of course I had access to all the classified material available in the government.

Every Soviet educational journal—and our country has fairly complete collections—was read and notes were made of the discussions being carried on by Soviet educators regarding the strengths and weaknesses of their educational practices. Soviet newspapers were scanned for educational statistics. Soviet teachers and government education officials visiting the United States readily answered specific questions.

I interviewed people who had been to school in the U.S.S.R. about their educational experiences. Those who had also studied in the United States or in Western Europe were particularly questioned for their opinions about differences, similarities, things well done, things done poorly. Especially valuable comments were supplied by former Soviet teachers and professors, some of whom are now teaching in the United States. (Interestingly enough, while all of the former Soviet citizens I consulted had left the Soviet Union largely because of their detestation for the Communist regime and the Soviet way of life, they nevertheless tended to look back upon their education with respect.)

And then there were the reports of tourists returning from the Soviet Union. Each saw what his eyes wanted to see as well as what was shown to him. I spent hundreds of hours interviewing and reading the accounts of those who were there. Some saw the tail of the Russian bear; others saw his ears. Some saw

ELEANOR SATHER LOWMAN, a recognized expert in the field of Soviet education and scientific training, was an intelligence officer for the U.S. government from 1950 to 1955. During 1956 she was a member of the staff of comparative education in the U.S. Office of Education and in 1957 she was employed by the Division of Scientific Personnel and Education in the National Science Foundation. Throughout this period she also served as a consultant on Soviet education for the U.S. Air Force, the Office of Defense Mobilization, the Academy of Science, the Center for International Studies at MIT, and the State Department.

only his teeth and his claws. A few felt his soft fur.

The data began to stack up. There was indeed more to Soviet education than mere Communist indoctrination. It was a systematic, efficient, methodical effort to supply the Soviet state with trained manpower of every conceivable type. Students were not regarded as individuals; rather, they were a prized national resource. As such, the education to which they were subjected had to be effective. It had to produce. It had to show a profit to the state for the time and money expended by graduating specialists fully as competent as those in the West.

Findings indicating the substantial caliber of Soviet scientific and technological training began to be supported by American scientists concerned with the actual achievements of these Soviet graduates. True, Soviet biology had suffered in the field of genetics as a result of politically supported but scientifically unacceptable data. But in the physical sciences and in engineering, ideology gave way to fact.

Soviet work in mathematics and meterology was found to be not only on a par with that in the United States, but in some respects ahead. Chemistry and physics, too, were found to be healthy and flourishing. At a time when Soviet science was regarded as something of a joke by the American public at large, increasing numbers of American scientists were coming across examples of Soviet research which excited their interest and commanded their respect.

The task of informing the American people about the Soviet effort in science and education was begun. It was a difficult job. Not only was the public apathetic, but even numerous government officials refused to believe the mounting evidence. How could a people subjected to authoritarian thought control possibly be doing anything worthy of American respect, much less concern?

Nevertheless, people began to ask for information. The mail in the U.S. Office of Education started to pile up. The flood of mail prompted the Office to obtain the services of someone to write a factual presentation of the Soviet educational system.

Because of my strategic position in the government it was almost inevitable that I should be invited to undertake this assignment. After all, I had had a unique opportunity to become acquainted with the most up-to-date information then available. To quote former Secretary of the Air Force Donald A. Quarles, my knowledge of Soviet educational policies and practices was "unique in the West."

I accepted the job. Nine months later the manuscript was finished. It was completed in spite of the complete lack of administrative support. The Office of Education simply was not geared to cope with an iron-curtain country. I had to supply all my own reference materials. To do this I had to buy out of my own pocket all books and journals. I had to establish my own liaison lines with other governmental agencies; I had to find my own reviewers.

There was no one in the Office of Education competent to examine the book critically, I was told, so I asked colleagues in other branches of the

government and various specialists in the field of Soviet affairs to go over separate sections and over the manuscript as a whole. Many of them spent long hours checking it over at no compensation for their time and effort.

Their suggestions were carefully incorporated and integrated into the final draft. It was submitted to the editorial division. One of the finest editors in the Office of Education then worked on the manuscript for three months—checking statistical tables, eliminating repetitious material, culling for inconsistencies, hunting for possibly misleading statements. It was marked for the press and ready to go October 1, 1956.

It was not a particularly outstanding book, but under the circumstances and in the time allotted, it was a reputable job. I was not ashamed to sign my name to it.

Immediately after turning in the finished manuscript I was asked to leave. There was no more money, I was told, to keep me on the staff. There would no longer be a Soviet desk. But there would be a desk for education in Latin America, for Western Europe, for the Far East, and for the Middle East and Africa. This, despite a specific request from the Defense Department that the Soviet studies be continued.

Two months before I was asked to leave, Secretary Folsom had been sent two letters. One was from the Secretary of Defense and one was from the Secretary of the Air Force.

Charles E. Wilson expressed appreciation for "the assistance" I had given to the Defense Department on Soviet education, commenting that it "was of the highest quality." In closing his letter he wrote that his department considered my work on Soviet education "a valuable contribution to national security."

Donald A. Quarles, then Secretary of the Air Force, wrote that, in preparing briefings for technological planning in the Department of Defense, the Air Force placed "much reliance" on my work. He said he felt strongly about the value of keeping abreast of Soviet educational achievements, commenting—with greater foresight than he realized—that "the importance of these studies may not be recognized fully within the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare."

I left. I accepted an appointment with the National Science Foundation. Later I became a consultant to the State Department on Soviet education.

The months went by. Winter became spring. Still no word on my manuscript. "It is being read for policy," I was told. Then one day when I telephoned I was told it had already gone to press. I hadn't seen

it before it went despite repeated assurances that I would. I was told there had really been no reason for my giving it a last reading.

Summer became fall, and no galley proofs arrived. One day in October—more than a year after it was completely ready for publication—I called again to ask about the galleys. I was greeted with: "The page proofs are here if you care to see them."

The next morning I was down at the office to see my book in page proof. I was stunned.

Apparently it had been turned over to people in the Office of Education who knew nothing about the subject matter, who knew nothing about editing, and who were not adept journalists. The manuscript had been cut in half, but not with any discretion. There had been no attempt to keep a balanced presentation or to eliminate less essential material.

Much valuable information on Soviet education especially included in the manuscript at the request of the Department of Defense, the Committee for the Development of Scientists and Engineers, the Office of Defense Mobilization, the National Science Foundation, and intelligence agencies in the Government—to name a few—was deleted.

For some reason many paragraphs had been completely reworded with the result that they not only contained errors but were longer than the original paragraphs. The entire chapter on administration of Soviet education—difficult to understand at best—was now cut up, devoid of its explanatory chart, and inserted at random throughout the book.

The section on financing education was scarcely recognizable. It now made no reference to the fact that in the U.S.S.R. over ten per cent of the national income was spent on education while less than three per cent of ours was. Sections outlining the method of financing education in the U.S.S.R. had been taken out and new paragraphs inserted on what *we* were doing and how we were doing it in the United States with respect to financing our education—interesting to be sure, but a bit out of place since there was now no data on Soviet financing with which to compare it.

As might be expected when wholesale deletions and rewordings are undertaken by non-specialists in the subject matters, errors crept in. Some were humorous: "As the preceding examples show . . ." There were no preceding examples; they had been cut out.

Some errors were careless: In discussing such qualitative factors affecting higher education as the national figure of over three applicants per one acceptance, the passage reads "three applicants per vacancy in the philological faculty of Leningrad University . . ." The idea had been to show that while the national average was over three, the range was from as many as 14 applicants per vacancy at the philological faculty of the University of Leningrad to a low of 11 applicants for 300 vacancies in Kharkov Institute for Librarians. Another example of sheer carelessness was the handling of the pictures in the manuscript. They were replaced out of order and out of context.

Some errors of fact were minor: for example, understating the number of Soviet students enrolled in higher educational institutions by a million in a text passage, leaving it correct in a statistical table.

Other errors of fact were serious: By rewording the section dealing with education in the Soviet Constitution—a key translation I had had checked for accuracy by the Russian Legal Section at the Library of Congress and by the State Department—the passage was completely erroneous. It not only said that education was compulsory through grade ten when in fact it was compulsory only through grade seven. But it also implied that education in the Soviet Union was free only through the primary and secondary grades when in fact it is free from first grade through graduate study. As a result of this rewording on free education, all subsequent general references to it had also been removed.

Errors of distortion were numerous. In the chapter on teacher training, for example, illustrations of the curricula for each type and level of

An Important Announcement for Progressive Subscribers

On April 15, 1958, the subscription price of The Progressive will increase as follows:

	Present Rate	New Rate
1 year	$ 4.00	$ 5.00
2 years	7.00	9.00
3 years	10.00	12.00
single copy	35 cents	50 cents

Until April 15, you may renew your subscription at the current rates for any length of time, and regardless of when your present subscription expires. There's a coupon on Page 48 for your convenience in renewing. Full details regarding this subscription rate increase are in this month's Office Memo, Page 2.

The Progressive MADISON, WISCONSIN

training were given. In attempting to "improve" this chapter only two curricula were left in—one for kindergarten teachers and one practically obsolete for primary school teachers. There is no indication of the training the vast number of secondary school teachers get, as those curricula were deleted. That alone was bad enough. But the now almost obsolete program for primary school teachers was set forth as representing the training all Soviet teachers get!

Although no new material on Soviet education was added to the book, some one or some group of people in the Office of Education added three and one-half pages of conclusions. With parts of these *everyone* who knows anything about Soviet education would disagree. The other half of the conclusions have nothing to do with highlights of Soviet education; they summarize education in the United States.

Thus, Soviet kindergartens are described as child care centers, when, in fact, they provide carefully planned educational activities of a greater scope than exist in any American kindergarten. Soviet extra-curricular activities are described as "work activities" of a "voluntary-compulsory" nature. This is not the case at all. Soviet children study a traditional curriculum. Extra-curricular activities in the U.S.S.R. serve the same function as do such activities in the United States—to provide children with opportunities for engaging in pursuits of special interest: photography, sports, language conversation, glee club, orchestra, chess, and journalism.

The lack of balance is self-evident. Long sections on the historical development of a given segment of Soviet training were left in, while important details and actual examples of present-day study programs and current statistical data are gone. The meat of the chapter on teacher training and the teaching profession was cut to the point of inconsequence, while the relatively less important chapter on vocational and agricultural training remains voluminous.

Errors of omission are the public's loss. The published version does reveal the scope and to some extent the

Herblock in The Washington Post

"Dear Boy, Where Have You Been Keeping Yourself?"

quality of Soviet training. But omitted were references to the all important *how*. It would have been of interest to a curious America to know some of the methods and techniques employed to solve many of the same problems confronting U.S. education today.

Other data cut out which had been specifically requested by consumer groups are: Soviet teacher salary scales; examples of curricula in higher educational institutions, draft deferment of students; programs for blind, deaf and dumb, and mentally retarded children; refresher courses for teachers; military training programs in civilian and military schools.

Substituted for a carefully compiled selected reading list was a mere enumeration of those sources cited in footnote references throughout the manuscript. This omission was particularly inexplicable because of all information requested by those writing to the Office of Education regarding Soviet education, requests for a selected bibliography head the list.

Despite denying intentions to make use of these materials, my requests for release of the material not included in the book were flatly rejected by my immediate supervisor.

In discussing the page proofs I pointed out the more significant errors of fact which could have been corrected at very little cost. I learned later why not a single correction was made: the manuscript had already been returned to the press before I saw the proofs!

The book is out now. My name does not appear as the author. I am buried in my own list of acknowledgments as the one who prepared the original manuscript. The Office of Education says the book is a staff study, although no other contributing authors are listed. There weren't any.

Why did I write a letter of protest? I had not planned to do so. It was only after the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare and the commissioner of education started giving speeches based on material in the book and referring to it publicly as a "careful, factual, and statistical study" that I wrote them what had happened. While there is much material of value in the book, I suggested that it be used with caution.

Long after the letter became public and the furor had died down, I received a courteous letter from Secretary Folsom thanking me for my interest.

The book is still being distributed by the Department. To my knowledge no effort has been made to correct any of the errors in subsequent printings. No one in Health, Education, and Welfare has ever expressed any curiosity about the errors or asked me what was specifically wrong. But perhaps the details are unimportant. The American people now know the seriousness of Soviet competition. In his second televised address to the nation following the launching of the Soviet sputniks, President Eisenhower cited one of the highlights in my book pointing out the very real challenge Soviet education presents. And he charged Americans with re-examining their local school curricula.

The U.S. Office of Education is now spearheading the drive to re-evaluate our own American educational process. This is as it should be. I sincerely hope, however, that more foresight, discretion, and care are displayed by those charged with this effort than were shown by those in the Office who were responsible for making known the facts of Soviet education.

soviet CONTRADICTIONS *as revealed in soviet literature*

by GEORGE GIBIAN

WHILE Mao Tse-tung has startled the Communist world by admitting that "contradictions" (in our terminology, conflicts, tensions, or hostilities) exist in China, classifying them in categories, and explaining their origin and future course, Soviet theoreticians have denied the existence of such contradictions in the Soviet Union. In his American television interview Khrushchev said they did not exist in Russia. The delicacy and importance of his answer were underlined by its deletion from the text published in Moscow. The denials of Russian spokesmen will not stand up against the evidence of their own current literature, as I propose to show by examining part of the recent Soviet literary output:

One—The most common contradiction is between the well-to-do, city-dwelling, privileged member of the ruling class who repeats the official, optimistic slogans, and between the masses of workers or farm laborers from whom he has become alienated.

In a recent story by Nikolay Zhdanov, "Return Home," published in the second volume of the controversial anthology, *Literary Moscow*, a successful bureaucrat receives word of the death in the country of his aged mother, whom he had failed to visit for six years. He takes a train to the village where she lived and is to be buried. His visit begins as a retracing of his own chilhood days and turns into a journey of discovery of the conditions of life of the rural population: "Varygin looked at the towels, gray for a long time, and again, not for the first time, the idea painfully struck him that his mother had suffered from want."

Life on the farm is much more old-fashioned and wretched than it had seemed from his office, where he was looked after by an efficient secretary, attended meetings, and learned about life from official reports only. The villagers look at him from across a wide gulf: "They say you are now one of the leaders." Some assure him that his mother had been well off—she even received sugar a few times a year. Others take the opportunity to overwhelm him with their complaints. They must make excessive compulsory deliveries of produce; they have to send off so much grain that none is left for themselves after springtime.

The conflict is clearest in Varygin's conversation with a local engineer, who tells him, "In our region more than half of the nineteen collective farms are doing poorly. The harvest is small, people work unwillingly, they eat badly," and attacks official optimism: "The village would be much better off if there were fewer government cheerer-uppers. It is necessary to overcome difficulties, not hush them up." The city man "felt neither willingness nor strength to examine all that the engineer told him and that he had seen in the course of the day."

The complacency of a ruler collides with the discouraging harshness of the actual life of the underlings. The story reveals the contradiction between the uninformed optimism of the bureaucratic elite and the wretched life of farm laborers squeezed by demands from above. Incidentally, it also explains a great deal of what is behind Khrushchev's recent moves for improvement of agricultural conditions.

Zhdanov's story ends with the official's return to town, pleased to escape the unpleasant realities he had witnessed.

Two—The contradictions between the Party leadership on the district level and Party membership among the people are exemplified in Alexander Yashin's short story, "The Levers," in the same volume of *Literary Moscow*. A group of workers on a collective farm, all Party members on the grass-roots level, criticize their district Party officials. The district head had called the local members his "levers." "Carry out the Party line," he had told them. "You are now our levers in the village." The men complain about him:

> "He doesn't listen to people. He decided everything by himself. He thinks the Party would lose authority if he talked to people simply, like a human being. . . . Our leaders in the District have forgotten how to talk to the people. . . . As long as there is no confidence in the simple peasant on the collective farm, there will be no real order. We'll see a lot of trouble yet. They write about us: a new human being has made his appearance. True, he has. The collective farm has transformed the peasant. True, it has transformed him. The peasant is no longer the same. Good. So now they ought to trust this peasant. He too has some sense. They must not only teach us, but also listen to us. Go and

GEORGE GIBIAN is a professor in the Russian and English departments at Smith College. He is the author of "Tolstoy and Shakespeare" and articles on Soviet and world literature in the New Republic, Russian Review, Problems of Communism, and Comparative Literature.

disagree with them at the Region. They will give you advice, a recommendation, but it is no advice, it is an order."

Yashin's story shows that the simple people feel a clear line of demarcation separates them from the next higher echelon of Party workers. They wish to be trusted, consulted, listened to; they resent being ordered about and considered mere tools, "levers." They yearn for warm, personal treatment.

Three—Another form of contradiction is shown in portrayals of evil men who have climbed up the hierarchy of industrial or scientific institutions, abuse their power to enrich themselves, and build "personal empires" or "monopolies." They are indifferent to the welfare of others and either too ignorant to notice the injustices being done to inventors and innovators whose brilliant ideas are being suppressed, or they know full well what is going on, but suppress the ideas for the sake of personal interests and friendships. The great number of such characters in recent Soviet writing suggests that in this area the Party may even be encouraging frank criticism in the hope of frightening and perhaps reforming or removing such "imperialists" from their positions, or at least of alerting the population to the problem.

In Venyamin Kaverin's novel, *Searches and Hopes*, the contradiction between the interests of science and the power interests of a highly placed individual is shown in several characters, Skrypachenko, Kramov, and a deputy minister, who obstruct the efforts of a woman scientist to develop penicillin. They use anonymous denunciatory letters to newspapers and medical journals to attack scientists whose rise they are attempting to halt, and even slander, leading to the frame-up of the heroine's husband and his sentencing to years of imprisonment.

Kramov's motives in wishing to suppress Russian investigation of penicillin and his advocacy of buying the English patents for its manufacture are purely selfish. He wishes to be able to say that he has done a great service to the state in acquiring a drug which will return to combat many wounded soldiers; he hopes to be able to write dozens of articles about it, showing himself to best advantage, justifying the many financial advances he paid out to various supporters; and he intends to satisfy his vanity without risk. On the other hand, an independent research project would be fraught with doubts and uncertainties. As one character says about Kramov and his henchmen, "These people are capable of committing crimes." They have established themselves on the editorial boards of medical journals, in research institutes, in medical schools, and in ministries. They are "bold intriguers who think one thing and say something altogether different." It is impossible to fight Kramov. One character says that only one thing can be of help—Kramov's death.

That is exactly what happens towards the end of the novel—Kramov dies. But his followers and others like him continue entrenched in powerful positions. On the other

hand, the protagonists also succeed—they develop a Soviet variant of penicillin. The upshot is a compromise; neither side has dislodged the other or won a decisive victory.

The contradiction depicted by Kaverin in gruesome detail is that between an evil, unscrupulous man and his clique in high positions in scientific and medical institutions, who abuse their power, and the honest, productive, hard working scientists, who are hampered and persecuted by their conspiratorial superiors.

Four—Another contradiction shown by Soviet fiction is that produced by the premium placed on a successful managerial record which conflicts with the welfare of the workers as well as with the demands of the whole economy.

In Ilya Ehrenburg's novel, *The Thaw*, the title of which could serve as a description of the entire post-Stalin period of Soviet literature, the head of a factory postpones the construction of long overdue apartments for the workers, even though the funds have been allocated and the building order issued. He is more interested in over-fulfilling his production quota, which means that a mark will be chalked up in his favor at the ministry, whereas housing for workers does not figure on the record of industrial production. A storm destroys the hovels in which the workers had been left to live; the director's dereliction becomes apparent to all. He is removed, but after a short period of time pops up again in a good position in another part of the country.

In Sofronov's play, *The Moscow Character*, the director of a textile machine factory similarly refuses to put into development and production a superior new model, for his planned output quota had not envisaged the introduction of a new model and hence did not take into account the interruption of production which would lower his output for the current year. He, too, gives preference to what will look better on his record rather than to what the national economy (and the consumer) requires. A contradiction is obvious between the requirements of the country and the direction in which self-interest of the managers is steering them through the incentive system of rewards used to guide the economy.

Five—A related contradiction is that between the demands of one's own career and those of integrity of character. In Daniel Granin's fine story, "Personal Convictions," a situation otherwise similar to that of Kaverin's novel is analyzed from the individual's moral point of view. The chief character, Minaev, started as a bold, independent, idealistic young man who dared to criticize whatever he held deserved to be attacked. He was soon taught to be more circumspect.

He tried to fight on, but after two friends who sided with him were

fired, he gave in. He conformed; he kept quiet. Still, he told himself that he was making only a temporary tactical retreat. He would work his way up a little; later, when he had more power, he would speak honestly in defense of whatever he believed was the right cause. But every time he reached a higher rung on the ladder of professional success in industry, he realized that he still did not have enough power—it would have to be the next higher job—and then the next above that—and the next.

The story shows him preparing to speak out at last against a group of powerful men in defense of a youngster who is quite justified in his criticism of a badly designed motor and who reminds Minaev of his own younger self years before. But Minaev cannot put his intention into effect. The exigencies of his position and of the research institute he is now directing make it impolitic for him to speak up—and he is beginning to realize that the time when he will be powerful enough to act courageously and honestly may never come at all. Not only his early years on the lowest steps of the hierarchy, but all his life will be sacrificed to expediency, compromise, hedging.

Granin demonstrates the incompatibility between the demands of forthrightness and courage, and the conditions of success in Soviet industry. To be honest, one must resign oneself to being an outcast and a failure; to be successful, one must shut one's eyes to many unpleasant truths. The author even suggests that the system is rigged to reward caution by promotions and to punish boldness by treatment appropriate to a troublemaker. Forces embodied in the social system squelch initiative and idealism; the yes-man is elevated above the innovator and rebel.

Six—The sharp line dividing the ruling class from the mass of the population has another by-product—the personal, emotional isolation of the elite from the people.

One reason why Vladimir Dudintsev's novel, *Not By Bread Alone,* has stirred up unusual controversies in Russia is its courageous portrayal of this contradiction, which is a reversal of the pious Soviet doctrine that Soviet leaders are close to the masses: that they *are* the people.

The industrial boss Drozdov is Dudintsev's exemplar of the isolated leaders; he is also the theoretician and spokesman for the group, of whose position in society he is aware and to which he has become reconciled. His separation from the people is evident at every turn. The elite all live together, in the same neighborhood, in superior duplex houses; Drozdov even has both halves of a house to himself.

To celebrate a wedding anniver-



sary, he gives a party to which his wife, who works as a schoolteacher, wants to invite some of her fellow teachers. Drozdov explains to her that this would not do; the furnishings of their house, their whole way of life would provoke the envy of her colleagues. Only other members of the elite should be invited—the head of the coal trust, party officials, industrial executives. Through his rise in Soviet society, he has become isolated from other people; this he considers the inevitable, proper price to pay for his success. The higher he would rise, moreover, the more isolated he would become.

His wife is revolted by her husband's frank acceptance of the stratification of Soviet society. When she is ill and taken to an over-crowded hospital, she finds out that other patients were moved out of a ward into the corridor in order to provide a private room for her. She asks for them to be brought in again. Drozdov learns of her attitude and is disgruntled. He feels that his hard work entitled her to special privileges. He tells her, "These are favors which are distributed at any given stage in proportion to the quantity and quality of work. Equalitarianism is a harmful thing. I for example never go to a hospital. My duties do not allow it. I get over my illnesses on my feet. If we ever lie down, we don't get up any more. . . . When a being like you is sick, it is a pleasure to look at her. You must be placed in special circumstances! You are my special one, a rare flower. When Ganicheva [the wife of another leading man] is sick, the woman will make them [other patients] get out again."

The contradiction here is between the privileged members of the elite, set apart in splendid isolation, and the bulk of the population. Drozdov is socially, materially, and in power differentiated and cut off from the people. In his own eyes, he looks on himself as a member of a ruling class. In addition, he disregards the best interests of the country in ways similar to those already illustrated from Granin and Kaverin. He suppresses new inventions, plays ball with groups of other powerful leaders, and even descends to false accusations leading to the sentencing of innocent opponents.

His wife leaves him and falls in love with his main antagonist. It is a hallmark of isolated, successful individuals in Soviet fiction that in the process of adapting themselves to the demands of their position in the hierarchy, they have become so inhuman that their wives cannot stand being married to them.

Seven—In *Not By Bread Alone,* another conflict is prominent—that between the group and the individual—but, surprisingly for Soviet literature, the individual is the hero, the collective is misguided. In Russian literature of the twenties and thirties, in a conflict of the group with an individual, the group was right and the individual wrong. A typical plot—that of Kirshon's play *Miraculous Alloy*—presents an inventor who refuses to cooperate with a group project in developing a new alloy. He disagrees with their methods and will not yield. He insists on working independently, following his own ideas. He is portrayed, of course, as an egotistic, unpleasant individual. Eventually the group, moving ahead in its cooperative enterprise, finds the solution, while he is still embroiled in his lonely experimentation. He then recognizes the errors of his way.

The group magnanimously allows him to rejoin, and he is reformed into a good, conforming member of the collective, and even allowed to share the glory of their invention.

In *Not By Bread Alone*, the situation is the reverse. Here the heroes are individuals scattered thinly throughout Russia; the bulk of the population seems to constitute an inert, hostile, self-deceived organism. At the end there is no resolution, no recantation or reform.

The hero is an inventor who has designed an excellent new centrifugal pipe-casting machine; the collective is backing a far inferior, wasteful machine. The inventor lives a lonely life, sees very few people, and is supported by a small handful of friends. He is tempted to rejoin the group, but he knows he could only do so at the cost of giving up his superior machine. He is not presented, as he would have been in the thirties or forties, as an anti-social freak and counter-revolutionary. He is correct in trusting his own judgment above that of many bureaucrats and technical experts. Yet he is framed by his opponents and sent to a forced labor camp. At one point the records of his invention are ordered burned. The papers and the inventor himself are saved, partly through luck and partly through the spontaneous help of a few individuals. The system is presented as corrupt; a few private persons mitigate and counteract it.

The novel reveals a conflict between the collective and the private individual. In his manner of presenting the conflict, Dudintsev seems almost to have returned to something akin to the critical Russian Nineteenth Century viewpoint. "One idealist here, and another there, they crop up at every step," Dudintsev has one of his characters say as the most optimistic conclusion circumstances permit—not very different from what Chekhov wrote, "I see salvation in separate individuals scattered over the whole of Russia, here and there. Whether they are intellectuals or muzhiks, strength is in them."

In a recent novel, Galina Nikolaeva's *A Battle On the Way*, one of the most courageous and artistically outstanding books of 1957, printed in five installments of the monthly *Oktyabr*, we encounter a character named Kurganov who wrote his dissertation on the subject of contradictions in Soviet society and who is now working in the provinces, concerned with problems of Soviet agriculture. He frequently refers to his former academic work and comments on contradictions in the life around him. He even explicitly compares the effects of the capitalist system—which tends to drive the inefficient operator out of business and rewards the up-to-date economic worker or type of tractor—with the Soviet economy, in which he urges that a set of non-capitalistic stimuli must be provided which will have the same healthy economic effect as the capitalist methods.

Galina Nikolaeva's long novel presents numerous examples of various types of contradictions, which sometimes are contradictions in the senses in which they have been exemplified in this article and at other times are more like "built-in incentives to inefficiency." Kurganov expresses his conclusions: "Contradictions of class societies were studied for centuries and resolved by bloodshed. Socialism has its own kinds of contradiction which are removed peacefully, by knowledge. The problem is to come to know them, to study them, as soon, as deeply, and as exactly as possible." On another occasion he says: "We have a good many difficulties and contradictions in our country. It is dangerous not that they exist but

that sometimes we are afraid to see them. And our strength lies exactly in studying and removing them consciously."

The Soviet success with satellites has given fresh ammunition to those critics who, like Anatoly Sofronov in the *Literary Gazette* in December, 1957, attack Russian writers who have been drawing attention to "contradictions" and other negative phenomena of Soviet life. Sofronov calls them "troubadours of negative orientation" and says that if Dudintsev, Yashin, and their like were correct, Russia would be on the technological level of the samovar, when actually she is a leading pioneer in the sciences; therefore the picture presented by Dudintsev must be false and his critics correct. This exploitation of Russian scientific advances has currently become the standard official line in urging writers to look more at the positive side of Soviet life.

Several facts emerge from an examination of the "contradictions" laid bare in Soviet fiction:

Many Soviet authors tacitly or overtly take for granted that social stratification exists in the U.S.S.R. They do not attempt to pay lip-service to the official view that in the "socialistic" stage of development, no classes like those of the capitalistic world exist, only social groupings of friendly workers, peasants, and intellectuals. Literature of the past few years presents a picture of a class of rulers, of an elite, which lives a far different life from the ruled, isolated from the population socially and personally.

The outlook of this upper class is very different from the lower class. The hardships of the workers and peasants are known to the rulers only from the vantage point of their city office desk. The elite hold a rosy view of Soviet life, but when they are brought into contact with concrete facts, they become confused and flee back to the security of their office shelter.

Some members of the elite commit transgressions of varying degrees of seriousness; most venial, resorting to clichés instead of facing a problem, refusing to produce a new machine or permit a new drug to be developed; more serious, neglect of workers' living conditions; most criminal, sending an opponent to years of forced labor on trumped-up charges.

The offenses of the elite are not the result of any innate sinfulness of the individuals or to their being "survivals of capitalism," but rather Soviet fiction shows them to be explainable by mechanisms embedded

in the Soviet system itself. The "contradictions" are built in.' They are fundamental, multiform, pervasive, and serious in their consequences.

The Soviet writer, permitted during the "thaw" to indulge in freer criticism than under Stalin, has gone beyond the limits which the government assumed he would observe. He has not restricted himself to exposing a few isolated bureaucrats; consciously or unconsciously, often perhaps without realizing the implications of what he was saying, he has pointed his finger at the root, not merely the excrescence, of the evil.

Paradoxically the writers are applying the sociological method of class analysis, almost Marxist in its exploiter-versus-worker groupings, against a state which purports to be an embodiment of Marxist ideas. The "contradictions," as they present them, constitute a longer, more detailed, more repellent list than Mao Tse-tung's categories.

Khrushchev's attacks on Stalin have tended to isolate Stalinism as a phenomenon unrelated to other aspects of Soviet life. He deliberately preserved silence about two serious questions arising out of his indictment of Stalin: how it was possible for Stalinism to arise in Soviet society (is there anything in the society which permitted, perhaps even encouraged, the emergence of Stalinism?) and whether it did not have consequences beyond itself (did it not taint other areas of Soviet life?).

Soviet writers have gone beyond Khrushchev; they have answered both questions, at least by implication. Their books show mechanisms in Soviet society which favor lesser men of Stalin's kind. Hence the many "contradictions" between the thousands of little Stalins helped upward by various institutions (or not prevented from rising by any institutionalized checks) and between the masses of the population. Stalinism pervaded life; it was not an isolated phenomenon which could neatly be excised all by itself.

Milovan Djilas had the courage to write of the rise of a new ruling class and communist bureaucracy in Yugoslavia, and of the conflict between them and the people. In the works of Soviet novelists and playwrights, we find data pointing in the same direction.

SCIENTISTS *under fire*

by EDWARD U. CONDON

The article below is adapted from a speech delivered recently by Dr. Edward U. Condon, formerly director of the U.S. Bureau of Standards, who was hounded out of his post in 1954 although cleared by many investigative bodies. Dr. Condon is now teaching at Washington University in St. Louis.—THE EDITORS

I WANT to tell you about the political abuse of the personnel security system, which has done so much in the past decade to blight the relations of loyal American scientists and their government. I hope that this will be the last time that this subject will need to be discussed. The evil consequences of bad policies have now come home to roost in a way that is plain for all to see. It may be that conditions have now become bad enough at last that the Adminstration will soon seek to remove from itself the badge of dishonor it has worn for so long.

During the last two months there has come about a general public awareness that America is not automatically, and effortlessly, and unquestionably the leader of the world in science and technology. This comes as no surprise to those of us who have watched and tried to warn against the steady deterioration in the teaching of science and mathematics in the schools for the past quarter century. It comes as no surprise to those who have known of dozens of cases of scientists who have been hounded out of jobs by silly disloyalty charges, and kept out of all professional employment by widespread blacklisting practices. It comes as no surprise to those of us who have known how good American scientists have had to face vilification by political speechmakers in and out of Congress, and have been falsely prosecuted for perjury, and have been improperly denied passports, or have had their passports seized and invalidated without due process by the State Department, or who have had their telephones tapped or their letters intercepted by government agents. For while we are rich and powerful, we have not been true to the principles of freedom for which we stand.

Over the past ten years I have had two full-scale loyalty hearings in the Department of Commerce, a full-field investigation by the Atomic Energy Commission, and finally in 1954 a hearing under the policies and procedures set up by this Administration. In all of these I received full clearance. All covered essentially the same ground which was no ground at all. The House Committee on Un-American Activities made numerous attacks on me in 1947 and 1948 before its then chairman [J. Parnell Thomas] went off to serve a term in the federal penitentiary as a common crook. Finally this Committee staged a political hearing on the same old stale and outworn material just before the 1952 elections.

During most of this period I kept on working to develop the scientific strength and stature of the National Bureau of Standards. Happily this work is being carried on by my suc-

cessor in spite of his having been summarily fired for a time by the present Secretary of Commerce who wanted the free play of the market place to take precedence over careful scientific experimentation.

Professor Edward Teller told the last personnel security board hearing in April, 1954 that the Bureau's work on the hydrogen bomb which I organized advanced our achievement of that goal by many months, probably a year. If he is correct in the implication that without that work we would have been delayed by about a year, then the lack of that work would have made us come in second in the international rivalry for the hydrogen bomb.

Nevertheless all the old stuff was rehashed once in 1952 and again in 1954. I was badgered all those years for having been interested in the American-Soviet Science Society, an organization which received a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation ten years ago to foster translation and wider distribution in this country of the Russian scientific literature. Now, a decade late, we read of crash programs to translate the Russian scientific literature and spread it around in this country.

In July, 1954, I was given complete security clearance by the Eastern Industrial Personnel Security Board. You might think that I would now be allowed to go back to work. Yet, in October, 1954, just before the elections, we find Richard M. Nixon making his twenty-years-of-treason speeches boasting that he got the Secretary of the Navy to suspend my clearance, as was done on October 21.

It was arbitrarily suspended without any pretense that additional evidence needed to be considered. It was suspended by a Secretary of the Navy who admitted that he had not seen the record. I was told that I would have to go through the same old dreary business again. Three years ago I faced a difficult decision —whether to continue to fight for the government's honor, or whether to yield to the Administration's determination to disgrace itself. Exactly three years ago at Thanksgiving, I was driving from Corning to Washington to take counsel with various friends on what to do.

Try to picture the situation. I had been under steady political attack for seven years, and had won at every hearing. But now I was told that I would have to go over all the same material again, before a kangaroo court whose members were to be handpicked to do their job by Defense Department officials. Many of my friends had been persecuted by the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Some of them had taken refuge abroad from these political persecutions of our scientists. Our good friend and past president, Robert Oppenheimer, who brilliantly built and led the Los Alamos laboratory during the war, had just been publicly disgraced by an official action of the government—largely on the basis of recently developed hysterical attitudes toward things that had happened before the war. The scientific staff of the Signal Corps Laboratories at Fort Monmouth had suffered a blow from which it has not yet recovered through the irresponsible attacks of Joseph R. McCarthy—attacks which the President had not resisted until Sen. McCarthy began lobbing his shots toward the White House. Then at last our President acted, but in his own self-interest, not in defense of honor and decency and fair play to scientists, or to any of McCarthy's other victims.

Under these circumstances . . . I decided the situation was hopeless, and that I had done all that could reasonably be expected of me in having resisted these evil dishonorable forces for seven long years.

In those seven years so much of my nervous energy had gone into the struggle that I was weary unto sickness, and was forced to neglect the proper courtship of my beloved profession. So I decided to withdraw from the struggle, and my resignation from an industrial position for which security clearance was needed was announced in early December.

You might think that I would now be allowed to go back to work. I came East in January 1955 after giving my retiring presidential address to the American Association for the Advancement of Science and was offered the post of chairman of the department of physics in a leading university. In March the chancellor of that university told me that he could not follow through on the appointment because a high government official threatened one of the university trustees that if my appointment went through, that university would lose all of its federal funds.

In June of 1955 I was asked to serve on a committee on a nonclassified problem of military importance—and then suddenly asked not to, just before the first meeting of that committee.

Incidentally I was cleared from July 1954 to October 1954. During that period some Navy people came to see me with an urgent problem on the development of a radome for a guided missile. It was highly secret, but I was cleared for it. By the time we had the development models made my clearance had been suspended, "pending further consideration," as Secretary Thomas put it. Some of our cleared young men tried to deliver the radomes but found these Navy men in such a state of panic that they would not accept them. A few weeks later—all this was just three years ago—they regained their courage and sheepishly asked to have the radomes. They were tested and found to be good and are now in production. Detailed problems about them come up from time to time but I am not allowed to help in their solution.

In connection with all the soul-searching that is going on, we hear a good deal being said about asking Robert Oppenheimer back into government service. I hope this is done —humbly and with apologies for the horrible way he was treated. The government ought to make honorable amends to him and others—but we all must recognize that if basic research is to be done, an excellent job of teaching must go along with it, and our very best people are needed for both these things. The very best physicists can make their most worthwhile contribution in these ways rather than in weapon development.

two who turned

THE FAILURE OF COMMUNISM IN AMERICA

by JOHN GATES

IN THE 27 years since I joined the Communist Party, my ideas of how socialism will be attained in the United States and what it will be like have undergone considerable change. But my conviction that socialism is the next higher stage in the progress of America remains unchanged.

When I joined the Communist Party in 1931, there were some 14 million unemployed in the country. When I left, there were—in spite of the highest living standards and government spending ever known—more than four million unemployed. When I joined, lynch rule was the favored instrument for wringing super-profits out of the South. Today, in spite of tremendous progress in the struggle for equal citizenship, many Southern states are in revolt against the federal government. Twenty seven years ago, war clouds hung over the Far East and over Europe. Today nuclear energy has provided mankind with the means not only of complete liberation, but also of complete extinction. I have no more faith today in capitalism as a final answer for the American people than I had 27 years ago.

If I joined the Communist Party in order to work for democracy, peace, and socialism, my leaving on January 10 of this year was for the same purpose. I had reached the reluctant conclusion not only that the Party was no longer an effective channel for these ideals, but that it could not become so without a radical transformation, and that such a change was impossible.

Many will say that 27 years was a mighty long time to reach such an obvious conclusion. But in the Thirties we made progress toward transforming the Party into an indigenous American socialist movement. In the Forties we made another try, again with considerable if short-lived success.

During the past two years we succeeded in generating the most far-reaching struggle for change the Party has ever known. But for a third time we failed. I am convinced now that the Party cannot be changed from within and that the fight to do so is hopeless. Most former Communists reached this conclusion before I did. During the last two years, when the Party crisis assumed its most severe form, 10,000 of its 17,000 members departed—more than half the total membership. Obviously, I did not lead the majority out of the party. They led me.

No one who has contributed to progress has been free of mistakes. I ask only that those who were never connected with the Communist movement try to understand those of us who were with that degree of objectivity that comes with a sense of one's own fallibility. The Communists, in spite of serious mistakes and ultimate failure, did make some contribution to America.

It never occurred to me that this movement, based on a theory of change as Marxism is supposed to be, might find itself left behind by the changes in American life itself. This thought has come late. It has hit me hard. It hit me hardest one afternoon, just a year ago, when 1,200 students on the Columbia University campus came to hear me speak.

"Mr. Gates," one young man shouted in the question period, "you say the Communist Party did big things for America. What were they?"

(Continued on Page 38)

The Progressive presents here the stories of two of America's leading Communists who broke with their Party in recent months—John Gates, editor for a decade of the now defunct Daily Worker, and Howard Fast, world famous novelist.

We do not concur in some of the judgments expressed—chiefly Mr. Gates' polemical comments on the extent to which the Communists contributed to the social gains of the Thirties—but we believe that both have told absorbing and revealing stories of service in, and break with, the Communist Party.

Howard Fast's story is told in the form of an interview with Martin Agronsky, distinguished NBC radio and television commentator, on the latter's fine Sunday afternoon TV program, "Look Here!" Mr. Fast is the author of many novels and biographies, including "Freedom Road," "Citizen Tom Payne," and "Spartacus."

John Gates, editor of the Daily Worker from 1947 to January 10, 1958, reached the rank of lieutenant colonel as a volunteer in the Abraham Lincoln Brigade during the Spanish Civil War. He volunteered for the U.S. Army after Pearl Harbor, served in the Aleutians and Germany, and was honorably discharged as a paratrooper first sergeant.

Mr. Gates was a member of the national committee of the Communist Party for more than a decade. He served a five year sentence, under the Smith Act, in the Atlanta penitentiary.—THE EDITORS.

'THE ONLY HONORABLE THING A COMMUNIST CAN DO'

HOWARD FAST interviewed by MARTIN AGRONSKY

AGRONSKY: Howard Fast, I'm a guest in your house. I don't come here, really, to sit in a seat of judgment. It's not my function to criticize you. I want only, in our conversation, to try to understand you, and through you to try to understand American writers who have joined the Communist Party. What I am most curious about is, how is it that you as a writer whose whole theme throughout all of his writings has been freedom—who worships, literally, freedom—how is it that you could have joined the Communist Party as you did? And now, the Communists libel you. They call you a slanderer. They call you a liar. They call you renegade. They call you a capitalist beast, as it were. How do you feel, Mr. Fast?

FAST: I feel rotten.

AGRONSKY: Why, Mr. Fast?

FAST: It's a perfectly natural feeling. These are people who have been my friends and associates—comrades—for years. And now, suddenly, these are the names that are applied to me. But, at the same time, I have witnessed the process for many years, myself, and I know that this in effect is a powerful weapon of the Communist Party. So long as he who leaves can be so designated, then fewer will leave. This is a terror weapon. It is a force weapon.

AGRONSKY: Do you feel it is a price you'd be willing to pay?

FAST: Well, I paid a much greater price. I paid a much greater price for the years that I spent in the Party. The price I am paying now is an internal price which I'll overcome. This is a special suffering of my own, and this is something I can meet and I will get over.

AGRONSKY: Let us understand this in the area beyond your own personal experience, Mr. Fast. How could you, as a writer, and especially as a writer who concerned himself throughout his career with the subject of freedom, come to join the Communist Party, to accept a totalitarian discipline? How can any writer write as a free man and be a Communist?

FAST: Well, then you would have to address the same question to literally hundreds of the most notable writers of our time.

AGRONSKY: I am willing to.

FAST: It's not for nothing that the phase of history we are going through now has been termed by some people, perhaps not too correctly, the Writer's Revolution. The recent Hungarian revolt was sparked and led initially by writers. The history of writers is intertwined like threads, like the whole history of the Communist movement of our time.

AGRONSKY: But you do not answer me, Mr. Fast, in the sense of how a writer who writes about freedom and who deeply believes in freedom can subject himself to totalitarian Communist discipline. How does this happen?

FAST: All these writers, with very few exceptions, who have come into the Communist Party, are people who have been deeply concerned with freedom, with man's personal dignity, and with man's struggle against oppression. They have been deeply concerned with these questions in their writing. They see, at a point in their lives, and at a point in the history of our time, an organization which promises them that this organization and only this organization can bring their beliefs into effective action. For example, in the Spanish War against Franco, the cream of Great Britain's intellectuals and young writers actually died fighting in Spain. Young Lardner, a son of Ring Lardner, an American writer, died fighting in Spain with many other American writers. It was this feeling.

AGRONSKY: They believed they were fighting and dying for Spanish freedom, Mr. Fast?

FAST: They believed they were fighting and dying, not only for Spanish freedom, but for man's freedom. It was in this phase of the anti-Fascist struggle that writers the world over felt that the only way they could struggle, with more than words, against Fascism was through the Communist Party.

AGRONSKY: But then, so many of them were disillusioned—Ignazio Silone, Stephen Spender, Andre Gide—all of them left in 1939. And you, Mr. Fast, you didn't even join until 1943, and you didn't leave until last year. Explain this to me.

FAST: Well, in 1943 we were in a war against Fascism. I did not come to Communism in 1943 as a stranger. I had been close to this, known Communists, been affected by Communists, read Communist literature.

AGRONSKY: And believed it?

FAST: Ever since 1933—believed it and disbelieved it. Because in 1939 I broke with all my Communist friends over the Pact with Hitler. In 1941 I thought otherwise. I saw the whole world joining with Russia in an anti-Fascist struggle. By 1943 I felt that the next step, here, to effectively struggle as well as write against this monster that was threatening to consume the earth—of Hitlerism, of Fascism—was to join the Communist Party.

AGRONSKY: But, Mr. Fast, so many

other people with the same concern as yours in freedom saw a third monster. They saw the monster of Communism. Let us look at what Communism had done by this time. It had gobbled up the Baltic countries —Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. It had taken over Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. And yet, in 1943 you came to the Communist Party. What did you feel you could accomplish then? Had not Communism demonstrated it was another form of Fascism at this point?

FAST: No, I don't think so.

AGRONSKY: You feel it wasn't?

FAST: I think it demonstrated it to some. Now, Ignazio Silone, a man for whom I have the greatest respect, a man of deep integrity and honor, saw this thing in 1939. I will admit that for years I pondered over the case of Silone, the proof of Silone. Silone himself was willing to work closely with the Italian Communist leader, Togliatti, and there was an enormous respect between these two men in the postwar years. I said to myself, "Well, there's no open and shut case here. This is a question of movements, of beliefs, of disbeliefs, of accusations, of lies, of slanders." When Russia declared a thing was a slander, I believed it was a slander. In other words, my—my—

AGRONSKY: The source of belief was there? But when people who are a part of our democratic society insisted the things that the Russians were doing were not the promotion of freedom but the repression of it, when you saw the Russians do what they did, how could you still believe they stood for freedom?

FAST: You believed they stood for freedom because you rested on the fact that total proof was lacking.

AGRONSKY: Total proof?

FAST: Total proof. And total proof came for me entirely at the moment when the general secretary, the nominal head of the whole Communist movement on earth—this is not in fact but in a manner of speaking—and the actual head of the Soviet Union's Communist Party delivered a secret report in which he not only swore upon his oath that every slander and accusation made in 20 years against the Soviet Union was true, but in addition to that dragged out a series of crimes, a record of terror, of bestiality, of bloody murder and torture that even the worst enemies of Communism had never thought of.

AGRONSKY: This is how you saw the light, Mr. Fast? This we can accept. But what I cannot understand, and find so difficult to accept is how you as a writer—a man who must see the world in the round—how in the world could you walk through life, as you did, with blinkers on and not see? You say the documentation was lacking?

FAST: Wait. Wait. Of course I didn't walk through life—

AGRONSKY: Mr. Fast, the documentation—I repeat again—I do not intend to indict. Let me put this question in this sense. We had two extremely moving books, that provided a documentation, by writers you respect. One was *The God That Failed*. This was Ignazio Silone. Then, we had George Orwell's *1984*. Did you read *The God That Failed*? Did you read *1984*?

FAST: Well, you read a book and you reread it. I would answer that in part by telling you the story of John Gates—who [was] editor of the *Daily Worker*. I heard Gates say that when in prison, serving five years for being a Communist, he took out of the prison library *1984* and he read it. It was a feeling of deep and sick horror because he felt he was looking into a mirror. The first time I read it, I read it in one way. When I read it again, I felt I was looking into a mirror.

AGRONSKY: When did you first read it?

FAST: Many years ago. Now, let me go on a minute with that. You asked why I didn't see. You must accept the fact that there were deep reasons why I refused to see. You would have to ask this question of Theodore Dreiser, our greatest contemporary novelist who willingly and openly joined the Communist Party a year before his death. You would have to ask it of George Bernard Shaw who was also sole support of the London *Daily Worker*, and to an extent the Communist movement. You would have to ask it of Sean O'Casey, of Louis Aragon, of Paul Eluard. I can give a tremendous list.

AGRONSKY: You can go on with your list, Mr. Fast, and I will refer to a phrase that you used. You used the phrase "I refused to see." Did you not go through life, Mr. Fast, with blinkers, self-imposed?

FAST: Of course I did. The horror of our times is that every one does. You too. Everyone does. We all wear a set of blinkers. What a wonderful world this would be if we had the ability to see, to look around us, to practice some sort of broad understanding and tolerance. I had my blinkers, other people had their blinkers. Today it's—it's incomprehensible to me.

AGRONSKY: That you could have been a Communist? Is that it?

FAST: No, that I could have gone on year after year, accepting these things. In this book that I've written [*The Naked God*], I say that every man and woman who joins the Communist Party begins to leave it the moment they join it. This is a hard thing to understand because many spend a lifetime and they never leave it. But it's true. You begin to leave the moment you've joined, and yet years and years go by and you don't leave it, and very often are willing to die in support of it. This is one of the great paradoxes of our time and I wish—

AGRONSKY: It's not easy to make me understand it. I still don't see it.

FAST: All right. Let me say this. All people of good will, to one degree or another, want a condition of brotherhood. People are made that way. They live with other people, they want a world, a condition of brotherhood, of love, of understanding, of social progress and advancement. Certain people who have a very deep devotion to these ideals become convinced and became convinced. It's not true today, but at a certain period in the history of modern times, during the great struggles against Nazism and Fascism, millions of people on earth became convinced that only through the Communist Party could these goals be reached or achieved. And that, incidentally, has always been the greatest weapon of the Party—this exclusiveness which you begin to believe. You find yourself trapped in believing and then are unable to shake loose from—

AGRONSKY: All right, Mr. Fast, we accept that you wore the blinkers. You wore them voluntarily, you could not break loose. What was it like, as a writer in the Communist Party? To what discipline did you have to submit, and how could you tolerate it?

FAST: You can tolerate a lot. That's the answer as to how you can tolerate it. You submit to an arrogant, stupid, Victorian dictatorship of thoughts, ideas, and so forth.

AGRONSKY: How does it work?

FAST: It works, in the main sense, as our censorship works. It works through the application of the censorship by the writer himself, because he knows the punishment that will follow his violating the decrees of censorship. For instance, the Communist Party, led by the Soviet Union, interdicted Freud, psychoanalysis, mental health—the whole science of the mind. Therefore, the Communist writer came to understand that he must eschew these things.

AGRONSKY: And you accept that without question?

FAST: No, you don't accept it without question. You fight against it, you twist, you turn. Many writers were expelled. Other writers did not accept it. My novel *Spartacus*—no commercial publisher in our country would publish because I was marked as a Communist. The book stores were unwilling to sell it. On the other hand, the Communist Party condemned it bitterly and savagely because it was a book with severe psychological and psychoanalytical trends and intonations in it. It was a book that was described as brutalistic, as sadistic, as anti-human by their standards. And so—

AGRONSKY: Still, you accepted it, Mr. Fast.

FAST: No. I was in motion. I was moving and everyone I knew was moving. I was fighting, I was struggling. You see what I have done today. Today I am publicly in the view of millions of people—

AGRONSKY: Yes.

FAST: —an anti-Communist. I've turned on the Communist Party, bluntly and frankly.

AGRONSKY: Yes.

FAST: I say that this should not exist any longer. Now, what I have done today, I do on the testimony of the Soviet leadership. They have told the world what the basis is that makes it impossible for any honest or decent human being to be a member of this organization. Several years ago, if I had done the same thing, the Communist Party would have crucified me as it crucified so many others who then either were compelled by their own inner drives or forces, or else had the courage, to leave this movement. And I don't want to, I will not, but I could name a dozen such people whose lives were shattered because they did something that the Party does not permit. You cannot leave the Communist Party and remain a decent human being.

AGRONSKY: What does the Party do to a writer in the sense of telling a writer what to write?

FAST: It doesn't tell him what to write. It tells him what not to write.

AGRONSKY: It tells him what not to write, and you accepted their telling you what not to write?

FAST: No, I didn't accept it.

AGRONSKY: But you only left last year, Mr. Fast, and you have been writing for many years.

FAST: Yes. But don't look at my—

AGRONSKY: Yes?

FAST: —life in the Communist Party as a bed of roses. I don't want to go into any story—you haven't the time for it—and this isn't the place for a detailed story of my struggles, or my twisting and turning, my rebellion, my fight within this organization to write as I please.

AGRONSKY: All right, Mr. Fast. Let's then update you, really, to the present. In this book that you've written explaining why you left the Party and in which you described how you finally made your break, I think you wrote "in the end there is fear." What kind of fear, Mr. Fast?

FAST: The Communist Party is a pseudo-religious organization. The terror which it exercises where it has power with the punishment of execution, with the punishment of torture and death as we saw in Russia, is exercised in countries where the Party is not in power with a form of ex-communication. The Communist Party says in effect, "When you leave or when we expel you, we will destroy your reputation, your standing, your mortal soul, and all else that you may value here on earth. We will destroy it for your lifetime, for your children's lifetime, and for generations to come."

AGRONSKY: This is a spiritual fear of which you speak now? Not entirely physical?

FAST: It's—it's—it's—

AGRONSKY: You don't fear assassination?

FAST: You can't call it spiritual.

AGRONSKY: A destruction of the spirit?

FAST: It's a non-spiritual feeling. It's a horrible, medieval, magical fear. It's a terrible fear, and yet it's a fear that they have implanted in millions of the very best, the most honest, the most dedicated human beings on earth. And this is a paradox and it is the tragedy of our time.

AGRONSKY: Mr. Fast, this is, perhaps, a brutal question. You have written that for some years now publishers have refused to publish your works, that you were forced to publish them yourself. Mr. Fast, did you, perhaps, leave the Communist Party because you felt you could no longer make a living if labeled a Communist?

FAST: No, I never had that problem. I don't boast about it, but I am the most widely read author of this century. There is no living author in the whole world whose books have sold the quantity that mine have. My royalties from Europe and Eastern Europe have always been adequate. Now, very shortly before I left the Party, since you brought this up, Boris Izakov, the head of the foreign department of the Soviet Writers' Union, was here, in this country, with Boris Pelavoi. I spoke to him and he offered me his opinion. But, I have coming to me, on deposit in the Soviet Union two million rubles—

AGRONSKY: Can you get it?

FAST: —in American exchange, this is a half million dollars.

AGRONSKY: Can you get it?

FAST: He felt, at the time he spoke to me, that the money would be obtainable in the near future. I will never get it. No, it's out of the question. So I did not do it for a financial gain. My financial condition is far worse now—

AGRONSKY: All right.

FAST: —than it was then.

AGRONSKY: Let me ask you this, Mr. Fast. You've left a faith, after 13 years, that you believed in devoutly.

You obviously distilled a number of fresh ideas about the Party since your break. There are 168 million Americans. We reckon there are some 10,000 Communists. What, from your experience in the Communist Party, would you say, first, to those Americans?

FAST: Well, I would say this to them, [that] we have a precious thing here and to cherish it and make it a little better. I would say that the Communist Party is not a thing to be feared, yet it cannot be destroyed by any force or any violence. The Communist Party feeds and grows on force and violence. Truth, understanding, and an ability to measure this thing calmly and react in a democratic way—this will destroy it. This will leave it out of our scene, and it doesn't belong in this scene anymore.

AGRONSKY: And what would you say, Mr. Fast, about the possibility of achieving what a man who believes in freedom wants to achieve in the democratic system?

FAST: Well, I say three things. Democracy is very imperfect, and yet, with its imperfections it's marvelous. Now, I say this from my point of view in the past decade in America. One: Writing has been made very difficult for me. I was blacklisted and yet I went on writing and I published my own books. Two: I went on living. This is of importance to me and my family. Three: I continued to fight with all my strength for what I considered my inalienable rights as an American citizen. Now, in Russia, a land I supported, this is true by information which is unquestionable: the writer in Russia did not go on writing when he did not write to fit the needs and desires of the Communist Party of Russia. He wrote no more. Two: He did not go on living. Many, more than 20 of the leading writers of the Soviet Union, were brutally beaten and tortured and executed—action toward writers which no other civilized country on earth has taken in our time. And—three—[he] conducted no fights for his inalienable rights because he had no inalienable rights. They were no part of the Russian scene.

AGRONSKY: And the price of freedom and the price of writing the truth in the Soviet Union, you now come to the conclusion, is death, and in the United States a man can express his feelings. You recognize that?

FAST: Yes. This is the terrible truth of our time.

AGRONSKY: Mr. Fast, you've concerned yourself with what you can distill from your experience for Americans. What about the estimated 10,000 American Communists that are left? Perhaps some of them are listening to us today. And, I'm inclined to think that they would be. What would you say to them?

FAST: I would say to them, don't wipe this out, and don't dismiss this as lies and slanders. There are no lies, there are no slanders in anything I've said today. This is the truth. The evidence is available to you. If you continue, with this proven evidence available, there's no honor, no decency you can lay claim to. The only honorable thing a Communist can do in our time is to leave the Communist Party forever.

AGRONSKY: Forever, Mr. Fast?

FAST: Unless if it became its opposite—which I see no hope of.

AGRONSKY: There really seems no hope for that. There's no occasion, certainly. Mr. Fast, thank you for this very moving exposition of your belief. Mr. Fast has been through a purgatory of his own.

THE FAILURE OF COMMUNISM IN AMERICA by JOHN GATES

(Continued from Page 34)

I started to answer, as so many Communist speakers do, beginning with the long, bitter fight for social insurance, the payments to the aged and the unemployed on which so many depend today. Who does not remember how spendidly the Communists fought for that?

A wave of laughter flooded McMillan Theater, swept through every corner of the hall. My face flushed, as though something had hit me.

I rode the subways home that night in grim bewilderment: I can still hear that laughter. These young people knew nothing of what I took for granted. Something sacred in my own life was unknown to them. There was a gulf of generations between us. Into that gulf so much work, so much heartache, and sacrifice of the "best years of our lives" had disappeared with hardly a nod of recognition.

Soon after I joined the Party, I left school and home and became a "full-timer," throwing myself into the unemployment, labor union, and anti-Fascist struggles of the Thirties. I worked with the Party in the popular movements that ushered in the system of unemployment and social insurance, the formation of industrial unions, the nation-wide campaigns for Negro rights, and the effort to achieve collective security against Fascism, dramatized by the 3,000 Americans, most of them Communists and I among them, who volunteered to fight against Fascism in Spain. Many of my best friends never came back. They lie in Spanish earth. It could never have entered my head in those days to be ashamed of the name "Communist."

And I could never have imagined then a scene at the New York State convention of the Communist Party, one year ago, when a young woman, veteran of the student movement days, got up to say:

"I loved the Johnny Gates who fought in Spain, but I hate the Johnny Gates who has taken the same position on Hungary as Franco. . . ."

Here was the triumph of hate over that love of man that had sent us all to Spain. Had I been part of such hate? Can it ever redeem mankind?

It was the struggles and the glories of the Thirties that made me—not to mention thousands of others—"stay in." They are what made us feel more "correct" than any other political movement of the time. There was a vacuum which we attempted to fill. We were convinced we were filling it better than anyone else. And in some respects, we were.

The other side of the picture is that whatever progress we made, even at our best, was severely limited by certain fatal defects from which we suffered and from which we could never completely free ourselves.

The very concept of the Communist Party was something that clashed with American life. It was conceived from abroad, based on principles devised by Lenin in 1902, and modeled after the only successful party of socialism up to that time, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Nothing succeeds like success—and the undisputed success of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union not only blinded us to its errors and crimes; it also made us eager to accept the word of Soviet Communists as the final say on our own problems. This was not a case of dictation from abroad. It was a voluntary relationship, compounded of an uncritical admiration for our brothers abroad and a lack of confidence in ourselves. At every crisis, we found ourselves unable to stand on our own feet.

Actually, our relationship with the Soviet Communists was two-edged. For it also brought us considerable prestige—particularly in the Thirties, when the planned economy and absence of unemployment in the Soviet Union contrasted sharply with conditions here at home; when Soviet policy for collective security to halt Hitler contrasted so strongly with the appeasement policies of London, Paris, and many circles here; and during the Red Army's great contribution to the defeat of Hitler.

I do not mean by what I have said thus far that our relationship with the Soviet Communists was the primary question. For the American Communists, as for every other American socialist movement over the years, the main and most difficult question has been that of working out a fruitful relationship with the trade union movement and with various non-socialist but radical movements of the people. Every socialist movement in America in the final analysis has foundered on this problem, whether blindly pro-Soviet, bitterly anti-Soviet, or where it existed before the Soviet Union had even come into being. But in the case of the Communist Party, there is no doubt that its peculiar relationship with the Soviet Communists had a decisive bearing on the primary question, on its inability to work out proper theories and organizational forms and to face sudden and unexpected shifts of an international nature.

The first major attempt to change the Communist Party began in 1934 and was marked by an attempt to forge close relations with the New Deal and the CIO. The prestige which the Party gained in some labor and intellectual quarters in the following five years was wiped out practically overnight when the Soviet Union and Germany signed a non-aggression pact in August, 1939, and the Party abandoned its policy of unity against Hitlerism.

The second major try at changing the Party came in 1941 with the attack upon the Soviet Union and Pearl Harbor. By its full support for the war against the Axis, the Party recaptured some of its lost prestige. In a new effort to become a movement more in tune with reality, the Party reversed in 1945 when a single Communist leader abroad, Jacques Duclos, wrote a single article. Earl Browder, under whose leadership the Party had made its greatest advances, was kicked out. The party returned

to discredited policies which were to result in its ruin.

The third attempt to change the Party began with many rumblings as far back as six years ago. It was not until 1956, however, that it burst out into the open. It can be said that the whole history of the Party from its birth in 1919 had built up to this climax. What made the issues finally inescapable were the aftermath of the death of Stalin, the revelations by the Soviet leaders themselves, the upheavals in several Communist-governed countries, and in every Communist Party.

In October, 1956, Soviet troops had started shooting in Budapest, then ceased, and were supposed to be pulling out. The world was in upheaval, and members of the Party's national committee were debating their views on Hungary and Poland. I remember rising to speak. I said Khrushchev almost created catastrophe by trying to unseat Wladislaw Gomulka in Poland, that Gomulka had saved socialism in Poland, and, instead of being threatened, should have been supported. I could not hold back my feelings. This Soviet intervention in Hungary, I found myself saying, is a crime, a crime it will take us years to overcome. I cried out:

"For the first time in all my years in the Party, I feel ashamed of the name, 'Communist.'"

My colleagues sat with frozen faces. None of us would ever be the same again, nor could we continue for long to live in the same movement. They could not tolerate the *Daily Worker* editorials which spoke the truth as many of its editors and staff, not only myself, saw it.

The post-Stalin revelations—and revolutions—superimposed on a total isolation resulting from a lifetime of mistakes, caused an unprecedented crisis in the American Communist Party. It created a movement for change far more drastic than had ever occurred before. The cry for change found expression in the program adopted by the national convention of the Party in February 1957.

This new program called for a peaceful, constitutional American path to socialism. It said that Communists had no monopoly on socialism and would join with other socialist-minded people to form a united party of socialism. The old "monolithic" and super-centralized character of the Party was modified to establish the right of dissent and the protection of minority views. A new attitude toward trade unions and other organizations was outlined,

disclaiming any desire to impose Communist policies upon them.

Most important was the statement of a new attitude to Communists abroad. Relations with other Communist parties and the socialistic countries were to be friendly but must include the right of frank criticism where necessary. The body of theory on which the Party had always based itself, the ideas of Marx and Lenin, were henceforth to be interpreted by the American Communists for America and not by Communists abroad for the American Party.

The press generally reported this new program as a "declaration of independence" from Moscow. In fact, what the convention did was remarkable, almost revolutionary for a Communist party. The changes were so fundamental that if carried out, the Communist Party would no longer be a Communist Party in the traditional sense, but something altogether different. But this was not to be.

The new convention program was a dead letter almost from the moment of adoption. The program had been publicly formulated some six months before the convention, when the organization was reeling under the impact of the startling events abroad. By the time of the convention the thaw that had begun in the Communist world was beginning to freeze over again, especially after Hungary. Thousands of members left during this time, some after the Khrushchev revelations, some because of the Jewish question, some because of Poland and Hungary, some because they could not stand the atmosphere of name-calling and personal abuse that was rampant, and still others because they had no confidence in the leadership and in the ability of the Party to carry through the changes agreed upon.

Consequently the convention program was the fruit of the desires of members who had already left the Party or were in the process of doing so. The leadership elected, however, was more representative of the sectarian trend which remained in the Party, and this, in turn, accelerated the disintegration of the organization. Paralysis and stagnation set in. Bitterness and recrimination increased. In this atmosphere, the *Daily Worker* became the chief target of the opponents of the convention policy. Its independent policy was weakened; it lost the confidence of both those who had welcomed its bold new approach and those who had always opposed it.

The suspension of the *Daily Worker* was the final dramatic proof that the Communist Party has ceased to exist for all practical purposes. It may persist for a time like other radical sects in American history, but only as a living corpse.

If the Communists in the United States have failed, so have all other socialist movements here. None can claim even as much success as the Communist Party. All are out of joint with the American people, although for different reasons. The fault, I believe, lies not with the people, but with the socialist movements. They all require a good look at themselves, their theories and programs, and need to make big changes to help bring about a mass American socialist movement. After 27 years of dogmatic adherence to the Communist Party, I do not profess to have the answers. I feel the need to think, to study, to listen to others, to discuss and debate. I am in no haste to join or form something new. I do, however, have some tentative ideas to offer.

America needs a mass radical movement. I use the term "radical" advisedly—first, because we need to get closer to the root of matters; secondly, because radicalism is a more embracing concept than socialism. Few Americans as yet believe in socialism, but many are interested in fundamental reforms that fall short of socialism but are necessary for its achievement.

A revitalized socialist movement must not only clarify its relations with the broader movements of the workers and others. It must also reexamine its relations with the Communist-led countries. If American Communists have been blinded by admiration, other socialists have been blinded by hate. Those obsessed with hostility to the Communist countries as their chief reason for existence lack independence just as much as do the Communists and, however unwittingly, help sustain the cold war and domestic witchhunts. While critical of the failure of these countries to achieve political democracy, American socialists should encourage every trend in that direction, and work for the kind of international climate and peaceful competition which will permit greater progress not only in the Communist countries but in our own as well.

Political democracy does not come automatically with the transfer of production from private to public ownership—a fact which I and many others were late in appreciating. Power can be abused; tyrannies can arise in planned societies; and eternal vigilance is the price of liberty for socialism too.

Reduced Prices for Quantity Orders

The Progressive's Special Issue

The Russians and Ourselves

1 to 5 copies	50c each	25 to 49 copies	40c each
6 to 24 copies	45c each	50 to 99 copies	35c each

100 or more copies 30c each

We will mail a bundle to one address or individual copies to your mailing list at the same prices. All orders postpaid.

The Progressive MADISON, WISCONSIN

The Struggle in the Far East

FOOTSTEPS TO DEMOCRACY

by HENRY REUSS

SPUTNIK, beeping its way over the arc of countries that lie on the borders of the Communist world, symbolized the end of two great American monopolies. Our technological supremacy and our unequalled ability to help underdeveloped countries are monopolies no longer.

Rightly or wrongly, Russia is recognized as our technological peer. Having had to bow down to American technological excellence for so long, people of the East are quick to find America caught off base. And everywhere, the Russian and Chinese Communists are either talking about or actually producing large-scale economic aid programs. As the State Department recently disclosed, for the last two years Communist aid in those underdeveloped areas where we and the Communists both operate has been more than double ours.

Furthermore, Communist aid comes without any military strings. Instead, the Russian ballet and the Chinese opera make frequent "cultural" visits. Newsstands are supplied with unlimited quantities of Communist literature. When I visited the little town of Sien-Reap in the jungles of northern Cambodia, the 71-man Peking Opera Company was playing to standing room only crowds every night. We have had Americans like Marian Anderson and Benny Goodman in the area, but they tend to stick to the capitals, thus giving the Communists a free cultural field in the villages.

Up until Sputnik, the superiority of American power in technology and in economic aid was largely responsible for limiting our losses in Africa and Asia to Communist China and North Vietnam. But now material power is in stalemate. If we do have something that the Communists don't, now is the time to bring it forth.

Almost any American, thus challenged, would say that of course we have something unique of our own—the idea of Jefferson and Lincoln that the life, liberty, and happiness of the individual are the things that count. Unfortunately, this light of America isn't coming through to the people of the East. And the reason, I believe, is that we are hiding our light under a bushel, or rather under two bushels.

The first bushel which is suffocating our candle is militarism. Try though we may, the planes and tanks and guns we send our allies in SEATO and in the Bagdad Pact make an unattractive contrast with the Communist campaign of trade and culture and smiles and peace. Not that the idea of military aid to the countries along the Asian perimeter is misplaced. These countries need arms as a deterrent to open aggression and for protection against domestic subversion. But there are at least two dangers inherent in the most sensible arms aid program.

One would feel better about American arms aid if there were more assurance that it was going to be used against Communist aggressors, rather than against neighbors. Yet today, American planes are being used against North African Arabs by the Spaniards at Ifni in Morocco at the same time that American rifles are being sent to the Arabs of Tunisia a few hundred miles away. Pakistan's prime minister, Dr. Chundriggar, complained to me last fall that his military pacts with America had estranged Pakistan's relations with India. Certainly the Indians were extremely upset by the maneuvers of the Iranian and Pakistani navies, both supplied by this country, that were then under way in the Persian Gulf.

A second danger may lie in the sheer size of some of these armed forces. For example, in Vietnam, with a population of 12 million and an average annual income of around $116, we are supporting a huge 150,000-man army. President Diem told me how eager he was to start on a land reform program but that the burden of maintaining the army was delaying the start.

The answer is not that we should end our military aid program, but these dangers must be recognized. Currently around 80 per cent of our total foreign aid budget goes into military hardware, or into the so-called "defense support." Sometimes "defense support" expenditures take the form of dams or highways, telecommunications or power facilities. In such instances, the casual observer might conclude that both objectives —the military and the economic— have been served. Unfortunately, projects of this sort frequently represent a compromise of the conflicting demands, satisfactory to neither. A road, for example, which wise economic planning would postpone far into the future while more essential facilities are constructed, and which is not sufficiently interesting to the military to entice them to spend their own funds, may be agreed upon simply because no better subject of agreement can be found. In this way, a project of low priority for individual policy planners becomes *top* priority through default.

Examples of this economic astigmatism are not lacking. Take the mag-

REPRESENTATIVE HENRY REUSS, Wisconsin Democrat, is one of the most articulate members of Congress arguing for a more creative course in American foreign policy. Mr. Reuss recently returned from a first-hand inspection tour of the Far East.

nificent series of roads we are building in Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam. Built on a crash basis and on an extravagant system of cost-plus contracts, they will cost us upwards of $70 million before we are through.

To an alarming degree, they are monuments to a new and unhealthy autarchic nationalism that is showing itself in Southeast Asia. The Cambodian highway, for instance, which parallels an existing road between Pnom-Penh, the capital, and the sea, is justified as making Cambodia independent of its neighbors, Thailand and Vietnam. No doubt the highway will gratify the Cambodian government. But the peasant in his paddy a few miles away may be unaware of the highway's existence. Driving his water-buffalo along the shoulder of a super-highway may or may not provide him with some gratification. For an impact on *his* life, American moldboard plows, or medical trucks to bring better health to the villagers along the existing highway, would be vastly more effective.

Our preoccupation with "projectism" has another disadvantage. It requires huge American administrative staffs in the nation's capital, passing papers back and forth with the government, and arousing resentments simply because we are rich, numerous, and *there*. In one capital I visited, a trained irrigation engineer who was eager to be out in the countryside supervising reclamation projects, learning the language, and getting to know the pepole was fretting at a desk, initialing papers.

The second bushel which hides the light of Jefferson and Lincoln is the fact that most of the countries we are aiding, whatever their political theory, are in practice many miles from being democracies. While I was in Taiwan (Formosa), Chiang Kai-shek was locking up some newspaper editors for criticizing his administration. In Cambodia, Prince Sihanouk controls all 91 seats in the national assembly. In Thailand, the military leaders run the country, managing to get themselves good jobs on the public lottery or in import licenses. In Pakistan a national election has not yet been held, despite a consitiutional provision requiring one. In Iran the government party counts the votes and determines who can be a candidate.

Now it is perfectly true that Western-style political democracy can be little more than a utopian dream in most of these countries, with a literacy rate around 10 per cent. One can forgive President Diem of Vietnam for his undemocratic intolerance of opposition when you learn that much of his opposition in the last three years has consisted of the sects. The Binh Xuyen, a group of gangsters with an army of 10,000, owned the gambling houses, opium dens, and brothels of Saigon. The Hao Hoa is a fanatical Buddhist sect whose leader, Ba Cut, seven times rallied to Diem's cause, and seven times betrayed him. Presently it subscribes to the belief that if you kill 20 people, you will be able to fly.

But there are many stations on the road to political democracy. The people of "free Asia" may not know much about parliamentary democracy, but they know what they want: schools, doctors, houses, food, land reform, a freer press, the right to speak out, an end to corruption, a beginning for local self-government. And as long as we are associated, as we inevitably are, with Asian governments that rule by military clique, that throttle the opposition press, that rig elections—we simply do not project an image of the land of the free.

What our foreign aid program in Asia needs, I firmly believe, is to be turned inside out. We must down-

FREE to each new subscriber

The Progressive's Special Issue

THE RUSSIANS and OURSELVES

INTRODUCTORY OFFER

7 months for $2 **PLUS the Russia issue FREE**

for yourself or for a friend

Enclosed is $2. Enter a new 7-month subscription and send "The Russians and Ourselves" free to:

Name.....

Address.....

.....

The Progressive **MADISON, WISCONSIN**

grade our military aid from an end in itself to a shield behind which progress can be made. We must deemphasize politically motivated projects of doubtful value, such as the Cambodian road, and with them, the size of our foregin aid bureaus in the capitals.

While we have to continue working through corrupt and dictatorial governments, we must stop acting as though we had no better hope for their people. Instead, we must show the essential difference between our side and the Communist side by emphasizing the development of democratic practices and social progress. It is ironic that America, home of the town meeting and of local self-government, of voluntary organizations from the PTA to the labor union to Rotary to the 4-H Club to the farm cooperative, appears in Asia mainly in the country's capital and as an arm of the country's government.

Happily, in a modest and unpublicized way, we are already doing many things that do advance freedom and democracy. In the Philippines, our *barrio* (village) program is now operating successfully in almost one-sixth of the 30,000 villages. Under that program, people from the villages are trained in the rudiments of democratic organization—how to get the neighbors united on building a school, digging a well, or treating a malarial swamp. If the local organization does its part, the Philippine government contributes local or U.S. technical assistance. Ambassador Charles Bohlen told me that he believed our *barrio* program was in considerable part responsible for last November's successful elections in the Philippines, perhaps the most democratic and free from corruption ever held in the East. The people, having had a taste of democracy, demanded, and got, a fairly honest count at the polls, and showed commendable discrimination at getting rid of some corrupt office-holders.

There are other examples of what might be called a footsteps-to-democracy program. In Vietnam—unlike Pakistan and India—the colonial government left no legacy of trained native civil servants when it cleared out. Our civil service training institute in Saigon, staffed by technicians from Michigan State University, is

Justus in The Minneapolis Star

The Sower

slowly creating a cadre of trained Vietnamese. In Cambodia, where the French neglected to provide any schools whatever outside the capital city during their century there, at least a handful of American teachers are training Cambodians to educate the new generation. In Taiwan, the land reform program is a model for other parts of Asia.

Because these activities depend on the consent of the village people, they are not the kind of things the Soviets do best. Moreover, many new countries that are delighted to have a Russian dam or highway demur at letting the commissars into their village. This means that we will find less competition if we will but enter the race.

What we need is at least double the 712 technicians which now comprise the entire U.S. Point Four staff in Asia and the Middle East. *Yet the Administration this year is actually reducing last year's $152 million Point Four request to $142 million!*

A nation of 170 million should be able to find more than 712 "shirt-sleeve" ambassadors to the underdeveloped areas—Americans, neither busy-bodies nor misfits, who have some degree of expertness and a disire to serve in the greatest adventure of the age. It may take some imagination to recruit them. How about a "Career Service" for a small cadre of senior specialists, and a "Point Four Selective Service" for a much larger number of young people who are willing to serve their country for a few years in far-off places, at a soldier's pay?

Along with a stepped-up program of advancing freedom, we need to be a little less hopeless at the prospect of disentangling ourselves from the repressive governments of some of our allies. Such entanglements are frequently defended on the basis that we must not interfere with the internal sovereignty of countries we aid. But we don't hesitate to interfere in the military and strategic sphere.

In the political sphere, we can at least make clear that we prefer democracy to dictatorship, and that we want to speed its arrival. When I told Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek that we hoped he would move as fast as possible toward greater freedom of democratic expression, he replied, "That is the right direction, and we will move as fast as we can." I'll admit that this is far easier said than done. Still, it is better to have democracy accepted as a goal, however long term, than to see it spit upon, as our other ally, Generalissimo Franco, did in October when he hailed the advent of Sputnik as illustrating the decadence of democracy.

Sometimes, too, in dealing with native rulers, we underrate their capacity for enlightenment. If we do not believe in their capacity, they tend to reflect our lack of confidence. In fact, many of these rulers are composites of reaction and enlightenment. Thus, Price Sihanouk of Cambodia is at one and the same time an oriental despot and a student who drank in Rousseau's ideas of the rights of man at the French Lycee at Saigon years ago. To oversimplify a little, therefore, why not have our diplomacy cater to the Rousseau in the Prince by really helping his school-building program, rather than to the potentate in him who sees a grandiose road network as a means of showing up his neighbors?

Such a shift in our aid program would emphasize footsteps to democracy rather than more power-conscious military and economic manifestations. It's the one kind of program we can offer that the Communists can't. What are we waiting for?

How Socialized Medicine Works in the Soviet Union

by MARK G. FIELD

This is the fourth in a series of articles exploring the highly controversial field of medical economics. The first, "Health Insurance for All," by Senator James E. Murray argued the case for a national health insurance program for America. The second, by Dr. A. Talbot Rogers, prominent London physician, analyzed the British program in action. The third, "Freedom and Security in Denmark," by Max Awner, American author and editor who spent a year in Denmark on a Fulbright Fellowship, examined the workings of the Danish system.—THE EDITORS

WHILE NO ONE in America seriously denies that medical attention is a "right" of the individual, not to be withheld on any ground, there is considerable difference of opinion as to how precisely this right ought to be implemented. Much of the heat generated on this problem comes from implications of the fact that in certain cases the patient is unable to pay the doctor on a fee-for-service basis, and that this payment must be made by someone else or some other agency. And it is held by the organized profession that this someone else, whatever his nature, profession, or position, is bound to have some kind of control over the physician by virtue of his responsibility for the management of the funds involved. It is the introduction of a third party which is seen as a threat to the sanctity and confidentiality of the patient-doctor relationship.

Usually it is the state (whether at the local, state, or federal level) which is the only agency capable and willing to underwrite medical care for those who cannot afford it. There is thus a fear that the doctor either will become a civil servant, or that he will be subject to the control of civil servants, a situation which is held to be prejudicial to "good medicine." While this fear may be exaggerated, and while it may be prompted by considerations other than the preservation of the patient's interests, it is perhaps not quite groundless. In this respect, it may be worthwhile to cast a retrospective glance at Russia's experiment with socialized medicine over the last forty years.

Soviet medical historians, particularly those who wrote in the period immediately preceding Stalin's death, were fond of stating that Soviet medical organization was something unique, and realized through the wisdom and foresight of Lenin and Stalin. Medical and public health accomplishments and experience in England, Germany, and even in Russia in the Nineteenth Century were impatiently brushed aside as having contributed little or nothing to the organization of medical services in the Soviet Union. The Communist Party and its genial leaders had done it all by themselves. And they had done it in spite of the opposition which the pre-Revolutionary medical profession allegedly bore to the Bolshevik regime.

According to Soviet historians, the organized pre-Revolutionary medical profession not only refused to cooperate with the new regime but did something which was even graver: it refused, in some instances, to give medical help to wounded Red Army soldiers and workers who were fighting for the Bolsheviks. Whatever the truth of these accusations (and the rewriting of history, medical or otherwise, is not an unknown art in the Soviet Union), they served as a handy pretext for the elimination of the pre-Revolutionary Russian medical associations—thereby destroying the corporate existence of the medical profession—and their replacement by organizations (such as the Union of Medical Workers) which are instruments in the hands of the regime in manipulating the professional actions of the physicians for its own purposes.

Parallel to the elimination of the medical corporation as a self-governing body and as a potential locus of independent power which it would not tolerate, the regime proceeded to build its own medical administration. In most cases the Soviet physician, whether he is a professor and member of the Academy of Medical Sciences, or a country doctor working in a remote area of Siberia, is an employee of that administration—the Ministry of Health, a medical bureaucracy the size of which and the scope of whose activities stagger the imagination of those accustomed to the more atomistic and unorganized system of medical care as they are found in the West, and particularly in this country.

One of the basic tenets of Soviet political philosophy is that rational

MARK G. FIELD, medical sociologist on the staff of the Beth Israel Hospital in Boston, has long been a student of Soviet life and institutions. During World War II he performed liaison work at the border between the American and Russian zones of occupation in Germany. He served for a time as a member of the Harvard Refugee Interview Project and went to Germany to interview displaced persons for a number of months. It was then that Dr. Field started gathering materials for a sociological study of the medical profession in Soviet society. In the summer of 1956 he was asked by Dr. Paul Dudley White, heart specialist for President Eisenhower, to accompany him on a medical mission to the Soviet Union. Dr. Field traveled extensively throughout Russia inspecting hospitals and clinics and interviewing Russians on the operation of socialized medicine. His book, "Doctor and Patient in Soviet Russia," has just been published by the Harvard University Press.

planning on a nationwide basis is the only answer to the problems of large scale industrial social systems. Planning necessitates control over available resources in manpower and materiel, and their allocation, in a manner deemed most appropriate to the needs at hand. In the medical field, this control rests squarely with the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Health (and its subordinate units) which is the supreme headquarters for all matters relating directly or indirectly to the prevention of illness and the maintenance of health.

The Ministry of Health is part of the governmental structure, and the minister has "cabinet" rank in the Council of Ministers. The Ministry could be described as the "Ford" of the Soviet medical world in that it is a self-contained vertical organization which not only directs the dispensation of medical care to the population, but also trains its own personnel, places them into medical jobs (forcibly if necessary), manufactures the drugs and medical instruments it needs, directs medical research, supervises the construction of medical installations, establishes treatments and procedures which then become standard for the whole country, administers public health and preventive medicine, inspects health conditions in industry, transportation, and food handling establishments, provides dental care and hundreds of other related medical and preventive services. Essentially, the Ministry is a large service bureaucracy, pyramidal in shape and hierarchical in nature, composed of a series of departments or administrations, each one concerned with one phase of medical services and dependent for its financial and other logistic sustenance on allocations from the state budget.

As a state employee, the Soviet physician is expected to go where he is ordered to go and to do what he is asked to do. This, of course, enables the Ministry of Health to move its physicians around for the "good of the service," and to have the kind of control over the dispensation of medical services that would be unheard of not only in a country like the United States but even in such countries like England, which have "socialized medicine," where the physician is not an employee of the state in the true sense of the word. As befits the work of a bureaucrat, the Soviet doctor sees his every professional action limited and guided by the bureaucratic standards or norms which his employing organization issue in a steady stream.

One area in which control over the physician is particularly stringent is the delivery of illness certificates to industrial workers. Concerned as the regime is with maximum productivity, it is liable to be suspicious and jealous of the physician's prerogative of permitting workers to absent themselves on grounds of illness and of abuses such as malingering or bribing to which such a function could lend itself. It has surrounded this function, as it has many other medical functions, with elaborate bureaucratic safeguards which often introduce into the medical process considerations which are essentially non-medical, and destructive of the patient-doctor relationship. Thus, in some industries doctors may be issued temperature minima below which they are forbidden to excuse anyone, in spite of the fact that there are certain illnesses that are not accompanied by fever.

While the Soviet medical profession has lost its status of a free corporation, it has increased considerably in size from the time the Bolsheviks seized power. There were about 20,000 physicians on the eve of the Revolution in the whole of Imperial Russia. Ten years later, the number had more than trebled. By 1940, there were more than 130,000 physicians. In 1946, in spite of war losses, the medical contingent numbered over 140,000. And *in the ten years that followed the cessation of hostilities, the number of doctors doubled:* Soviet statistics indicate that early in 1956 there were 330,000 civilian physicians in the Soviet Union, or about 16 doctors per 10,000 of the population, a figure considerably higher than our own 13.3. This represents over the last 15 years (including the war years) an average *net* increment of 10,000 doctors per year.

Even if we assume that our own physicians are better qualified, or that our equipment, drugs, and facilities enable our doctors to do a better job than their Soviet colleagues (which may be true), it is nonetheless disturbing to contemplate the rate at which doctors are trained in Soviet society—two and one-half times as many as in the United States—and the fact that more than one-fourth of our own residencies and internships are filled by foreign-trained physicians.

The structure of Soviet medical education is somewhat different from the American. For one thing, there is no college; after completing ten years of schooling the student is ready, at 17 or 18, to enter professional training at a medical institute. The course lasts six years so that the first two years correspond loosely to our two-year pre-medical course. Basically and theoretically there is little that differentiates the Soviet from the American medical curriculum except for the emphasis on the study of Marxism-Leninism, to which about as much time is devoted as to anatomy. This medical education, on paper at least, appears as thorough and comprehensive as ours. In practice it may be hampered by lack of equipment and by the large size of the classes admitted to the medical institutes.

Considering the large number of physicians in the Soviet Union, where did the Russians get so many people to go into medicine? The answer is simple enough: they trained women doctors. Since the Bolshevik revolution, the proportion of women doctors to the total medical profession has increased almost eight fold: at the present time, 76 per cent of all Russian doctors are women. Thus med-

icine has become *a woman's profession*, exactly in the same way as elementary and secondary school teaching has become a woman's profession in this country. And by the same token, the rewards, the status, and the prestige that most of these women physicians can command are similarly low. I often was told, when I visited industrial enterprises, that the physicians who were taking care of the workers received about half as much pay as well-qualified workers.

The latter might easily earn in the vicinity of 2000 rubles a month ($200). Compared to this the beginning physician earns around 600 to 700 rubles a month; after five years of experience this is raised to about 800 rubles; and after ten years or more of service, the salary goes to about 1000-1100 rubles. Specialists, physicians who have advanced medical degrees, and those who carry administrative responsibilities earn somewhat higher salaries.

Thus, with the exception of a few highly placed doctors, the Soviet physician ranks not only very low relative to his or her American counterpart, but also low in the hierarchy of Soviet wages, and almost at the bottom of the hierarchy of professional salaries.

Even with its high overall ratio of doctors to the population, the Soviet Union is suffering from a shortage of physicians in the countryside. Physicians are usually posted to rural assignments immediately at the end of their medical course for a period of three to five years, but few remain there beyond that time, and many manage to evade such assignments through bureaucratic manipulations and pull. Since half of the population lives on the land, this is a serious problem. The problem is relieved, to some extent, by the *feldsher*, or physician's assistant, a sort of highly trained nurse, usually of peasant background, who provides a great deal, if not the majority, of routine medical services in the countryside.

The real test, of course, of a medical system and the question the practical man wants answered is that of effectiveness. In other words, does it work? This answer lies in vital statistics.

Unfortunately, the Soviet Union has not released any vital statistics beyond crude birth and death rates. (This means that we don't know what the mortality is when we divide the population by age groups, particularly the first year of life, by sex, by city versus the countryside, and so on.) But we know the following: taking the 1913 death rate as a base, this rate has been reduced to one-fourth what it was. Thus, according to published statistics, the Soviet crude death rate is slightly lower than the United States at the present time. The birth rate has also declined, but stands, at the present time, slightly above the U.S. birth rate.

Beyond statistical indices of birth and mortality, one must rely on qualitative evidence to determine how well the system of medical care works. From the testimony of former Soviet citizens, from eyewitness information gathered during a trip to the Soviet Union last summer, from casual conversations with Soviet persons in the course of the trip, and from a reading of *Meditsinski Rabotnik*, the house organ of the Ministry of Health (where no punches are pulled), one gathers the impression of a system that operates more on a quantitative than qualitative basis, and which is often plagued by a disease that also affects most other areas of the Soviet system: bureaucratism with its by-products of indifference, inertia, and depersonalization.

This bureaucratism, which derives from the very structure of the medical system, affects not only the dispensation of medical care, but also such vital areas as the production of pharmaceuticals and equipment, the placement of medical personnel, and the construction of medical facilities.

The medical system appears to operate at a level below the potential of modern scientific medicine, and yet well enough to satisfy the needs of the system as determined by that system's ruling élite. It is a mass operation, oriented to satisfying the needs of the regime rather than the personal requirements of Ivan Ivanovich.

Where does Ivan Ivanovich fit in all this? He is in most cases assigned to a neighborhood dispensary or, should he work for a large industrial enterprise, to the dispensary maintained by that enterprise for its employees.

This dispensary constitutes his port of entry, so to speak, into the medical system. It is there that he sees a doctor, usually a general practitioner, who examines him and decides what shall be done next. He may be sent to work, or back home, or to a specialist or to a hospital. Should he require the services of a physician at home, a request must be made at the same dispensary, and a physician may be sent to his home during the day. Should a medical emergency arise at night, or when the neighborhood dispensary is closed, he has the possibility, if he lives in an urban area, of phoning the emergency ambulance service, which must dispatch an ambulance with a doctor to the scene of the emergency. The best and most comprehensive medical systems are found in the urban areas, particularly in the large cities. Medical care becomes progressively more primitive as one moves to the countryside.

In addition to the general medical facilities such as neighborhood dispensaries and hospitals, there also exists a network of specialized facilities. There are those, for example, that cater to the needs of pregnant and nursing mothers, called Women's Consultations, and where gynecological as well as obstetrical help may be obtained. Other specialized dispensaries may treat such conditions as cancer, tuberculosis, malaria, or venereal disease.

The more affluent members of the population may avail themselves of the services of a private physician. Private practice has never been forbidden in the Soviet Union, but it is not, by far, the most common type. It is usually reserved for those physicians mentioned earlier who have achieved academic distinction.

But the number of physicians in private practice is small, and I doubt that any of them lives by private practice alone. Usually such work is carried on in conjunction with official or academic responsibilities. Thus most medical services are made available to Ivan Ivanovich at no direct cost to him. Indeed, he firmly believes

that the government "gives" him this medical care (as stipulated by Article 120 of the Constitution), not realizing that he pays for these services rather heavily through the so-called turnover tax which is added to the price of most basic commodities, and which is essentially regressive, since it affects the poorer person more than the richer.

My impression is that Ivan Ivanovich is satisfied with the medical services at his disposal, and that socialized medicine is one of the most popular aspects of the Soviet regime.

It is true, of course, that in some instances his medical care is likely to be complicated by its bureaucratic nature, and that delays, red tape, unavailability of certain services, and "indifferent behavior" are not infrequent. And yet these are experiences which are not unknown to Ivan Ivanovich (he encounters them in all areas of Soviet life), and he accepts them as being part of life in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, he is reminded, at every occasion, of how bad things were under the Czarist regime and how lucky he is compared to the workers under capitalism who cannot afford medical care.

Finally, I would like to conclude with an impression that I gathered while visiting medical installations in the Soviet Union: I was struck by the kindness, the gentleness with which patients were handled by the staff. It seemed to me that the medical area, the hospital even more than the dispensary, was a sort of sanctuary from the harsh realities and the excessive demands that the regime makes of the population. There was a respect for the "sick" which I often find missing in our more aseptic and better equipped hospitals.

Is it because so many doctors are women, and are better equipped, emotionally, to "mother" patients? Perhaps, but I would also be inclined to find the answer in another direction: medicine represents a continuation, even under the conditions of Soviet totalitarianism, of the great humanitarian traditions of the Russia of the Nineteenth Century. It is in names like Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy, Chekhov, and many others that one must find what is unique in today's medicine in Russia, and not in Stalin's or Lenin's or even the Party's.

changing soviet tactics in foreign affairs

by MICHEL GORDEY

SINCE Stalin's death in 1953, Soviet foreign policy has moved out of the harsh, brutal isolationism mixed with deep fear and distrust of the capitalist world which was the substance of "Uncle Joe's" personal diplomacy. Since 1953, Soviet diplomacy has gradually opened up for contacts, smiles, and entirely new methods.

- In Washington, Soviet Ambassador Zarubin has amiable talks with Mr. Nixon and Mr. Stassen before winding up his assignment.
- In London, Ambassador Jacob is cracking jokes and engaging in many Paris activities, ingratiating himself especially with French right-wing politicians, and going far beyond his government's official policies on such problems as Middle Eastern borders and Algeria.
- In London, Ambassador Jacob Malik has been assiduously cultivating British Labor leaders in spite of the great scandal which arose in April, 1956, during Khrushchev's stay in London.
- Such examples are numerous: the puzzling "new look" of Soviet diplomacy has made it more difficult for the West to deal with it than in Stalin's days when contacts were scarce and almost useless. However, Soviet diplomacy in 1958, despite its changes in method, remains faithful to the principles, to the very origin of Soviet political thought. Lenin's teachings on the way to deal with the West are still gospel in Moscow.

On the very first day of the Bolshevik Revolution, November 8, 1917, Lenin wrote in his famous "Decree on Peace": "Everywhere governments and peoples disagree with each other, and that is why we must help the peoples to interfere in the questions of war and peace. We must deprive our enemies of the chance to say that their conditions [for peace] are different from ours, and therefore that it makes no sense in negotiating with us . . . We are against secret diplomacy and we shall act openly so that all the people may know."

These words, written 40 years ago on the eve of the Brest-Litovsk peace, describe just as well the international situation of 1958. Today Moscow still speaks to Western public opinion over the heads of the "capitalist governments" which it distrusts and hates. The last edition of the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* still quotes Lenin's words: "Imperialist diplomacy is simply a tool of a policy which makes the peoples of the world into mere cannon fodder . . . Whenever these gentlemen meet, it is like a gathering of ravens and one can immediately smell the odor of dead bodies . . ." These quotations from the article on "Diplomacy" are preceded by a definition of that word: "Diplomacy aims

MICHEL GORDEY, roving and diplomatic correspondent for the Paris daily, France Soir, has been a specialist on Soviet and East European affairs since the last war. He speaks Russian fluently and carried out major assignments in the Soviet Union in 1950, 1956, and 1957. In the fall of 1956, he was an eye-witness to the Polish "October days" in Warsaw, then covered the Hungarian Revolution. Early in 1957, he flew to Moscow, then to Washington, and wrote a dozen articles in a series called "Neither War nor Peace," comparing Soviet and American attitudes in the present international situation. Gordey, a Frenchman of Russian descent, is married to an American girl. He has received the Claude-Blanchard Prize in France for international reporting, and was awarded one of the "Oscars" in French journalism for 1957.

at realizing the objectives of the ruling class of a country." This means, of course, that any diplomatic step or proposal made by a "capitalist country" is considered in Moscow *a priori* as hostile and highly suspicious, since they originate from the "class enemy."

This is not a theoretical digression. In years of teaching and training, Soviet diplomats and officials learn the conclusions to be drawn from such principles. In a two-hour talk I had in Moscow in the winter of 1957, with post-graduate students of the Soviet College for International Relations, every problem I raised was answered and discussed with those principles in mind. And while the students—most of them future diplomats—were friendly, intelligent, and well-briefed in their own way on recent international events, I could sense during every minute of our conversation their deep conviction that I represented the views and interests of the enemy. "Lenin has taught us those truths, and history has confirmed them at every step," one of the students told me when I asked him why he assumed that every decision made in the West was meant to hurt the Soviet Union.

renew

your subscription to
The Progressive
now—

subscription rates go up April 15!

☐ Renew subscription 1 year ☐ $ 4
☐ Payment enclosed 2 years ☐ $ 7
☐ Bill me 3 years ☐ $10

Name.....

Address.....

.....

The Progressive
Madison, Wis.

I do not contend that our own diplomats and governments are differently inclined towards the Soviet Union. Paris, London, Bonn, and Washington also consider every pronouncement coming from Moscow as inspired by hostile intentions. If we add to this double-sided hostility the abyss in political thinking and the different meanings of almost every word or term in the political and diplomatic vocabulary, it becomes only too clear what lies ahead of us if we want to achieve some kind of *modus vivendi* in the atomic age between the Soviet Union and the West.

The new developments of Soviet foreign policy since the death of Stalin and particularly since the assumption of strong leadership by Nikita Khrushchev, seem to be threefold:

1—An increasing feeling of Soviet power. We must never forget that from 1917 to Stalin's death in 1953, Soviet foreign policy was based on a deep-seated inferiority and encirclement complex. The real disparity of economic, political, and even military potentials of East and West led Stalin to isolate the Soviet Union from any real contact with the outside world.

Stalin's Iron Curtain worked both ways. It stopped all real knowledge or influence of the West inside the U.S.S.R. It also prevented Soviet diplomacy from risky forays into areas where a spark could ignite a real conflict with the West. The three "aggressive moves" of the Stalin postwar period (Prague, Berlin, and Korea) were undertaken in the belief that there was no risk. Soon after it became evident in the last two cases that there was real danger ahead, Moscow retreated and accepted a settlement. At that time, Soviet power was still recuperating from the traumatic shock of the German invasion of Russia. America led in the military race as long as it retained the atomic monopoly, followed by vast nuclear supremacy.

In the last three or four years the relation of power in the world has been changing at least in its outward manifestations. The emergence of Red China as a major force in the Far East, the technological progress in the Soviet Union, the prestige victories won by sheer threats of Soviet military intervention (Suez crisis, Syrian affair), have given the Soviet leaders an entirely new feeling of power, a feeling unknown to them since the birth of the U.S.S.R.

Then came the "Sputniks," the launching of the Soviet ICBM, the display of new Soviet planes: all these combined to give Nikita Khrushchev the sweet taste of a foreign policy derived from "positions of strength." Nowadays, one has only to talk for a few minutes with a Soviet diplomat, official, or correspondent before hearing quickly some ironical remark about the "changing positions of strength." One Soviet newspaperman took delight recently in quoting articles written a few years ago by U.S. generals or scientists on "World Rule by Space Conquest." He then went on to quote some Dulles pronouncements on "a policy of strength." Of course, he added, "We Russians are against such methods, but one must admit that we could also one day be forced by events into using similar arguments."

In Paris and London nobody has forgotten Bulganin's note of November 5, 1956, when, at the height of the Suez crisis, Moscow for the first time threatened Western Europe with long-range missiles. Since that note such threats have been repeated on various occasions. In the coming months, it is expected, Soviet diplomacy will use "missile-language" again if any decisions are made by NATO to strengthen the rocket-defenses of Western Europe.

Some keen observers of the Kremlin believe that the new feeling of strength of the Soviet leaders will make them more pliable, more open to agreements based on mutual concessions. Their knowledge of their own military power could do away with the old paranoiac feeling of encirclement and inferiority which has

been hanging over Soviet policy for almost 40 years. The feeling of power also could give them a greater sense of responsibility in world affairs. Such trends can be detected in recent Soviet moves. But one should never forget the ideological sources of Soviet actions. And in 1958 we should not overlook the peculiar traits of character of one Nikita Khrushchev.

2—The taking of calculated risks. This is a new diplomatic method for Soviet diplomacy. It is, without any doubt, the projection of Khrushchev's personality on world affairs. Several times recently—at the time of Suez, in the Syrian-Turkish crisis, and in the new Russian policy towards the Arab Middle East and Southeast Asia—we have seen good samples of this new Soviet daring. Under Stalin such risks were deliberately shunned. If the old man ever made daring decisions in the postwar period, it was rather by misinformation or miscalculation than by sheer delight in challenging and probing the West. In recent years Nikita Khrushchev has assumed complete control of Soviet foreign policy and has taken to a kind of a personal diplomacy, using interviews, cocktail-talk, improvised public speeches to raise suddenly some unforeseen points on world problems.

One example of Khrushchev's new method is his offer to withdraw Soviet troops from all of Eastern Europe if the NATO powers evacuate their troops and bases from West Germany and neighboring countries. Stalin used to suggest measures to which he was always 100 per cent sure that the West would be obliged to say "no." Khrushchev's new way is quite different. But does he know how far he can go and where he must stop without losing face or prestige? Up to now, it seems that he has always stopped on the threshold of a really grave tension. Will the increased feeling of Soviet strength also raise the risks which Khrushchev will be willing to take on? In any event, under his one-man guidance Soviet foreign policy has become much less predictable than it had ever been under his predecessor at the Kremlin summit.

3—The emphasis on Asia and Africa. The means used by Soviet diplomacy in this field are entirely new. True, Soviet ideology "supporting the colonial peoples' struggle for liberation" dates back to the first years of the Bolshevik regime. But now Soviet action takes place not only by words and propaganda, but by deeds and practical, consistent policies. It all started with the long and fascinating visit paid by Bulganin and Khrushchev to India, Burma, and Afghanistan in late 1955, less than four months after their Geneva summit meeting with President Eisenhower. The speeches and promises by Khrushchev and his companion, particularly during their Indian journey, showed for the first time the massive and determined entry of the U.S.S.R. in the competitive field of vying for the favors of Asia. Since then, Moscow has extended its action to the Arab countries of the Middle East and even dispatched the first "probing expeditions" to Latin America.

It is in the underdeveloped countries that the Soviet Union is going to challenge the West with more and more vigor: extending technical help, granting low-interest loans, offering to build roads, railways, and factories with the assistance of Soviet engineers. More and more Asian and African students are being invited, and given scholarships, to study in Soviet universities; more and more teachers, writers, and scientists are being trained in Soviet methods.

At the same time, a special effort is made in the military field in those young and weak countries where the army is still the only existing power factor. In Syria, in Egypt, and in Yemen, the shipping of a few obsolete tanks and jet-planes provides the U.S.S.R. with a solid hold on the officers' corps, and thus indirectly on the vital policies of each of the recipient countries. And each time heavy emphasis is laid on the "help without strings attached" aspect of Soviet assistance. Invisible strings are in such cases more binding than those more visible.

One has only to remember the subtle policy followed by Moscow at Bandung, then at the recent Cairo Conference of Afro-Asian peoples, to see how much this policy has paid off in a short time indeed. The "helping hand" and the "true brotherhood" of the Soviet Union have impressed millions of people on both continents whose ultimate fate will probably be decisive for the fate of the world.

In the summer of 1956, at the Kremlin, I heard Nikita Khrushchev drinking toasts with the Syrian, Egyptian, and Burmese Ambassadors to Moscow and shouting: "The old world is crumbling, a new world is rising, let's laugh, my friends, and rejoice, all of us together!" The ambassadors, though representing three non-Communist governments, were glowing with pride and sharing this obviously anti-Western slant of Khrushchev's toasts. Since then, things have moved much faster, both in Nikita Khrushchev's agile mind and in the world at large.

Hardly a day passes now that *Pravda* or some other Moscow newspaper does not play up the arrival of some delegation or theater group or writers or doctors from Asia or Africa. Black and yellow faces are dominant in cover-stories for Soviet magazines, particularly for those whose international and multilingual editions are distributed at no cost throughout Asia and Africa. At the same time, Moscow misses no opportunity to stress the absence of racial discrimination in the Soviet Union. One typical example was a front-page picture published on New Year's eve by *Pravda*. It showed the great celebration now organized every year inside the Kremlin for Moscow children. Half of the young faces marveling at the huge tree and at the Soviet version of Santa Claus (called Grandfather Frost) were dark-skinned or had slanted eyes, and were obviously of Kazakh, Mongolian, or Tartar descent—a lesson in "understated and implicit propaganda," of which Moscow knew nothing at all not so long ago.

This is "competitive co-existence" as seen and practiced by Moscow and the only way to deal with it lies, of course, in the economic and social fields much more than in military alliances. Here, as in so many other fields of action, it is obvious that the Soviets are pursuing a highly intelligent course, while we of the West, ever so military-minded, are losing ground because of our blind reliance on stupid policies which have been outdated by the great surge of events in recent years.

What Soviet Children Are Taught About America

by RUTH WIDMAYER

TO MANY Russians, the people of America are to be pitied, not scorned or envied. When I visited the Soviet Union last summer with a group of educators and students I was surprised to find that despite years of a hate-America campaign the Russian people are not hostile or resentful toward Americans. Everywhere we went—except in Moscow where the people are more accustomed to foreigners and more sophisticated—we found ourselves the objects of curious and friendly crowds, eager to hear about life in the United States.

We were treated with courtesy, kindness, and sometimes genuine affection. Children at youth camps in Kiev and Yalta came crowding up to us, asking us to sing American songs and begging us for our autographs. On the Black Sea steamer going from Odessa to Yalta, on the streets of Leningrad, in a shoe repair shop in Tiflis, on the beach in Sochi, on train rides—Russians sought us out and wanted to make friends with us. Americans who expect to be met in Russia with suspicion and treated as though they have the plague are astonished at the amiability of "the inscrutable Russian enemy."

One might indeed wonder, after association with the Russian people, if perhaps the Soviet leaders' attacks on the United States have fallen on deaf ears. But this is not so. Many Russians have accepted without question the characterization of the United States as a decadent, imperialist, war-mongering, corrupt bulwark of the dying capitalist order. Yet the average American is not a representative of the hated cold-war enemy to them.

The fact is that the Russians do not consider Americans responsible for the evils they associate with the United States. They think we are helpless victims of an unjust system. It is much like our attitude toward them—we don't believe the Russian people are to blame for the cruelty, lack of freedom, and disregard of human rights which prevail in the Soviet Union. As far as the Russians are concerned, our government does not really give us—the people—the right to determine the policies that vitally affect our lives. According to them, a small clique of mighty Wall Street millionaires is the real source of power here.

Where do these ideas come from? One of the most potent sources is the educational system. In the classrooms of the country the Soviet mind-molders have available huge captive audiences of individuals in their most impressionable and receptive years. By the time the Soviet youth becomes an adult the stereotype of America is already so well imbedded that what he hears about America on his radio, reads in *Pravda*, or is taught in Red Army indoctrination courses merely reinforces the notions he acquired in school.

The textbooks used in the high schools do much to give Russians their out-dated and grossly distorted ideas about American life. Texts in modern history, geography, and foreign literature all tend to portray America as the sinister citadel of world imperialism. One of the most concentrated doses comes in the textbooks on the English language. Unlike American language texts which offer innocuous, non-political material about the culture of the people whose grammar and sentence structure are being studied, the Soviet texts abound with editorialized stories and comments. (All Soviet students today must study English, French, or German from the fifth through the tenth grades.)

These language texts are a revealing source of Soviet views regarding our economic and social institutions. The following direct quotations from several of these texts will illustrate how Russian textbook writers wish their readers to view America. Thus, the English language textbook published in 1956 and used in all the seventh grade classes throughout the Soviet Union, informs Russian youngsters about race prejudice in the United States. It tells a story of two white children who make friends with two Negro children in the South. The children get along fine with each other and are not at all concerned about the difference in their skin colors until the parents of the white children find out about the Negro playmates. Here are some excerpts from the story:

For a long time Billy and Sam did not go to the river to play. Myrtle and Charlie looked for their little friends every day. They were very unhappy. Myrtle asked every day why Billy and Sam did not come.

"Let's go and ask," said Charlie, "I know where they live."

They went to the boys' home and knocked at the back door. The boys' mother opened it.

"Please, are Billy and Sam sick or dead?" they asked.

"No!" she shouted. "And if I catch you little niggers here again, I'll beat the life out of you. Don't you forget it!"

Charlie and Myrtle told the story to their

RUTH WIDMAYER, the first woman associated with the Russian Research Center at Harvard to receive a doctorate, wrote her Ph.D. thesis on "The Communist Party and the Soviet Schools." Recently she spent 40 days in the Soviet Union visiting a number of schools where she observed classes, talked to teachers and students, and obtained the textbooks on which this article is based. Her articles on Soviet education have appeared in School and Society, The School Review, Harvard Educational Review, and The Education Digest.

father. "There, there, my little ones," he said, "don't cry about it. You have plenty of good friends in Black Row. It's best not to play with those white children."

"But why, Pappy," asked Charlie.

"Almost all white people hate us because we're black."

"But why? Did you do anything to them?"

"Nothing, my child. . . . They did us wrong. A long time ago they stole us and made us slaves. They sold us for money like cows and sheep. I think they are afraid of us and that's why they hate us."

So that is how Charlie and Myrtle, like Sam and Billy, had their first lesson in race hatred.

People of different races can live and work happily in our country, because our country is a Socialist country.

This is but one of numerous stories in the English language texts on racial discrimination in the United States. Not only is discrimination against Negroes emphasized, but there are also stories about other minorities, including American Indians.

The picture of America portrayed in the textbooks is that of the grim depression era. Many Soviet citizens think that sordid conditions such as the following are still prevalent among large numbers of people. Although the story was written in the 1930's, the text, published in 1956, indicates in no way that the story is a quarter of a century old and thus gives the impression that the conditions described portray present-day life in America.

MY AUNT LENA
By Michael Gold

My Aunt Lena came to America from Hungary in a dark hour, in a bad winter. My father had no work and my mother was tired and ill. The streets were covered with wet, dirty snow, and we all had bad colds. Many people could not pay their rent and the landlords made them leave their homes.

"Our turn is next," said my father. But all this meant nothing to my Aunt Lena. She was only 16 years old, and everything was new to her. She was happy when she first came to New York. She loved America, she loved the common things that we knew so well. . . . She got up early, sang as she made the breakfast and then went out to "discover" America.

Sometimes she took me with her. . . . Everything was wonderful to my Aunt Lena. She was afraid of nothing: she laughed and we laughed with her. She was so happy at first, and that made us happy, too.

Then everything came to an end.

One night at supper, my mother said:

"Listen, Lena."

"Yes, Katie?"

"Lena, what's to be done? We can't pay the rent again."

"No," said my Aunt Lena in alarm.

"Little sister, we're poor. I should like to go and look for work, but I have to cook and sew and take care of the children. Don't you think you could begin to work, Lena?"

"Me, Katie," she said sadly. "Must I work? I am so young to work. In the old country I didn't work!"

"No," said my mother, "but we're poor, sister. Here we have no cows and chickens as in Hungary. Here everyone works, even the children."

• • •

So my Aunt Lena went to work in a clothing factory. The work changed her. She was tired at night. . . . She did not sing any more and became pale and thin. After that we seldom went to see the boats on the river.

The themes of fear, grinding poverty, and job insecurity are reiterated in story after story. The text on the English language used in all the colleges preparing future teachers of English begins the first lesson with a story of two Russian girls returning to college after their summer vacation. After the girls have exchanged a few casual remarks, one says to the other:

"Look . . . here is an article about college graduates in America. Shall I read it to you?"

"Do, please."

Olga read:

"This year many graduates from educational institutions, engineers, doctors, lawyers, teachers, as well as many other specialists have joined the ranks of the unemployed. The magazine *United States News and World Report* recently stated that the graduates had little hope of finding work in their special fields." [The date of the *U.S. News and World Report* is not given. This textbook was published in 1956.]

"How different it is with our graduates!" exclaimed the young man who sat listening to the girls. "When our students graduate our government offers them a wide choice of work all over the country. . . ."

Justus in The Minneapolis Star

"Just Curious, That's All"

One of the most illuminating of the selections in this volume is "A Common Patient," divided into two separate lessons. It is quoted in detail here because of the many interest revelations it provides of Soviet concepts of life in the United States.

A COMMON PATIENT

On my way home from the factory, I felt there was something wrong with my left eye. "Something must have fallen into it," I thought. "It will be gone by morning." But in the morning it was no better. The lid was swollen, the eye was red, and by evening I could hardly see with it.

"Wash your eye with boric acid and put a compress on it overnight," the foreman advised me. "It'll be all right by morning."

"And what if it isn't?"

"Then you'll go to a doctor."

"And what about my job? How can I stay away from work? I'll be fired, won't I?"

"One day won't matter," the foreman said. "It'll be taken off your pay. But that's all you're allowed. That's the rule with us. Try to get well in that time, or you'll lose your job. There are a lot of unemployed at the factory gate just waiting for such a chance. You know that yourself."

"Yes, I know," I thought bitterly. Didn't I hang about the gate for three months before I got my job? Hungry and miserable like a homeless dog. The very thought of it made me shiver.

. . . In the morning my eye was completely closed by a huge swelling. My landlady screamed with fright when she saw me. "You must see a doctor at once!" she cried. "Go to Dr. Brown."

"Will he see me so early?" I asked doubtfully.

"Of course he will. Such a serious case! He charges a dollar a visit. Hurry!" [A curious conception of a doctor's fees in the United States.]

Dr. Brown took the bandage off my eye and frowned.

"Hm . . . this is a very serious matter," he said. "You need an eye specialist, not an ordinary doctor. A good professor. There's Professor Brick. He's famous for such delicate operations. Only I must warn you. He charges $25 a visit."

"And all I've got is $11," I thought. "If I pay this doctor $1, I'll have $10 left for the professor. . . . But I can give him the rest on pay-day."

Dr. Brown saw the hesitation on my face.

"Don't grudge the expense. It is a question of your life. You must hurry," he continued as he adjusted the bandage, "or you won't be alive by tomorrow."

• • •

. . . One thought went through my mind. "This is the end! And what of it?" I thought. "What am I losing? The chance

to stand in a long line at the factory gate begging for a job, or the constant fear of losing my job when I am lucky enough to have one." The words of a speaker at an election meeting came back to me: "Our country is the richest in the world, and if all the money in it were divided among the entire population, the share of every American would be twenty-five thousand dollars."

"Twenty-five thousand," I thought bitterly. "And I haven't even twenty-five for the professor's fee." The professor . . . the word was associated in my mind with the word "celebrity." [Professors *are* celebrities in the Soviet Union; the assumption is that they are celebrities in the United States also.]

[When the patient arrives at the doctor's office a few hours later he is informed by the receptionist that he will have to pay a fee of $25.]

"I'm . . . I . . . I'm sorry," I said slowly, "I have only ten."

The young woman frowned and shook her head.

"But I'll give him the rest the day after tomorrow," I added hurriedly. "Saturday is my pay-day."

"That won't do," the young woman said coldly. "The professor won't see you."

"But what am I to do? Look here. . . ." I moved the bandage up from my eye. The sight was more convincing than words. A look of sympathy flashed in her eyes.

"Just a minute, I'll ask." She disappeared into the office. In a few minutes she returned. "The professor won't see you. That's final."

. . . Suddenly, before I myself knew it, I burst into the professor's office. . . .

The professor turned towards me sharply. He was a dried-up, clean-shaven old man, his narrow face had an irritated expression, and his watery green eyes had an ill-tempered look.

"What do you want here?" he asked with indignation. "Look!" I tore off the bandage.

"This is not a charity institution," he said, irritably. "What do you want of me? Any doctor can perform the operation."

"But Doctor Brown said you were the only one . . ."

"Your Doctor Brown is a fool!" he burst out. "I don't need his recommendations. If everybody in your position is going to bother me, I'll have to close up my office. I know your sort." (How his voice got on my nerves.) "If I do one of you a favor, I'll have a dozen, a hundred of you crowding into my office tomorrow."

"But I'm not asking for favors," I objected. "I've got a job. I'll sign a promise to pay you . . ."

His sharp, unpleasant voice cut me short. "I don't want any of your promises! I don't treat common people like you," he shouted.

"For God's sake, profesor. You don't want me to die, do you? That's inhuman. You're an educated man, prof . . ."

"Don't you lecture me on morals, young man. Get out of here! I don't want common people like you about, do you hear? Get out!"

I did not stir. I stood staring at him fixedly with my right eye. . . . My brain began to burn, my heart beat like a hammer. At that moment I felt capable of murder. The professor read all that in my face. I had no weapon, but I had the strength in my hands to crush the life out of that disgusting creature. . . .

"You don't want common people?" I whispered, leaning forward slightly.

"S . . . si . . . sit down," the professor stammered out, pointing to a large chair.

I straightened up, took a deep breath, and walked over to the chair. I could hear the professor breathing hard behind me. He took a long time washing his hands in order to calm down.

He performed the operation without an anaesthetic. It was torture such as I had never dreamed of, and I was on the point of losing consciousness. Suddenly it was all over. The pain left me and my head felt very clear.

The professor took my ten dollars just the same, but he was so glad to get rid of me that he told me not to come back with the rest of his fee. "Only," he said with a forced smile, "don't tell any one that I treated you."

Cultural and moral decay in the United States is another oft-repeated theme in Soviet text books. The 7th graders are introduced to the subject in this way:

Not all children in capitalist countries can go to school. Many parents are too poor to send their children there. Often children do not like school because in some countries teachers still beat the children. Sometimes teachers hate their work and hate the children whom they must teach. The children feel this, of course, and do not try to learn. They simply do not like their lessons. They like holidays better than schooldays.

In the 8th grade text, one finds a diatribe against comic books, which might not seem entirely unjustified until one reaches the end:

Poison for the Minds of American Children

A well-known writer of children's stories in our country is K. Chukovsky. . . . In an article in a Soviet newspaper he wrote about the favorite magazines of American children. These magazines are called "Comics," and every week millions and millions of comics are published. . . . For every American boy and girl, five different comics full of brightly colored pictures are published every week.

What is there in these magazines? you will ask.

Chukovsky writes: "As soon as one of these magazines appears on my table, it seems to me that I am in a den of thieves and bandits."

Before the eyes of the young readers, one of the "heroes" robs ships and banks, steals pictures. Another destroys a railway and then robs the trains; a third is a murderer. . . . These are the heroes of stories for children!

The most successful children's writer in America is the one who can write stories showing new or cleverer ways to rob, steal, and kill. All the achievements of science and technique are used by the bandits in children's comics.

The publishers of comics make very much money out of these magazines. They make more than publishing-houses in America have ever made before.

In all the stories of the comics there is a "superman" who can do anything. To jump over a New York skyscraper is nothing for him. He is a detective, and his work is to fight the gangsters. But it is clear from these magazines that even a "superman" is not strong enough to fight crime in modern America.

The number of crimes committed by children in the U.S.A. is growing fast. There are many reasons for this, but certainly comics play their part. From time to time articles appear in American newspapers and magazines against comics, but these articles do almost no good. One such article ends, "It is useless to tell children not to read comics, and it is just as useless to try to waken even a spark of conscience in the publishing-houses or the writers of comics."

The present rulers of America do nothing to take this poison away from their children, because they want a new war. "Today's children are tomorrow's army," says Wall Street. According to the Wall Street Imperialists, American children must be taught that banditry is a normal thing and that modern technique will help them to rob, kill and commit crimes.

But there are progressive, peace-loving people all over the world, and in America, too, who are fighting for democracy. Our country, the first Socialist country in the world, is the leader in this great struggle. In the end American children and all the children of the world will be saved from war and such fascist poison as American children's comics.

After reading these prototypes of Soviet anti-Americanism, it is easy to see why the Russians are friendly and hospitable to ordinary Americans while they have only contempt and hate for the so-called ruling circles in the United States. One of the many examples I encountered of this sharp dichotomy in the Russians' minds between "ordinary Americans" and our "ruling circles" was in a conversation on a beach in Odessa. Two men began to talk to a friend and me and asked how we liked their country. We told them that we found their country interesting in many ways and then we asked them what they thought of *our* country. One of them was a Russian marine who had been in the United States during the war. The first thing he said was, "The United States wants war against the Soviet Union—not the common people of your country, but Eisenhower and Dulles. The rich people want war."

Occasionally we felt we were able

to modify some of the misconceptions about the United States among the Russians we met. The group with which I toured the Soviet Union included a Negro woman professor of sociology. She was an impeccably dressed, prosperous looking woman with an imperious, self-assured bearing. Nothing about her suggested a cowed victim of Jim Crow. Everywhere we went she was a sensation. People stopped her on the streets even more frequently than the rest of us to ask where she was from, what kind of work she did, and so forth. Many Russians had never seen a Negro before and had only the officially-inspired image of all American Negroes as cringing, fear-ridden objects of discrimination. When the Russians learned that our black companion teaches both whites and Negroes in the same college, that she was able to secure a higher education, is as well paid as her white colleagues, and has prestige and respect among many whites, they were dumbfounded.

Talking with Americans is often likely to produce skepticism about the accuracy of what the Soviet people have been told about things American. This is most likely to be true when, in conversations with Russians, our emphasis on the positive values of American life is accompanied by candor and humility in admitting our own shortcomings. The Russians are more willing to listen to us if we do not deny or whitewash such things as our race problem or the existence of partial unemployment in some parts of the United States.

If American after American reaffirms the fact that in the America of 1958 there are no bread lines, that equal rights for all persons regardless of color or class are being continually expanded, and that over 15 million of our citizens are now receiving social security benefits and millions more will become eligible every year—the Soviet citizen can hardly help developing some serious doubts about whether he has been given the whole truth about the United States and whether capitalism, in the form in which it has been modified and humanized in recent decades, is as brutal a system as he has been taught.

THE PEOPLE'S FORUM

Nixon Can't Be Trusted

Dear Sirs:

Usually I find the thinking in *The Progressive* much to my taste, but I cannot digest your suggestion, in the February issue, that Vice President Nixon should replace President Eisenhower. With all his age and ailments Mr. Eisenhower is a vastly superior man. Mr. Nixon simply can't be trusted.

RENE LEWIS
Princeton, N.J.

Dear Sirs:

In your recent editorial you advise Ike to resign. This would of course make Dickie Boy president.

Eisenhower has been going in the wrong direction since his election in '52—but slowly. The direction would be the same under Nixon, but Nixon with his great energy would take us faster.

My vote is against dumping Hindenburg for Hitler. I value my civil liberties too highly.

W. C. MEYER
Clayton, Mo.

Dear Sirs:

What a let-down to find *The Progressive* handing us the "new Nixon" line too. Assuming the truth of that cynical cliche about "strange bed-fellows" in politics, I am shocked to think that you do not realize that this is a matter that has nothing to do with party politics.

Evidently, a ruthless "arriviste," a calculating opportunist, has only to say, ingenuously, with boyish charm, "I was so young, etc.," and that makes everything right. Is this the truth that shall make us free: "Use the foulest means possible, but get to the top of the heap! Then you are respectable and fit to be President of the United States."

For 26 years we have been raising a family to adulthood. We have three children, all younger than Mr. Nixon was when he started his upward climb, but not one of them is too young to know and live by the basic decencies; and they've been hungry too!

Must we now tell our children that their parents have failed them; that we have taught them all the wrong things?

EDITH GOLDFARB
Onset, Mass.

Dear Sirs:

Et tu, Brute!

Consternation filled my being when another of my favorite publications suggested that Richard Nixon should not be the object of "permanent distrust," but I vowed my bifocals must be sadly awry when I read "The New Nixon" in the editorial of the February *Progressive*. Alas, after polishing the lenses to an unaccustomed brilliance, there it was—stark and (I hope) not altogether unashamed!

He *looks* different? He *sounds* different? How does he *act*?

The New York *Times*, December 28, 1957: "The moving force behind the decision to reduce the American staff on Technical Assistance projects is Vice President Richard M. Nixon. . . . He returned from his travels convinced that there were too many Americans abroad . . . . that they often created resentment toward the United States. . . ."

The article then pointed out that diplomatic missions concerned have sent blunt telegrams to the State Department and the I.C.A. protesting such action. Now, puckering his lips in the other direction, Mr. Nixon currently favors the new Development Loan Fund, which actually hopes to substitute private investment abroad, although it is included in the budget under economic aid.

His pronouncements on race relations do not seem to inspire trust in Negroes of my acquaintance, and his close friend and adviser, now Attorney General, created no objections among Southern Senators when he was appointed.

Yes, he is ten years older, but still hungry —for the Presidency. As Margaret Halsey so pungently puts it, "this is debasement of our moral currency"!

ELIZABETH WEIDMAN
Dearborn, Mich.

Build-up of Nixon

Dear Sirs:

Regarding your February editorial, "The President Should Resign," suppose we assume that the President's health remains as it is until at least January 20, 1959. At that time he can, and likely will, retire as previously hinted in public statements.

This is a part of the political move to hold Nixon in power for the succeeding two terms. As you know, the present constitutional provision states that no President can hold office for a greater period than 10 years. The 1959 date marks the exact mid-point of the present term.

This, of course, is well known to the Republican high command and the present build-up of the Vice President is a long-

range strategy to convince the public that he is the next wonder-man in the making.

Ike may come along with this plan. A careful study of all his acts (as opposed to his public utterances) show they have been purely political. This was much in evidence during the 1952 and later in the 1956 campaign. History will show us that even though he was presented to the public in one concept, the President appeared to be acting in terms of a political strategy board.

C. C. HALL
Springfield, Ill.

Thomas' Fears Confirmed

Dear Sirs:

After six weeks in the Middle East, I should like briefly to supplement the article I wrote for the November issue of *The Progressive* on that area.

I went without great hope that any formula could bring about a prompt settlement of the problem of the Arab refugees. My fears were more than confirmed. There is no formula, however rational it may seem, which has a chance for immediate settlement. Indeed I doubt whether there can be a settlement of Arab-Israeli relations except in the framework of a general Russo-American *modus vivendi* in the Middle East.

The outstanding and depressing fact is the extent and depth of Arab fear and hatred of Israel as an immigrant nation and as a kind of spearhead of a new Western imperialism. Israel is regarded as a necessarily expansionist nation by its own philosophy of the ingathering of all exiles and by its role as agent of the West in dividing the Arab world and protecting Western oil concessions.

The Arabs would not even be satisfied by Israeli withdrawal to the boundaries of the U.N. partition plan, not unless that withdrawal were accompanied by an absolute prohibition of further Jewish immigration and a resettlement of all Arab refugees in Palestine. This, Israel would not, probably could not, accept and live as a nation.

UNRWA does a good job at extraordinarily low cost in running camps for nearly a million Arab refugees. Such camps are no model villages with possibly one or two exceptions. But the chief trouble is not physical but psychological and spiritual. The refugees are largely without jobs. Their children are growing up untrained for jobs. They have little to do but think of the past. The camps are breeding grounds for fascism or communism or a mixture of both. Better support for educational projects would somewhat help this situation. Both sides, certainly the Arab states, regard the refugees as pawns in a political game rather than as living and breathing human individuals.

The Russian triumph with Sputnik, the skillful and generous-seeming economic aid now offered by Russia to Syria and Egypt, and Russian lack of commitment to Israel, added to the extraordinary ineptness of Dulles' diplomacy, give Russia an overwhelming diplomatic advantage in the Arab world.

Bulganin and Khrushchev made rather extraordinary proposals looking to the disengagement of the major powers in the internal affairs of these countries and to the demilitarization of the area. Caution in accepting these offers at face value is justified, but nothing can justify our government's failure to make positive proposals along this line. For instance, U.N. guarantees that no borders will be changed except by negotiation, not by force, this guarantee to be underwritten by the Western powers and the U.S.S.R., which nations should also agree absolutely to discontinue the arms race in that area. All this is a phase of our progress toward universal, controlled disarmament. Our failure to do anything constructive is even more obvious in the Middle East than elsewhere. Dulles has been able literally to alienate everybody, both Israeli and Arabs.

While I do not believe that any proposal that Israel can make would win instant acceptance, I think it of the utmost importance that along with the Russo-American negotiation should go a far more convincing declaration by Ben Gurion of refusal to try to expand by force which would be accompanied by a far more generous offer to repatriate a very considerable number of Arab refugees, if in the event they want it, and to indemnify the others on the basis not only of loss of property but of the years in camp.

It would be possible to work out their absorption in the Middle East outside the territories of Israel, if there was any good will. Financially, the U.S. would have a moral obligation in view of our general support of Israel to supplement what Israel would pay in this process of indemnification. Israel should also press more eagerly for economic union, or federation, at least with Jordan. In the long run, such offers might somewhat change the situation and permit the settlement without which the future peace of the world is in danger.

Bad as the picture is, there are some constructive forces and there is some progress, especially along educational lines, in the Arab nations. None of the governments is Communist, although in Syria and Egypt there is a strong tendency to regard Russia as the big brother. This tendency is shared by most of the Arab world even in countries like Iraq or Lebanon whose governments are more or less allied to the West. Our talk of leadership of the free world arouses some cynical amusement in view of the fact that our friends are people like King Saud and others of the more conservative, reactionary, and rich landowning elements. It is anything but a happy picture, and that picture cannot be changed for the better by the processes of spending more billions in order to get more weapons of annihilation.

NORMAN THOMAS
New York, N.Y.

Timely Aid to India

Dear Sirs:

I would like to thank all "my brothers and sisters" of America for the aid to my country—India. The currently announced aid of $225,000,000 is most timely, because, as it is well known, my country was undergoing an acute foreign exchange crisis. The aid is, of course, not sufficient enough for India to relax. India is well aware of this fact and she will continue her vigorous activity and prove to the world how to gain success in a democratic way.

U.S. aid to India has been always a blessing to her 370 million people. The aid now amounts to $1,413,000,000 since independence in 1947. The people of India have always been aware of the obligation, and the best way to reward obligation is by gaining success in all spheres and thus demonstrate the success of democratic ways of doing things for which our countries stand. The maintenance and success of the free world has become an added responsibility for every free nation on the earth. My country will aptly demonstrate her ability to shoulder the responsibility whenever time demands. All her efforts are directed towards maintenance of peace. This has been aptly demonstrated by her leaders and people whenever occasion has demanded.

NANOO M. PATEL
Los Angeles, Calif.

Carping at Ike

Dear Sirs:

We are canceling our subscription because we do not approve of your carping at the President.

MRS. GORDON KINDY
San Diego, Calif.

Wonderful Job

Dear Sirs:

You are doing a wonderful job on a very small budget. My children will reap far more from your efforts than the meager sums I have contributed.

R. L. HEINRICH
Baytown, Texas

Gandhi's Greatness

Dear Sirs:

January 30, 1958 marked the tenth anniversary of the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi. This great Indian leader was the most progressive spirit of the age because he proved for all time that non-violent resistance was the practical solution to war. Gandhi was a man utterly above politics and avoided the snares of belonging to the right or left. He had no personal ambition or property, his life was dedicated to the principle of non-violence and freedom.

Today, recognition of Gandhi's greatness is mere sentimentality unless we persuade our leaders to study his life and methods profoundly. To overcome the fear and hatred of our age a completely non-partisan step towards peace is mandatory. In the past years both the United States and Russia have used "peace talks" as weapons in a propaganda war. Gandhi would have shunned such tactics and it is up to us to insist that our leaders do so. America, being the first and only nation to use the atomic bomb on human beings—not only once but twice—must take courageous leadership and ban atomic tests. Gandhi was not so afraid of his enemy

that he had to have stockpiles of bombs; he needed no bombs at all, only courageous men.

A thorough exploration of active pacifism and a renunciation of the use of force would be such effective weapons that they would baffle the Russian soldier and cripple Soviet propaganda around the world. We must realize that Soviet propaganda exploits our weaknesses, therefore we must cast out the evils in our own land. We must prove boldly to all the world that in the question of peace we are utterly above political games and name calling. Unless we heroically take Gandhi's message to heart we will be part of the ignorant force behind the bullet of his assassin and the world will turn into a monstrous slaughter-house in the most criminal war known to the human race.

ROBIN PRISING
New York, N. Y.

Bomb Test Protest

Dear Sirs:

In reply to E. Whealdon of Medford, Oregon (The People's Forum, January), I wish to state that I do indeed want to sign the resolution put forward by Senator Wayne Morse, calling for a cessation of nuclear bomb testing. Whenever and wherever we can register our protest to these tests we must do so. However, I do not want to cut out any portion of any of my *Progressives*. Therefore I will permit Mr. Whealdon to cut this letter from his *Progressive*, and I assume it will have the same meaning.

MRS. JEAN STEELINK
Tucson, Ariz.

Stevenson's Competition

Dear Sirs:

Governor Stevenson's speech to the New York County Lawyer's Association, New York, Dec. 9, 1957, is beautifully written, as are most of his speeches, and this one is clever too. It has balance in that he pays appropriate respect to both the deterrent power of "superior" military might and man's deep desire for peace. He also cleverly supplies just the necessary amount of fuel to keep the "cold war" lamps brightly burning by making the usual charges against our "opponents" and paying the usual compliments to ourselves and "allies."

Having thus charmed the audience by his apparent moderation and high purpose—only small wars versus high hopes for peace—he calmly presents this proposal: total and unlimited competition, both military and economic, between the "slave" and "free" worlds. It would be almost impossible, it seems to this writer, to conceive of a blueprint better designed to destroy the United Nations, to divide the world permanently and to make total war inevitable.

Governor Stevenson, of course, does not wish any of these things to happen. But can he not understand that NATO and the other alliances, outside the United Nations, will destroy this world organization just as effectively as the *cordon sanitaire* and similar alliances destroyed the League of Nations earlier? These, too, were outside the international organization and considered necessary for security. Cannot he and other reasonable men realize that unlimited economic competition—another name for economic exclusion, spheres of influence *et al*—among sovereign states has always played an important, if not dominant, role in warfare?

Implicit in economic aid, whether unilateral or bloc, is political pressure against both opponents and neutrals alike. This is why Nehru, U Nu, and the leaders of the other uncommitted nations have always supported multilateral aid through the United Nations, similar to UNRRA of the pre-cold war period. Only in this manner can any aid possibly become a unifying instead of a divisive force in the struggle against poverty, ignorance, and bigotry.

Maximization of world trade is certainly one of the major means for dispelling these curses of civilized man. Can any informed person really believe that this totally competitive program, as advanced by Mr. Stevenson, will increase East-West trade in goods, services and ideas, or promote peace? Was not this type of competition one of the major causes of World War I where the two blocs were led by Germany and England respectively? And is not history replete with similar instances of wars between leading powers? Will this be an exception?

Despite the charm of manner, the facility of style and apparent good will, the Governor's speech, like that of Vice President Nixon a few days earlier (before the Congress of American Industry), fails completely to encompass the main issue. If there is no alternative to peace, can there be any substitute for international cooperation? May not both have fallen into the same booby trap with Mr. Khrushchev, who, also, recommends East-West economic competition?

HUGH B. HESTER
Brigadier-General U.S.A. (Rtd.)
Washington, D.C.

Action for India

Dear Sirs:

I wish to congratulate you for the valuable articles such as "If India Falls" by Senator John F. Kennedy, "The Right to be Let Alone" by Justice William O. Douglas, and "A World Safe for Living" by General Omar Bradley, in the January issue of *The Progressive*.

As one born in India and a citizen of the United States for 40 years, thank you especially for Senator Kennedy's article. It is timely and penetrating. It brings some pertinent facts about the situation in India before the American people.

Last year I was in India and as a technical man visited many industries—three unfinished steel plants, projects with huge dams, reservoirs, and hydro-electric power plants, and many research laboratories.

The progress they have made in the last ten years is indeed heartening. It would be tragic if these efforts of India were to fail for want of funds. As Senator Kennedy has pointed out, the program India has undertaken is not over-ambitious.

Talking with the Secretary of the India Government Planning Commission, I learned that at the end of the first Five Year Plan, the average per capita annual income was raised to only $57. The aim of the second Five Year Plan is to raise it to $65. This surely is not too much.

To an unaccustomed observer the poverty of the people is appalling. There are still millions of people in the larger cities of India living shelterless in the streets and railway stations. I hope Congress will take imaginative and practical action to strengthen India's efforts.

PRAFULLA C. MUKERJI
Brooklyn, N.Y.

Gov. Collins' 'Moderation'

Dear Sirs:

In your January issue, you give Holiday Greetings to Governor LeRoy Collins of Florida for his "counsel of moderation in the field of civil rights." Well, in the words of a great man whose political career was halted by Southern bigotry, "Let's look at the record."

ITEM: In December 1956 the U.S. Supreme Court declared racial segregation on intrastate buses to be unconstitutional. Tallahassee Negroes promptly abandoned their seven-month boycott and began taking seats without regard to a city ordinance requiring segregation. Governor Collins obligingly suspended city bus service until the city commission could draft a new ordinance requiring bus patrons to take seats assigned to them by the driver; no mention is made of race in the new law, but its sole purpose is to continue segregation. Governor Collins gave this move not only passive acceptance, but active cooperation.

ITEM: A public health official in a north Florida town ate lunch with a Negro in a local restaurant. She was promptly fired. An appeal was made to Governor Collins, who claimed that he had no power to intervene. His position as governor and his personal prestige could both have been decisive.

ITEM: A year ago I was expelled from Florida State University for supporting integration. Again, Governor Collins refused to intervene against the demands of racists.

ITEM: Governor Collins signed into law a bill providing that any school which is integrated by the federal government must be closed.

ITEM: No school, college, or university in Florida, at any academic level, is integrated, despite the governor's claim that "integration is the law of the land."

ITEM: The adjutant general of Florida has declared before a legislative committee that, should a situation similar to that of Little Rock arise in Florida, he would order the state national guard to fire on federal troops. No comment from Governor Collins.

ITEM: A Negro assistant state's attorney was fired when it was found that he dictated letters to white secretaries. No comment from Governor Collins.

The only conclusion that can be drawn from these actions and inactions of Governor Collins is that he is firmly opposed to any moderation of traditional racism. Such

noises to the contrary as he makes from time to time are for strictly Northern consumption, and have no relation to the political situation within Florida. Far from being a moderate, Governor Collins is, even more than his Arkansas colleague (once also hailed as a "moderate"), thoroughly committed to holding the line on segregation. He made this clear in his campaign for re-election in 1956, and will continue to make this clear whenever the opportunity arises to cater to the White Citizens' Councils of his state.

JOHN BOARDMAN
Syracuse, N. Y.

Weapon Against Communism

Dear Sirs:

In the article, "A World Safe for Living," in *The Progressive* for January, the implications in the editors' introduction overshadow the contents of General Bradley's address.

General Bradley appealed for action to halt the "search for peace through the accumulation of peril." But his statement of faith in the ability of intelligent human beings to get together on some basis of a just accord is discounted by the explanation to the editors that his expression of views on the need for action does not compromise his position that we must gain equality or superiority in scientific performance before an accord can be achieved.

That means that General Bradley anticipates a continuation of the arms race until the "whole electronics house of cards" reaches the point of impossible extension, when we will have nothing to do but settle down to an uneasy life "in a thickening shadow of death."

IT
TASTES GOOD
IS GOOD
DOES YOU GOOD

FINEST INDIAN RIVER FRUIT
Uncolored
Tree ripened
Direct from Groves
GUARANTEED
Oranges, Grapefruit, or Mixed
Bushel—$7.75
Half-Bushel—$5.25
Express Prepaid
Add 5% for Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, and Upper Michigan. Prices on request for states farther West.
JAMES H. HART
Island Groves
R.F.D. 2, Merritt Island, Florida

As a matter of fact, the United States has a weapon that can be used with devastating effect on Communist tyranny, without a buildup of military superiority. This weapon is the democratic idea, the idea of complete justice and true humaneness in human association.

Let us, the American people, have our government offer to the world, through the United Nations, a carefully composed, comprehensive plan for establishing an international equality of opportunity to use, or to benefit from the use of, the world's natural resources and facilities for living, and for providing for production and exchange of wealth in the mutual interest of all peoples.

If the people of Russia and the satellites should be offered an assurance of partnership in a world-wide project of rehabilitation and equalization of opportunity, it would start a ferment of anticipation that the Communist dictators could not control.

RAY O. CAUKIN
Pasadena, Calif.

Rigged for Rigor Mortis

Dear Sirs:

The excellent letter by Hiram B. Holdridge titled "Spurious Leadership" in the January issue leads me to add a thought or two.

Our leadership is now clearly seen to be wavering and ineffective. But we must face another fact which reflects against our people as a whole. Most Americans have apparently come to believe they haven't needed strong leadership except in war. Too democratic. Perhaps that's why so many liked Ike. And that now appears to be why Ike liked them.

Together they liked "enlightened self-interest." So each rigged up wiring for nuclear bomb "deterrents" around the world to make the world safe for his kind of "self." But now one basic "scientific" fact emerges: Both "selves" are rigged for rigor mortis unless the wires are ripped up and the bombs dismantled.

Surely educated Americans are smart enough to realize by now that the world can't be "saved for democracy" unless we and the world's other nations are brought to agree to pay a proportionate price toward world responsibility. For whatever price each nation pays it will get a proportionate degree of individual and collective freedom. No single leader can lead us to this unless we proclaim the self the world self. And no group of nihilist leaders can stop us if we insist upon our most basic freedom—freedom to live!

RAY SOUTHWORTH
Los Angeles, Calif.

Poll for Arab Refugees

Dear Sirs:

Your article in the November 1957 *Progressive*, describing the horrible conditions in the Arab refugee camps, should stimulate all who are responsible for their continuance into immediate action.

This problem can be readily solved by persuading Israel to permit all refugees to enter Israel together with all of the former areas of Palestine that these refugees now occupy.

The refugees involved should have the inalienable right to determine by a plebiscite the state to which they and their respective areas should become annexed.

By way of illustration, if the area of Gaza votes its destiny into Egypt, they should automatically be citizens of Egypt; but if they vote to return their area and their allegiance into Israeli territory, then they could eventually become full citizens of Israel.

SOLOMON A. DANN
President
Arab-Israel League for a Free United States of the Middle East
Detroit, Mich.

War or Peace—Now

Dear Sirs:

The issue of war and peace must be decided *now*. If the decision is for war, the war must be fought *now*.

The reason for this is simple: if the present armament race proceeds to its logical conclusion, either side will have absolute power completely to obliterate the other. Whoever strikes first will achieve the final destruction of the other. Under such circumstances, neither side could be trusted not to strike first. The last chance for the two sides to perish together in a fair fight is rapidly slipping away.

If the decision is for peace, each side must completely disarm and each side must be given complete freedom to inspect the other on the ground to give absolute assurance that there are no violations.

Peace through strength is a delusion which has always led to war, and from this moment on, war means annihilation. Peace can be achieved only through friendship with the enemy. The question of war or peace, death by hate or life by love, is here and now and will not wait for an answer. As far as I am concerned, the answer will be peace.

VERNON WARD
Belhaven, N. C.

Mayer the Poet

Dear Sirs:

I resubscribed primarily because you run the articles of Milton Mayer. I say this so that you will count me strongly on his side in the continuing controversy over him; I would cancel my subscription if he were dropped. That does not mean that I agree with him much over half the time (I am no pacifist), but I believe him to be a great man and a most intelligent commentator on public affairs. He makes me just a little prouder (as sometimes I am not proud at all) of being an American. And his humor (which evidently some of your correspondents do not comprehend) is exactly in the tradition of the poet and the man of letters.

GEORGE P. HAYES
Decatur, Ga.



Histories of the Movies

by MARTIN S. DWORKIN

THIS IS either the best or the worst time for histories of the movies to come out—depending upon whether we think the present chaotic uncertainties are a phase in an evolution, or in an era's ending. That they do come out, at a time when theater attendance is dwindling disastrously, does say something for a growing serious interest in the movies that is encouraging—a development presaged a year ago (in my "Lost and Found," *The Progressive*, March, 1957).

The depth of the seriousness since then is best indicated, alas, not in new penetrations, but in reprints of cinema incunabula: Sergei Eisenstein's *Film Form* and *The Film Sense*, joined in a single paperback volume (Meridian Books); Rudolf Arnheim's *Film as Art*, an adaptation of his own *Film*, also in paperback (University of California Press); and a revised edition of Gilbert Seldes' pioneer excursion into critical comment on the new mass-entertainment media, including some of the earliest deliberate movie criticism, *The Seven Lively Arts* (Sagamore Press). A venture into integrated literary and film criticism, *Novels into Film*, by George Bluestone (Johns Hopkins Press), seems to be the only seriously intended critical work among the new ones. The others are popularly historical and carefully introductory in approach, aimed at the widest response, if not the deepest interpretation: Bosley Crowther's epitaph for the crumbling Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer colossus, *The Lion's Share* (E. P. Dutton); and, most recently, *The Movies*, a gigantic picture-book with text and captions by Richard Griffith and Arthur Mayer (Simon and Schuster); and *The Liveliest Art*, by Arthur Knight (Macmillan), an urbane survey of movie history, significance, and apparent future directions.

The latter two panoramic works are impressively different in intention and appearance, demonstrating again that there may be as many ways of being popular as of being serious. The point bears making because of the manner in which serious film people have greeted both books —and because we must forever reiterate the platitudes that something popular may nonetheless be seriously significant, and that popularization can be a quite worthy way of extending knowledge, provided that the substance of what is to be known is not contemptuously cheapened to dross.

Nothing is gained in understanding of the movies as social phenomenon or as art by disparaging histories because they review the trash that has filled the screen. The issue once again is that perennial sentimental insistence that history be historiography: that what happened be what we want to describe. The criticism of the Griffith-Mayer picture-book, and of Knight's elementary survey, must itself not be grounded upon that unconscious disdain of the movies that makes movie criticism such an easily irresponsible enterprise for so many, presenting opportunities for opinionating without standards or relevant competences, and permitting the sublime luxury of demanding masterpieces without possessing criteria of judgment that have something to do with the particular, unique nature of the filmic art.

So far, Knight's artfully unpretentious "Panoramic History of the Movies," as *The Liveliest Art* is subtitled, has stimulated the flow of aesthetic bile among the *cineastes* much more than has the loudly booming treatment by Griffith and Mayer, "told in 1,000 wonderful pictures and 150,000 words of brilliant text." Not that Knight is taken more seriously than are Griffith and Mayer. But the critics in the coterie of cinema and art magazines are more serious about not taking him seriously. There may be a certain wisdom in this—aside from the partisan purposes being served.

For, in one sense, Griffith and Mayer's *The Movies* does not properly belong to the renascence of interest in books on film, but to the current passion for nostalgia for our recent past—the Twenties most of all, the Forties and Thirties, and the early decades of the century, too, when the pictures-that-move and the antique automobiles were genuine wonders. As it stands, thick and formidably diverting, *The Movies* appears as less a history or work of consistent interpretation than one of those overpriced, poorly printed production jobs run up for the gift trade, the book clubs, and—all too soon—the remainder counters: a "picture-book" in which picture selection ultimately determines what is to be treated at all, and picture layout how much precious white space is to be squandered on text.

The unifying theme repeats a classic apology for nostalgia: that the movies haven't changed since they began; we, the audience, have changed. And all the hundreds of photographs are there in orderly sequences, suitable for browsing, to prove it.

And yet, there is a flashy quality to the book's stress upon the movies' carnival brass and brilliances, that captures a sense of their continuing appeal, come whatever aesthetic theories and social maturities may, that is somehow slighted in Knight's more detailed, analytical treatment of tech-

niques, directors, and international trends. This is a sense of the movies as fun, and as they have vivified the dreams of those who rarely read books —other than the ones drawn from or destined for movie translation; of the movies as a force that has changed the world and our ways of knowing the world.

Among the captions and paragraphs pasting the photographs to one another are many shrewd observations, aptly made—as well they might be. Richard Griffith is curator of the Film Library of the Museum of Modern Art, and author of several books on film. Arthur Mayer is one of the most intelligent persons in the business end of the movies, a sharp commentator on the practicalities of getting better films to greater audiences, in his many essays and his book, *Merely Colossal*. It is a pity that they—and/or the publishing powers—were so plainly carried away by the picture-book format, and by the particular pictures finally selected, that so massive a work as *The Movies* is so infrequently more than illustrated nostalgia, for end-table entertainment.

If Griffith and Mayer seem to care more about memories, cynically spiced but affectionately redrawn, Arthur Knight, who is film critic for *The Saturday Review*, presents an introductory handbook for film appreciation, in which film history is interpreted in terms of trends towards the present—or, rather, towards whatever future may be materializing, as theatrical and non-theatrical forms of film experience compete and combine. There is no question that *The Liveliest Art* belongs with the new bibliography of film—although there is some questioning about its value as introduction, history, or interpretative commentary. But it is true that Knight's concern with the movies is largely limited to studios and theaters, rather than extended to comprehend their meanings in social history. He introduces the inventor, the artist, and the businessman as "the three points in the triangle of film creation," and says immediately that "none of them could function without that vast, motley, disorganized throng which, assembled in neat rows in orchestra, mezzanine and balcony, becomes momentarily 'the audience'." His emphasis thereafter, however, is upon techniques and styles of film making, events and directions in the business of presenting movies to the public.

In avoiding the doctrinaire political interpretations of older histories of the screen, Knight has neglected social meanings. And in correctly crediting directors, technicians, and businessmen, he even leans too far away from a realization of the fame-splashed, tabloid and fan-magazine reality of Hollywood fakery, that is what "the movies" have meant to most people, everywhere.

To explain the nature and meaning of the movies, there is needed a lot of Griffith's and Mayer's sense of the movie stars in the firmament of the people's dreams—as well as Knight's knowledge of techniques. But there must also be a profound comprehension of the forces in the lives of peoples that have given the movies their ideological power. And, deepest of all, there has to be recognition of the movies as representing the modern revolution in knowledge of the world.

Reading books about the movies already signifies a commitiment much different from that involved in sitting in theaters, or watching films on television. The problem of popularization, then, is not simply one of enticing people towards the exercise of critical awareness of the elements of film, as that has already begun by the time a book is opened. Nor is it one of merely being "unburdened either by technical jargon or the special esperanto of *cine-club* experts," as Knight contentedly characterizes his own commendably lucid, but often excessively urbane style. Popularization in its most meaningful educational sense is the choice of a level of clarification, rather than the specific omission of essentials. In this light, *The Liveliest Art* popularizes some vital aspects of movie history in interesting, factual fashion; is uneven in others, such as some of the "International Trends"; and is inadequate or wholly neglectful in dealing with the social, political, and philosophical considerations that may be the most important of all, in understanding the history of what happened to us on screen.

Transforming Dixie

AN EPITAPH FOR DIXIE, by Harry S. Ashmore. W. W. Norton. 189 pp. $3.50.

DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW, by Albert P. Blaustein and Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr. Rutgers University Press. 333 pp. $5.

WITH ALL DELIBERATE SPEED, edited by Don Shoemaker. Harper. 239 pp. $3.50.

Reviewed by

Francis M. Wilhoit

OLD REGIONS, like old soldiers, often refuse to die—or even to fade away. Thus, the Old South, which survived the ravages of the Civil War and Reconstruction, has outlived a hundred Cassandras who predicted its demise. But rapid decay in Dixie has definitely set in; and, indeed, death now seems so certain that one of the South's most distinguished contemporary sons has felt justified in setting down an obituary that is only slightly immature. The obituary is *An Epitaph for Dixie*, and the author is Harry S. Ashmore.

Few observers of the Southern scene are so well qualified by temperament and professional experience as Ashmore to describe the collapse of the Old South and the traumatic birth pains of the New. Executive editor of the *Arkansas Gazette*, Harry Ashmore has long been the most liberal, dynamic, and audacious of those Southern journalists whose moderate voices have sometimes been too glibly equated with the Voice of the South. During the recent Little Rock tragedy, he took his stand fearlessly for law and human decency and is still suffering the consequences of his decision to stand for the right whatever the cost. He is the author of the definitive work, *The Negro and the Schools*, which by happy coincidence was published on the very day that the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its historic desegregation decision.

Although something of a journalistic requiem mass, *Epitaph for Dixie* is not a dirge of despair nor does it pipe the minstrelsy of doom. It is not even chiefly or exclusively a study of the present desegregation conflict in the South. It is rather a broad picture of the changing contours of

My Brother's Keeper

JAMES JOYCE'S EARLY YEARS

by his brother

STANISLAUS

"Stanislaus Joyce's book is not only indispensable as a study of a great author by his brother, but it would be fascinating even if the brother were a complete unknown. Really, the talent in the Joyce family is almost incredible."—FRANK O'CONNOR

In this salty, outspoken, affectionate portrait of his brother, Stanislaus Joyce has written a book of unique interest and high literary distinction. Every page crackles with his razor-sharp powers of observation, with his Irish gift for vituperation. Authoritative and explicit, this remarkable biography covers James Joyce's early years, the all-important Dublin years which were the wellsprings of everything he was to write. Stanislaus was the one person with both the ability and the closeness to Joyce to re-create this fascinating period, and to give us insights and personal data nowhere else available. *Illustrated* $5.00

Introduction and notes by RICHARD ELLMANN
Preface by T. S. ELIOT

THE VIKING PRESS

New York 22, N. Y.

POETS OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

Edited by W. H. Auden and Norman Holmes Pearson

The poetic riches of 600 years have been gathered together in these five remarkable volumes. Beautifully designed and bound durably in paper, they offer a magnificent survey of British and American poetry from Middle English to modern times.

"Beyond question the best and most useful anthology of English poetry ever made."—ALLEN TATE

"A splendid collection . . . done by editors who have a true feeling for poetic craftsmanship in all its glorious diversity."—DAVID DAICHES, *Saturday Review*

Each volume contains nearly 100,000 lines of verse, yet the price is ONLY $1.45 each.

MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE POETS: Langland to Spenser

ELIZABETHAN AND JACOBEAN POETS: Marlowe to Marvell

RESTORATION AND AUGUSTAN POETS: Milton to Goldsmith

ROMANTIC POETS: Blake to Poe

VICTORIAN AND EDWARDIAN POETS: Tennyson to Yeats

Now in handsome paper bindings!

THE GRAPES OF WRATH
by John Steinbeck $1.95

DEATH OF A SALESMAN
by Arthur Miller $.95

THE APPRENTICESHIP OF ERNEST HEMINGWAY
by Charles A. Fenton $1.45

the South, sort of an up-to-date version of Cash's trail-blazing *Mind of the South*. Race is an important motif of the book but not the only one.

Epitaph for Dixie is required reading for all thoughtful students of American civilization. The strength of the book lies in its unfailing luminosity, its felicitous style, its warmth of feeling, and its clear perception of the nature of those forces now transforming the South—urbanization, industrialization, mechanization of agriculture, unionization, and increasing social mobility. My criticisms of the book are few: It is too brief; it ignores certain significant sociocultural variables such as religion; and parts of it are written with perhaps a little too much unblushing sentimentality. But the strengths far outweigh the defects.

What is the cause of the present crisis in the South? Ashmore is not always explicit on the matter, but he clearly feels that the default of leadership is among the most important causes of the South's troubles. The "good people" are quiet; the "bad people," besides doing all the talking, run the state governments.

What of the shape of things to come? Ashmore believes that industry will soon utterly transform the face of the South and that the federal government will ultimately force token integration upon all Southern states. He has no illusions, however, about the lack of enthusiasm with which integration will be received, nor does he feel that the South will suddenly transform necessity into opportunity. The frenetic segregationists will continue to resist all change, but he feels that the South's innate conservatism and its growing materialism will ultimately put the lawless mobs to flight.

The keenest insight offered the reader in *Epitaph for Dixie* is probably this: The present desegregation controversy is not so much an isolated phenomenon as it is a symptom of the revolution that is now transforming the South from a Closed to an Open Society. Ashmore feels that the achievement of an Open Society in Dixie is inevitable, but so is continued massive resistance. Every day the old symbols look more tattered and faded, but they still, alas, disgrace the gonfalon of Dixie.

Americans in increasing numbers are waking up to the fact that desegregation is the greatest moral and political issue facing the nation today. The literature on this national culture crisis is vast but far from satisfactory. Some of it is dangerously sensational; much more is depressingly narrow and naive; while virtually all of it is confined to the narrative-impressionistic level. What we now need are desegregation studies that are analytical rather than descriptive, interpretative rather than merely prescriptive.

Desegregation and the Law by Blaustein and Ferguson, accurately subtitled "The Meaning and Effect of the School Segregation Cases," could scarcely have been more timely. It is sharply analytical, achieves considerable interpretative depth, and is utterly devoid of that clumsy jargon which has long been a stylistic characteristic of even our best writers on legal subjects. The authors are professors of law at Rutgers University Law School; though still young, they have had distinguished careers in public service, teaching, and scholarly writing.

Before getting to the quintessential meaning of *Brown* v. *Board of Education* (the first of the five school segregation cases), Blaustein and Ferguson give the reader a brief summary of the background of the cases. The scope of the judicial process is pithily analyzed; the clock is turned back to earlier cases; and the Fourteenth Amendment is reviewed at length.

The reader is then brought face to face with the full meaning of *Brown* v. *Board of Education:* the fact that on May 17, 1954 the Supreme Court decided that *all* state segregation statutes, based solely on racial classification, are *per se* discriminatory and thus violative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The full implications of this new standard were not clear—even to specialists—until 1956, when subsequent decisions of the Court clarified the matter. Of course, there are many in the South today who still refuse to admit that the *Brown* decision voided *all* state-supported segregation in whatever field.

I have only three quibbles with *Desegregation and the Law:* It ignores the arguments *against* the year's postponement of the implementation decision (this was the year in which Southern fatalism changed to militant defiance). It shows little recognition of the fact that the legal process is but one aspect of our multi-faceted, closely articulated political process. And it includes the highly dubious statement that the Supreme Court is "the ultimate guardian of American civil liberties."

With All Deliberate Speed bears the sub-title "Segregation-Desegregation in Southern Schools" and was prepared by staff members and associates of the Southern Education Reporting Service, under the able editorship of Don Shoemaker. It is a documentary summary or "wrap-up" of desegregation developments in the South and the border states since 1954. All but two of the contributors are members of the staff of *Southern School News*, which means they are working reporters.

The book is a useful repository of statistical data relating to Southern schools; it contains a splendid if not exhaustive bibliography; and here and there it shows provocative insights which this reviewer wishes had been explored in greater detail.

The unevenness of the contributions is but a natural result of plural authorship; yet the disparity in quality is often shocking. Thus, the reader passes directly from the trenchant analysis of Edgar L. Jones' "City Limits," where the influence of urbanization on the desegregation crisis is skillfully sketched, to W. D. Workman's "The Deep South," which only barely manages to transcend the bounds of polemical partisanship.

While the editor and his staff succeeded in covering a lot of subjects fairly well in a small space, I looked in vain for such topics as the role of religion in the present crisis; an analysis of the genesis of segregation and desegregation voluntary associations; the attitude of Southern Negroes toward state action aimed at indurating segregation; and the economics of segregation-desegregation. Moreover, when the editor says that he "asked only that these contributors park their opinions at some convenient curb and essay the role of reporter," he is begging the question of just what is and should be the role of a

reporter in our society. Because his reporters have been enjoined to be utterly disinterested, they often succeed in being merely uninteresting.

This book, despite its many virtues, raises a host of fundamental questions about the nature of the *Southern School News*. Because scholars in the field of race relations have benefited from the paper's service, they have hesitated to criticize it; yet continued silence can only harm what could be, but is not yet, "an experiment unique in the history of journalism."

In order to realize its full potential, the *Southern School News* must be something more than a clipping agency. It must cease believing in the chimera of *tabula rasa* objectivity; it must recognize that documentary reporting is of slight value unless related to conceptual analysis; it must learn that facts do *not* speak for themselves; and it must re-structure its entire organization in order to use fewer reporters and more expert consultants in such fields as law, political science, and psychology. Shoemaker is an admirable journalist, and all scholars appreciate the fact that he has to walk an "objective tightrope" between the Fund for the Advancement of Education and his board of directors, headed by the arch-segregationist Thomas R. Waring of Charleston. Much has been done already; far more could be done in the future with more realism and less journalistic self-restraint.

What is the prognosis to be gleaned from the evidence in *With All Deliberate Speed*? All the writers seem agreed that progress will come, but most seem to feel that it will be painfully slow. And some would probably state that the South is proceeding with all deliberate speed—*away* from desegregation.

Shoemaker's contributors, no less than Blaustein and Ferguson, seem agreed that the Negro must ultimately win educational equality through continued legal disputes. For this reviewer the answer lies elsewhere—through enfranchisement of the Negro and direct political action through bloc voting. The Civil Rights Act of 1957 may turn out to have been even more revolutionary and valuable than the *Brown* decision. But this, I hasten to add, is a hope, not a prediction.

REALITIES OF RUSSIA

RUSSIAN LIBERALISM
From Gentry to Intelligentsia

By GEORGE FISCHER. Was there ever a chance of a Western type of free society in Russia? In this important book Mr. Fischer traces the plight of the liberal in Russian society from the Great Reforms to the 1905 Revolution. He points out the attempts at reform made by Russian liberals, why these attempts failed and the light that Russian liberalism throws on the dilemma of many underdeveloped societies today. $4.50

DOCTOR AND PATIENT IN SOVIET RUSSIA
By MARK G. FIELD,
With an introduction by Paul Dudley White

This remarkably informed work moves from a discussion of the history and development of medical care in the Soviet Union to the physician and his social role and finally to the patient. We see how the actions of the Ministry of Health and of the individual physicians are strictly controlled by the Party and how the emphasis on production in Soviet society even changes the standards by which one is considered sick or well. Chapters on the patient draw on over 1600 written questionnaires. $5.00

SOVIET TRANSPORTATION POLICY

By HOLLAND HUNTER. Those interested in the development of Russia as an industrial power will find this book unusually revealing. It is well-known that most nations in their developing stages place great emphasis on expansion of transportation facilities. Russia, with apparent success, is an exception to this rule, however, and Mr. Hunter has written a thoroughly documented analysis of the wisdom of the Russian policy from the middle 1920's to the present day. $8.50

HOW RUSSIA IS RULED

By MERLE FAINSOD. "The fullest and most reliable study of the Soviet political system that has yet been written. . . . Deserves as wide a public as possible." *The Manchester Guardian.* $7.50

Books from the Russian Research Center, Harvard University

Many other aspects of Soviet affairs are fully treated in authoritative books from the Russian Research Center of Harvard University. You can obtain able treatments of Soviet military organization, taxes, public opinion, industrial production, law and justice, minerals, ideology, internal politics, and other subjects. Write for a descriptive catalogue of the Russian Research Center Studies now available.

Through your bookseller, or from

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
79 Garden Street
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

F.D.R., Countryman

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND CONSERVATION—1911-1945, Volumes I and II. Compiled by Edgar B. Nixon. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. 700 pp. $9.50.

Reviewed by

Charles H. Stoddard

IT IS almost trite to say that the public and private papers of a leading public figure often reveal insights into his personal interests and significant accomplishments which too frequently escape issue-oriented historians. That this is particularly true of Franklin D. Roosevelt has been thumpingly demonstrated in this 1300-page collection of his papers on forestry, soil, water and wildlife, park conservation, and natural resource planning. Furthermore, I venture to predict that among the most enduring and tangible monuments to Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal, his far-reaching accomplishments in conservation will rank close to the top.

There is an underlying reason for Roosevelt's broad interest in natural resource problems: he was a countryman at heart. He had what the late Aldo Leopold called "an ecological conscience." Many pages of his letters, conference reports as well as written speeches, reveal a man with an earthly awareness of trees, wild things, and a "feel" for the land—not as a sentimentalist, but as a practical realist.

A Southern liberal writes

AN EPITAPH FOR DIXIE

By HARRY S. ASHMORE

Executive Editor, The Little Rock *Arkansas Gazette*

"Merits the adjective great. This penetrating appraisal of the new South is the definitive work."
—RALPH MCGILL, Editor, *Atlanta Constitution*

$3.50 NORTON

Only a man who had reforested his own acres with tree species he himself had carefully chosen, and who had watched them grow, would have the vision needed to create and stoutly defend a national reforestation program so that unemployed city boys might have similar experiences in the Civilian Conservation Corps. Only a man who knew his American land and was both an idealist and a political realist with imagination could have translated this knowledge into a vast body of solid accomplishment.

These volumes do not include any of Roosevelt's papers on public power or reclamation except insofar as they were related to the general field of resource planning. Presumably, papers on TVA, REA, and other water developments will be included in another collection. There is much evidence in these papers, however, to indicate that he was primarily interested in integrated management of resources—particularly river basin and regional resource planning. The TVA and the National Resources Planning Board were pioneering efforts in this respect.

F.D.R.'s conservation programs were established largely during his first and second Administrations before World War II. To review them all would require more space than should decently be allotted to any reviewer; but the impact of their sheer numbers cannot be appreciated without a listing of the highlights: establishment of the Soil Conservation Service, establishment of 159 new national wildlife refuges, establishment of King's Canyon, Great Smokies, and Isle Royale national parks and a number of national monuments; the first national water pollution control act; the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934; the Duck Stamp, Pittman-Robertson and Wildlife Coordination Acts (all landmarks in wildlife conservation); expansion of the national forests by 13 million acres; the Plains Shelterbelt; and the Norris-Doxey Farm Forestry Act. There are many other major forward steps in existing programs which had received no forward push for years.

Roosevelt's personal interest in conservation was fertile ground for early leadership in conservation policy when, as state senator in Albany, he sponsored the Roosevelt-Jones Wildlife Protection Bill. His first real scrape with Al Smith came in 1931 over the Reforestation Amendment (designed to retire and reforest submarginal New York State lands) when the latter opposed it as being unnecessary. (It was approved by a large majority of voters.) These early experiences were fostered and encouraged by his personal friendship with Gifford Pinchot as early as 1911. On many occasions during his career F.D.R. sought out and used some of Pinchot's advice on forestry matters. And it is of interest that Pinchot and F.D.R. were planning a World Conference on Conservation shortly before the latter's death.

Students of public policy have often noted that the only two great forward strides in conservation took place under the two Roosevelts—both countrymen with a personal interest in the outdoors. But whereas the first Roosevelt had the interest and political drive to put over new programs, the ideas behind them were largely those of Pinchot and others. These papers clearly reveal that many of the basic ideas in the New Deal conservation programs were those of the President himself and that he inspired others to give them the detail needed to bring them into fruition.

It should be a matter of some concern to the conservation movement of the United States that Presidential leadership of a special quality has been needed to make progress—men whose backgrounds include a personal interest in problems of the land. This is a matter of concern because fewer and fewer of our future political leaders will be drawn from those who have had direct contact with resource problems. This dilemma has made itself painfully apparent during the last five years when attempt after attempt has been made to turn back and turn over many painfully-won conservation gains. While organized citizen conservationists were able to stem the tide, the White House has not only shown no awareness of what was going on, but has lent prestige to those who would turn back the conservation clock. Nor did the Democratic candidate, Adlai Stevenson, exploit the oppor-

tunity to drive home in a single major speech the many undeniable transgressions of the Administration in conservation. This is true despite the organized efforts of many prominent conservationists to help him do so.

As a participant in several New Deal conservation programs beginning with a job as a forestry foreman in a C.C.C. camp during college years, I felt I had a reasonably detailed knowledge of conservation in the New Deal. These two volumes open up many new insights into Roosevelt the man, the political leader, and the conservationist, which will be instructive to both professional and lay conservationists. No historian of the 1930's henceforth can afford to overlook this dynamic and lasting chapter of our history.

Goals of Liberty

THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE, by William O. Douglas. Doubleday. 238 pp. $4.

Reviewed by

Charles Alan Wright

"IN RECENT years as we have denounced the loss of liberty abroad we have witnessed its decline here. We have, indeed, been retreating from our democratic ideals at home . . . It is time to put an end to the retreat."

In those words, taken from the Foreword, Justice Douglas states the justification for this book. In the book, which contains three lectures delivered at Franklin & Marshall College, Douglas undertakes to define what individual liberty must be, in the context of 1958, if democratic ideals are to be achieved.

The first lecture deals with freedom of expression. Here Douglas takes his stand firmly on the First Amendment and its flat prohibition of any law abridging freedom of speech or of the press. He rejects Judge Learned Hand's view that these words are "no more than admonitions of moderation." That view, Douglas says, "has done more to undermine liberty in this country than any other single force." His own belief is that the absolute language of the First Amendment should be applied in a virtually absolute manner, allowing speech to be suppressed only where "speech is so closely brigaded with action that it is in essence a part of an overt act." In this lecture Douglas considers every important Supreme Court decision about freedom of expression and finds not a single instance in which suppression was justified by his test.

The second lecture takes up a number of problems of individual liberty under the general heading, "The Right to Be Let Alone" (one of two chapters adapted for the December and January issues of *The Progressive*). Present law and practice are compared with the ideal in such varied areas as legislative investigations, loyalty oaths, religious freedom, wiretapping, and abusive police practices. No absolute answer will suffice here, not only because the relevant provisions of the Bill of Rights are more qualified than is the First Amendment, but also because we patently cannot bar all legislative investigations or all searches by the police. Necessarily abridgements of the right to be let alone must be measured against a standard of reasonableness. Justice Douglas is no more successful in defining this standard than the Supreme Court itself has been—but he is eloquent in pointing out the ancient truth that a particular practice cannot be regarded as "reasonable" merely because it is effective in ferreting out criminals or subversives:

"The means are all important in a civilized society. It may seem unimportant that a miserable person is forced to confess to a crime. But in the sweep of history, a nation that accepts that practice as normal, a country that engages in wire-tapping, a people that exalts the ends over the means have no claim to a position of moral leadership among the nations."

The final lecture, in many ways the most provocative if also the most technical, examines the much-neglected right of civilians to be free from military domination. Here are discussed such topics as the dangerous tendency to let the armed forces, rather than the civil authorities, decide important questions of foreign policy, attempts by military tribunals to try civilians, and abuses of martial law. The Seventeenth Cen-

YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 1956

The most comprehensive account of the work of the United Nations and its specialized agencies. **$12.50**

RUSSIAN FICTION and SOVIET IDEOLOGY

ERNEST J. SIMMONS discusses the work of Konstantin Fedin, Leonid Leonov, and Mikhail Sholokhov in terms of the literary, social, and political forces that have helped shape their work. **$4.75**

SOVIET EDUCATION

Edited by GEORGE L. KLINE. **With a Foreword by** GEORGE S. COUNTS. Nine essays by former Soviet teachers and students give detailed accounts of Soviet education in action. **$3.50**

SOVIET MARXISM

HERBERT MARCUSE. To explain some of the major changes in Soviet Marxism, Dr. Marcuse considers the historical reality behind Soviet doctrine from the point of view of its basic Marxian concepts. **$4.50**

THE THEATER in SOVIET RUSSIA

NIKOLAI A. GORCHAKOV, in this history of the Russian theater in the twentieth century, in which he worked for many years as a director, traces the growth and decline of one of the most glorious phases of the world's theater. **$10.00**

PEOPLE of COAL TOWN

HERMAN R. LANTZ studies a community representative of America's changing frontier and discovers the social and economic pressures that have affected the inhabitants. **$5.75**

Columbia University Press
2960 Broadway New York 27, N.Y.

tury rallying cry, "no standing armies," is not likely to be realized in the foreseeable future. Douglas is at his best in stating its implications in a form feasible in the present world.

The concept of liberty, as Douglas views it, is both inspiring and breathtaking. The Supreme Court received torrents of unjustified and intemperate abuse for the few tiny steps it took last June in the direction of the democratic ideal. Even against that background Douglas has the courage to call for drastic change. These changes will hardly take place overnight. Indeed it is useful to remember that on the legal and constitutional issues involved, there are arguments for a position contrary to Douglas', arguments sufficiently strong that they have consistently had the support of a majority of the Supreme Court. But no thinking person is likely to dispute Justice Douglas' statement that these are the goals to which a free country must aspire.

A revolutionary plan for a CAPITALISTIC distribution of wealth—to preserve our free society

THE

Capitalist Manifesto

By LOUIS O. KELSO and MORTIMER J. ADLER

$3.75, now at your bookstore
RANDOM HOUSE

The Poetry of Precision

by RICHARD SCHICKEL

THE LATE James Agee was "essentially a poet." So states the jacket of his posthumous novel, *A Death in the Family* (McDowell-Obolensky. 339 pp. $3.95), and most of the reviewers have paid due homage to the poetic quality of his book. Jacket and reviewers are correct; *A Death in the Family* is a poetic novel, but unique in the long—and mostly fruitless—history of attempts to fuse the two forms.

Here is an example of Agee at his poetic best, in a description of a very old woman's eyes:

> ". . . suddenly her eyes darted a little and looked straight into his, but they did not in any way change their expression. They were just color: seen close as this, there was color through a dot at the middle, dim as blue-black oil, and then a circle of blue so pale it was almost white, that looked like glass, smashed into a thousand dimly sparkling pieces, smashed and infinitely old and patient, and then a ring of dark blue, so fine and sharp no needle could have drawn it, and then a clotted yellow full of tiny squiggles of blood, and then a wrong-side furl of red-bronze, and little black lashes. Vague light sparkled in the cracked blue of the eye like some kind of remote ancestor's anger, and the sadness of time dwelt in the blue-breathing oily center, lost and alone and far away, deeper than the deepest well."

The point is that James Agee looked long and deeply into those old eyes, and he had the precise command of his art necessary to set down clearly what he saw and what its meaning was. Moreover, it should be clear from the passage—which is typical of the book—that the kind of poetry with which his novel is infused is quite outside the tradition of what is commonly called the poetic novel.

The poetic tradition which men like Thomas Wolfe brought to the novel is that of free verse, the tradition of Walt Whitman, Carl Sandburg, and others. The effect of this tradition on the novel has been mainly pernicious. The writing it has fostered has mostly been pretentious, vague, and rather self-consciously "beautiful."

There is, of course, another poetic tradition, one in which compression, precision of language, the careful use of symbol, image, and metaphor are the laws of composition. It is to this tradition that *A Death in the Family* belongs. And it is adherence to its laws—with only a few lapses into Wolfianisms—which makes Agee's final work such a splendid one.

A Death in the Family has no plot in the conventional meaning of the term. Joy Follet, a good man, the father of two small children, is killed in an auto accident. The novel covers the period from the night before his death to his burial a few days later. It tells with precision how Follet's family, including his in-laws, behaved in those days. That is all that "happens" in the novel. We are, of course, made privy to the thoughts and feelings of those people, although no stream of consciousness technique is used to reveal them. A good deal of space is also devoted to details of their behavior and to the words they speak. But Agee's was a highly selective eye, which ignored the trivial and the unnecessary. In an age of behavioristic fiction, in which cigarettes are incessantly lighted and drinks endlessly poured for no reason except that that is what people really do, the selection of material by a novelist is almost a revolutionary technique.

Agee's selectivity brilliantly heightens the mood of his work. More than that, along with his painstaking search for *le mot juste*, it results in a kind of literary impressionism of a high order, capturing a reality beyond mere naturalistic realism. As in the best graphic impressionism, there is in Agee's novel agonizing truth and shocks of recognition that are almost physically painful to the viewer. Working with commonplace materi-

als, as the Impressionists did, Agee found great truths, and was able to communicate them while eschewing the banalities of photographic realism.

Unfortunately, Agee did not live long enough to complete final revision of the book. Thus, there are several brilliant chapters, set outside the short time span of the novel's main action, which describe a young and sensitive boy's growing awareness of the world. Agee obviously intended to weave this material more closely into the fabric of the main action. That he did not live to complete this final task is tragic, but the failure to do so does heighten the book's impressionistic quality, and the relation of the father's death to the boy's development (clearly the child is Agee himself) is quite obvious.

In no other sense, however, is *A Death in the Family* an unfinished work. It needs no excuses or apologies. Toward the end of the novel, the boy, Rufus, is listening to an uncle's description of an incident at his father's funeral, which the child was not allowed to witness. "He could see it very clearly, because his uncle saw it so clearly when he told about it, and what he saw made him feel that a special and good thing was happening." The sentence aptly describes the book in which it appears. Agee, too, saw clearly, and because he did, he makes us see clearly new meanings in familiar things. And, *A Death in the Family* is a very special and a very good thing. It is at least one reviewer's nomination for the Pulitzer Prize.

Briefly Noted

It sometimes seems that only European novelists are capable of combining philosophy and adventure in a novel. Americans, when they set out to write an adventure novel, feel that anything faintly resembling real thought will hurt their chance of selling the book to M-G-M. Likewise, they seem to think that anything as physical as adventure intruding in a philosophical novel will prevent it from being reviewed by the little magazines.

The Europeans have been successfully combining the two in their fiction for years. The latest is Romain Gary's *The Roots of Heaven* (Simon and Schuster. 372 pp. $5.95), which is the story of a crusade to save the African elephants from needless slaughter at the hands of white hunters. But, of course, it is more than that. To the half-mad Morel, who leads the crusade, the elephants are symbols of "the margin of humanity" which man must maintain if he is not himself to become extinct. A society, Morel reasons, must take on the burden of such useless things as elephants, or soon concepts like dignity and justice will become extinct because they too will seem materialistically useless. All this sounds a little forbidding, but Gary has drawn a fascinating gallery of characters who join Morel on his crusade, and their adventures are exciting even though they teeter on the brink of absurdity. Happily, they never go over the edge. There have been more successful combinations of adventure and ideas—as in Conrad and Malraux—and Gary is sometimes needlessly repetitious and confusing. But, all in all, *The Roots of Heaven* is a highly rewarding and stimulating novel.

Another stimulating book is Stringfellow Barr's *Purely Academic* (Simon and Schuster. 304 pp. $3.95). Its plot is rather obviously manipulated, but this satire has the virtue—in an age marked by bland novelistic humor—of anger. What upsets Barr are the hypocrisies of the American educational system. He is an insider—having been both a teacher and administrator—and he knows whereof he writes. The result is a book of hilarious scenes, in which nearly every cherished academic fraud is opened to public view. There is, unfortunately, a great deal of truth in Barr's humor, and you'll probably learn a lot from him about why our colleges are turning out a generation of barely literate B.A.'s. Of course, the real trouble in the Groves of Academe is a result of something much more deeply imbedded in our society than fatheaded college presidents, hack teachers, and idiot college trustees. But the colleges are a pretty fair microcosm of our society, so maybe you'll learn something about the big picture from a study of Barr's Liliput. That, however, requires some reading between the lines.

A first novel by Roderick MacLeish, *A Time of Fear* (Viking. 253 pp. $3.50) doesn't waste a bit of time on ideas. It is all about kicking and gouging (physical as well as verbal) in a suburb which is threatened by unscrupulous real-estate agents who are attempting to put up one of those hideous low-income "developments." They introduce into a previously pleasant block a particularly repulsive family in an attempt to drive property values down, and they are not above some even more unsavory techniques. In the end, virtue—of a particularly bourgeois sort—triumphs. The whole story is related in simple declarative sentences and there is a smattering of sex mixed in just the right proportion to the violence. In short, this is a pretty typical example of standard American entertainment fiction, vintage 1958. At that, it is probably an improvement over Lew Wallace.

Another example of the average fare being served up these days is Arthur T. Hadley's *The Joy Wagon* (Viking. 223 pp. $3.50). His novel is about an electronic calculator who runs for President sometime in the

WILLIAM O.
Douglas
speaks his mind on THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE



– *to confine the military to strictly military tasks*
– *to be let alone*
– *to express themselves freely even when challenging basic American institutions*

The new book by Justice Douglas is a major statement on one of the most pressing problems facing America today. *$4.00*

DOUBLEDAY

PENDLE HILL • A Quaker resident center for religious and social study • publishers of Pendle Hill pamphlets • institutes, seminars, conferences • study, worship, work, recreation • a place for 'withdrawal and return.' • 1958 summer term 3 July 31 • write for catalog • *WALLINGFORD, PENNA.*

EUROPE

Summer 1958—9 Weeks

We'll see the usual, plus North Africa, Yugoslavia, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Berlin, Sweden, and Denmark. A low-priced, different kind of trip for the young in spirit who don't want to be herded around. Write to:

EUROPE SUMMER TOURS

255 Sequoia (Box P) Pasadena, Calif.

Best Book Contest

$1600 Cash Awards plus 40% royalty. All types of manuscripts invited. For Contest rules and details of famous publishing plan, write for Brochure PR.
PAGEANT PRESS, 101 Fifth Ave., N.Y. 3

HUMANISM

Is a man centered religion? The California Courts have ruled you can have a religion without having it connected with the mysticism of past ages. Those who want to learn more about the scientific Religion of Humanism with its objective approach, may subscribe to the **Humanist World Digest @ $1 a year. Address: 1011 Heinz Ave., Berkeley 10, Calif.**

BOOK MANUSCRIPTS CONSIDERED

by cooperative publisher who offers authors early publication, higher royalty, national distribution, and beautifully designed books. All subjects welcomed. Write, or send your MS directly.

GREENWICH BOOK PUBLISHERS, INC.
Atten. MR. KRESS 489 FIFTH AVE.
NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

Pacific New England Co. Inc.

TO UNITE THROUGH TRADE AND TRAVEL, COMMERCE AND CULTURE

P. O. BOX 1152 STUDIO CITY, CALIF.

Buy little gifts here. Free catalog.

future. This calculator, see, figures out scientifically all the things a guy should say and do if he wants to get elected. His (Its?) speeches are pure Eisenhower, and so are his ideas, except they are ten times more banal. He (It?) very nearly gets elected. Obviously Hadley hoped, through his gimmick, to make some telling comments on American politics. He didn't —mostly because the telling comments he put on paper have all been made before by people like Mr. Dooley.

Finally, although you are probably sick of hearing it by this time, let it be stated once more, for the record, that James Jones' new book, *Some Came Running* (Scribner's. 1266 pp. $7.50), is an impossibly bad novel. Jones has a tin ear and an even tinnier philosophy. Writing and ideas are of about the level you'd expect to find in a high school literary magazine, except that the faculty adviser would blessedly blue pencil the sexy stuff. One can only stand in awe of the monumental ignorance that went into the writing of this book.

U.N. Balance Sheets

THE UNITED NATIONS AND PROMOTION OF THE GENERAL WELFARE, by Robert E. Asher and associates. The Brookings Institution. 1216 pp. $8.75.

STRENGTHENING THE UNITED NATIONS, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE, Arthur N. Holcombe, Chairman. Harper. 276 pp. $4.

Reviewed by

David C. Williams

THE United Nations, like Mount Everest, has the quality of being there. Some statesmen may belittle it, some nations may bypass it, but it has already, in a single decade, acquired more reality and even personality than the League of Nations did in two.

Solid reasons why the United Nations has become much more than a talking shop may be found in its record in economic and social affairs, human rights, and the advancement of dependent peoples, exhaustively reviewed in *The United Nations and the Promotion of the General Welfare*, the aptly-titled third volume of a series of Brookings reports on the work and problems of the new international organization.

Under the editorship of Robert E. Asher, former special assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, a distinguished panel of contributors, including Walter M. Kotschnig, William Adams Brown, Jr., James Frederick Green, and Emil J. Sady, have subjected the United Nations record in the field of general welfare to a critical but friendly appraisal. The authors illumine the enormous printed record of Lake Success and Turtle Bay with their own wide experience in the practical functioning of the United Nations and its associated agencies. Here is how Asher summarizes their findings:

"The record of the United Nations system in harmonizing conflicts of view among member governments, achieving the specialization necessary for effective international action, and contributing to economic and social progress, leaves much to be desired. Nevertheless, given the extraordinary complexity of the issues, the brief period during which economic and social problems have shared the limelight with political and military problems, and the paralyzing effect—during much of that period—of strife between the free world and the Communist world, the sum total of concrete achievements during the first postwar decade should afford a basis for qualified optimism about the future."

One reason for optimism about the future of the United Nations is the manner in which its Charter, like our own Constitution, has shown it-

THE REVIEWERS

MARTIN S. DWORKIN is a film critic who reviews regularly for The Progressive; he is teaching a special course on films at Teacher's College, Columbia. FRANCIS M. WILHOIT, a native North Carolinian who teaches government at the University of Miami, is completing a doctoral thesis for Harvard on "The Politics of Desegregation in Georgia." CHARLES H. STODDARD is a forestry research associate for the organization Resources for the Future. He has just completed a book on forestry which Ronald Press will publish. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT is a professor at the University of Texas Law School. RICHARD SCHICKEL is a reporter for Look magazine; his articles and reviews have appeared in The Reporter and The Progressive. DAVID C. WILLIAMS is editor of ADA World.

self to be a living document, capable of evolving to meet new problems and needs. The Security Council seems on the way to joining our own electoral college in limbo, while the General Assembly has embarked upon so lively a career that it is the theatre of competing blocs, just as our own system of government is powered by political parties not provided for by the Founding Fathers.

While reiterating the need for a Charter Review Conference, the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, research affiliate of the American Association for the United Nations, devotes its tenth report, *Strengthening the United Nations,* largely to suggesting ways in which the United Nations can evolve under its present Charter. The Commission's distinguished chairman, Professor Arthur N. Holcombe, declares:

"We think that a Charter Review Conference might be helpful, though much can be done to strengthen the United Nations by the General Assembly without such a Conference. Even more could be done by the governments of the leading member states, if they could be persuaded to work more resolutely through the United Nations."

By providential timing, the Commission launched its report, recommending that the United Nations assume jurisdiction over outer space, just after the Russians launched Sputnik. (A preliminary draft had apparently anticipated an American satellite, but the adjective was fortunately blue-pencilled.) While ensuring wide public attention for the report, this coincidence may have had the effect of overshadowing its other recommendations, notably the acquisition and administration of other unoccupied territory, such as the high seas and Antarctica. While we cannot yet say whether the Martians will turn out to be borrowers or investors, we can reasonably assume that these more mundane reaches will be tapped as the world exhausts more accessible resources. Taken by the United Nations now, they might in the future relieve it of some of its present need to pass the hat among the member states to finance such activities as technical and economic assistance to underdeveloped countries—for the expansion of which the commission calls for the establishment of a United Nations Development Agency as the equivalent of the long-debated Special U.N. Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED).

I could wish myself that the Commission had given more attention to the re-activation of the Peace Observation Commission. Had this Commission been in position to send observers to Budapest in immediate response to Premier Nagy's desperate plea, it is just conceivable that Soviet policy—which apparently wavered during the days that Hungary's freedom hung in balance—might have taken a milder turn. The Commission does, however, have cogent recommendations for strengthening the United Nations to fulfill its central purpose of preserving the peace—recommendations which, if carried out, should reduce the temptation to by-pass it.

TO AUTHORS
seeking a publisher

If you are looking for a publisher, send for our free illustrated booklet, titled **To the Author in Search of a Publisher.** It tells how we can publish, promote and distribute your book, as we have done for hundreds of other writers. All subjects considered. New authors welcomed. Write today for Booklet PR. It's free.

VANTAGE PRESS 120 W. 31 St., New York 1
In Calif., 6253 Hollywood Blvd., Hollywood 28
In Washington, D.C., 1010 Vermont Ave., N.W.

CLASSIFIED

BOOKS

FALL OUT—Radiation Hazards from Nuclear Explosions, by nine British scientists. Intro. by Bertrand Russell. Timely, important, fact-filled handbook. 159 pp. Cloth, $2.75. Wellington's, Dept. 4, 346 Concord, Belmont 78, Mass.

PROFESSIONAL librarian-bookseller offers best available out-of-print book service. Free searching, reasonable prices. Preston E. Amos, 2838 N. 7th St., Milwaukee 6, Wis.

MAY I find the book you want? Free search service. Marcia Haskells, 122 S. 3rd Ave., Mount Vernon, N. Y.

FOR SALE

IRISH TWEEDS. "Bawneen." Bleeding Madras. Imported tartans. "Aran" sweaters, jackets. Unscoured knitting yarn. Carol Brown, Dept. PR, Putney, Vt.

TREE RIPENED CITRUS FRUIT organically grown, not washed, gassed, or sprayed $3.50 bushel plus express. Add $1.75 4½ lbs. Florida Honey, postage extra if mailed, also Dried Fruits & Nuts. ORGANIC ACRES, Box 37, Seffner, Fla.

THERE'LL NEVER BE ANOTHER contemporary community like Greenbelt Knoll in Philadelphia (winner of awards from AIA and City of Philadelphia) —AND **there'll never be another value** like the 2150 foot, air conditioned, 3 bedroom, 1½ bath house sadly being left after only one year by engineer transferred to Ohio. 4½% mortgage—little cash. Phone BAring 2-1100 or evenings MErcury 9-1934, or write Box GK, c/o The Progressive.

OPPORTUNITIES

WANTED: Intelligent, perceptive high school and college students and teachers with taste for good writing, clear thinking, to read The Progressive. Only 50 cents per semester per student in orders of ten or more to one address. School Dept., The Progressive, Madison, Wis.

PUBLICATIONS

IN a disintegrating world, "Balanced Living" writers discuss how they, and others, learn to live life whole. Sample 25 cents. School of Living, Brookville, Ohio.

"SEXUAL SYMBOLISM and the 1957 Car," by S. I. Hayakawa. "The Significance of Being Unique," by Earl C. Kelley. "Aspects of African Sculpture," by Ladislas Segy. Read the current issue of ETC: A REVIEW OF GENERAL SEMANTICS. $4 a year, trial issue $1. Write Dept. 11, 400 West North Ave., Chicago 10, Ill.

THE LIBERAL. If you are a Freethinker, Rationalist or Agnostic, you will want to read this monthly magazine. 24 pages cram full of information that you will never see in the daily press. Book list, reviews, etc. $1 a year. Sample copy upon request. Friendship Liberal League, Inc., Box P, 5526 Westford Rd., Philadelphia 20, Pa.

STAMPS

MAJOR PREMISE: All intelligent stamp collectors read The Progressive. MINOR PREMISE: Intelligent stamp collectors appreciate low cost, high value Stamp approvals. CONCLUSION: All intelligent stamp collectors will write immediately to PHOENIX, 69 Exchange St., Pawtucket, R. I. Q.E.D.

SPORTING GOODS

SEND 10c for list either shotguns, handguns, rifles, ammunition, or send 25c for all lists. Frayseth's, P.O. Box 308, Willmar, Minnesota.

TOYS

FOR YOUR searching mind & your loving heart, ponder our winding catalog . . . in the old, familiar, rambling, random edition, where great minds & children's toys speak side by side. (Monsieur comrade, c'est la guerre? Mais, non! Mais, non! C'est l'amour! Vive l'amour—toujours!) For your free copy, send name & address today. In the meantime, Merry Springtime! Pacific New England Co., Inc., Box 1152, Studio City, Calif.

Provocative...*outstanding*...

ANY 3 FOR ONLY $3.95



Book Find Club selections...ALL under discussion

The books pictured here are representative of the selections regularly offered to members of BOOK FIND CLUB at savings up to 50%. These are among the most stimulating and informative books by the outstanding writers of today. They are intended for people who want to keep informed of the most significant ideas, discoveries and adventures in every important area of human experience.

Membership is both easy and rewarding. Each month you receive *free* our literary magazine, *The Book Find News*, which contains an authoritative review of the forthcoming selection. If you like it, you need do nothing, it will arrive automatically; if not, you simply return a form saying, "Send me nothing." Or—you may choose from a list of over 100 current books, all available at special membership savings. And—under the *Book Find Club Bonus Plan*, you receive one *free* book for each four selections purchased.

Begin your membership now by accepting any 3 of these important books—all 3 for $3.95.

AMERICA AS A CIVILIZATION. *By Max Lerner.* A brilliant insight into the workings of America. An examination of the automatic factory, public relations, steady dating, the split-level home, and many more aspects of the growing pains of a nation. **Pub. at $10.00.**

ALBERT CAMUS: The Invincible Summer. *By Albert Maquet.* No writer has become a classic more quickly than Nobel Prize winner Albert Camus. Here is the first full-length study in English of all Camus's novels, stories, plays and essays supplemented by a complete bibliography. **Pub. at $3.75.**

THE SANDBURG RANGE. *By Carl Sandburg. 496 pages, 16 pages of photographs, portraits and caricatures, 6½" x 9¼".* A single volume that presents every aspect of a notable literary career, including Sandburg as poet, biographer, historian, novelist and storyteller for children. **Pub. at $6.00.**

ATTORNEY FOR THE DAMNED. *A portrait of Clarence Darrow in his own words, edited by Arthur Weinberg.* The most famous courtroom addresses from one of America's greatest lawyers and humanitarians, brought together for the first time. **Pub. at $6.50.**

A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN MORALS. *By W. E. H. Lecky.* A brilliant study of the origins and development of Western moral beliefs and conduct. **Pub. at $5.00.**

THE YOKE AND THE ARROWS. *By Herbert L. Matthews.* An exciting report on Spain, her political and cultural situation, by the well known New York Times correspondent. **Pub. at $3.75.**

MYTH AND GUILT. *By Theodor Reik.* A foremost psychoanalyst explores the crime and punishment of mankind and probes human guilt-feelings. **Pub. at $5.75.**

THE POWER ELITE. *By C. Wright Mills.* A thoughtful, carefully documented scrutiny of the new "top-drawer" ruling class of America . . . the men and women now at the pinnacles of fame and power and fortune. **Pub. at $6.00.**

TOMORROW AND TOMORROW AND TOMORROW. *By Aldous Huxley.* Huxley at his most varied, startling and readable best, his unrivalled erudition and intellectual virtuosity touching on a great range of human knowledge. **Pub. at $4.00.**

THE AMERICAN PAST. *By Roger Butterfield.* The ultimate in picture histories, a panorama in pictures and words of the entire history of the United States, newly revised and updated with additional text and plates. **Pub. at $4.95**

THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN COMMUNISM. *By Theodore Draper.* A sober, responsible, professional history of the origins of the American Communist party, with impressive documentation and dispassionate analysis. **Pub. at $6.75.**

THE PROGRESSIVE
Madison 3, Wis.

Please enroll me as a member and send me, for only $3.95 plus 24¢ postage and handling, the 3 books I have chosen. I am to receive free the monthly *Book Find News*. I agree to purchase at least 4 additional books during my first year of membership, and I am to receive a *free Bonus Book* for each 4 purchases. I may cancel my membership without obligation at any time after accepting 4 selections.

- ☐ America as a Civilization
- ☐ Albert Camus
- ☐ The Sandburg Range
- ☐ Attorney for the Damned
- ☐ The American Past
- ☐ Tomorrow and Tomorrow and Tomorrow
- ☐ Myth and Guilt
- ☐ The Power Elite
- ☐ The Yoke and the Arrows
- ☐ A History of European Morals
- ☐ Roots of American Communism

Name _____
Please Print

Address _____

City _____ Zone ____ State _____

(Same price in Canada: 105 Bond St., Toronto 2, Canada)

PRO-38-B

MAIL THIS COUPON TODAY!